Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

44. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, June 4, 1985

SUBJECT

• Interim Restraint

I know that you have already heard much more than you want to on this topic, but I would like to make a few observations before you give your final advice to the President. I have given long thought to the impact of the decision on the Alliance, on the Soviet reaction, and on our own public posture here. With these factors in mind, I strongly favor Option B, while feeling that Option C is second best and Options D and E would cause major problems both in the Alliance and eventually with our own public.

I believe the basic fact that we must bear in mind for the future is that the Soviets have far more capacity to break out of the numerical limits than we do. To argue that they have no military need to do so and therefore will not represents a total misreading of Soviet psychology: they will in fact be determined to do so just to make a political point, if they can blame the break-out on us. And I believe both European publics and eventually our own will blame us for discarding these restraints if we adopt Options D or E. This could cause serious disruption in the Alliance and much greater pressure on SDI. (Take a look at the chart in this week’s U.S. News & World Report—Tab I²—to get an idea of how the press, even some friendly to us, is likely to portray the issue.)

I understand the argument that there is not much we can put into a supplemental or a beefed up FY87 defense budget. But this argument defies logic: either the cuts forced on us in the 86 budget are meaningless, or else there is something more that can usefully be done. What that is need not be defined right now.

My problem with Option C is that it will be undermining a very precise agreed procedure which, since it is easily verifiable, is in our interest. We should have no illusion that the Soviets will accommodate us to send persons to look down the tubes, or that they will refrain from fudging on other dismantlement procedures, using this as a justification, if it suits them. And the option is likely to have this effect without the advantage of a clear military justification, in the sense that what is gained seems to be marginal at best in military terms, and could actually divert funds from more effective uses. Nevertheless, this option is clearly more easy to manage politically than D and E.

Finally, regarding communicating the decision to the Soviets, I would recommend a letter from the President to Gorbachev if Option A or B is chosen, making the point that it was a difficult decision in view of Soviet performance, but was made in order to encourage progress in arms reduction negotiations and in the hope that it would facilitate resolution of compliance issues. If any other option is chosen, I would recommend communicating it to the Soviets by diplomatic note, and thus avoid personalizing the issue.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological Files, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1985. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Sent through Poindexter, who did not initial the memorandum. McFarlane wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “I agree. M.”
2. Not attached. A copy of Robert S. Dudney, “New Soviet Arms Buildup: How Big a Threat,” U.S. News and World Report, June 10, 1985, pp. 37–38, is attached to another copy of Matlock’s June 4 memorandum to McFarlane that is ibid.