Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

285. Briefing Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) and the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 26, 1988

SUBJECT

• Next Steps on Resolving Krasnoyarsk

Last week you discussed with Mr. Shevardnadze² a number of potential ways to correct the Krasnoyarsk violation:

— dismantling the radar and perhaps building a space facility on the site;

— dismantling the radar in the context of a settlement on D&S; and

— dismantling the radar with a statement expressing satisfaction with (but not commitment to) the ABM Treaty.

With a settlement on D&S not in sight, the most plausible solution would be for them to dismantle the radar and salvage some of their investment for other uses, accompanied by a joint statement on the ABM Treaty.

At the end of the exchange with Shevardnadze, you expressed willingness to pursue a solution along these lines, and Shevardnadze agreed. He went on to suggest that experts take inventory of the equipment and structures at Krasnoyarsk. Elements incompatible with the Treaty would be dismantled; elements not incompatible would stay in place.

The purpose of this memo is to suggest a way to follow up on this discussion by nailing down an agreement between you and Shevardnadze on the dismantlement of the radar. Such an agreement could guide the work of experts to conclude a more detailed agreement on precisely what would be dismantled to correct the violation.

Two criteria are particularly pertinent to the resolution of Krasnoyarsk. The first is that the early warning capability at Krasnoyarsk must be eliminated. The second is that the lead time for the construction of an early warning or ABM radar should be restored to that period which was envisioned when the Treaty was negotiated.

These are the criteria that should be used to assess Shevardnadze’s suggestion that an inventory of the equipment and structures at Krasnoyarsk be taken to see what elements are incompatible with the Treaty. In the U.S. view, the following need to be destroyed:

— the transmitter antenna

— the building on which the transmitter antenna is mounted

— the receiver antenna

— the building on which the receiver antenna is mounted.

Other elements of the radar site, such as the power supply and various support structures, might be allowed to remain, consistent with our two criteria. This would be a subject for discussion by the experts.

We recommend that you find an opportunity to return to this subject with Shevardnadze in New York along the following lines:

— Last week we held constructive discussions on many issues which face our two nations.

— The discussion of the Krasnoyarsk radar was particularly useful, but inconclusive. Perhaps this can be resolved.

— The solution we discussed would have three elements:

○ Dismantle the large phased-array radar at that location.

○ If something useful can be done at that site once this is done, so be it.

○ Such an agreement to dismantle the radar could be accompanied by a statement expressing satisfaction with the ABM Treaty.

— You expressed overall agreement to such an approach, and made a suggestion—that experts take an inventory of the equipment and structure to see what elements are incompatible with the Treaty. These would need to be dismantled. What is not incompatible could be used for other purposes.

— This is a constructive suggestion, and can be pursued.

— Our view is that the dismantling should eliminate an early warning capability at that site; any early warning capability at that location is incompatible with the Treaty. The dismantling should also be such that the time to construct a capability at Krasnoyarsk not allowed by the Treaty not be shortened below that contemplated in 1972 by whatever remains at the site.

○ Mutual recognition in 1972 that large radars were the long lead time items in an ABM deployment. This was the motivation for the radar constraints in the Treaty.

— The following would need to be dismantled:

○ The transmitter antenna

○ The building on which the transmitter antenna is mounted

○ The receiver antenna

○ The building on which the receiver antenna is mounted.

— If you agree with these points, then we could follow your suggestion that a team of experts from both sides could meet to discuss the details of what elements of the Krasnoyarsk radar must be dismantled to satisfy U.S. concerns that I have outlined.

If Shevardnadze can agree to this, in the first instance our experts can be Burns and Castillo. (Castillo is in fact quite knowledgeable on radars). With appropriate guidance from you and Shevardnadze, perhaps they could now succeed where they were unable to do so last week.

For your information, the paragraph in the ABM Treaty relevant to the Krasnoyarsk violation is Article VI(b), which reads as follows:

“(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.”

You will note that this language makes no reference to large phased-array radars. All radars for early warning constructed since 1972 have been LPARs, but some dish radars also have such capabilities.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 NODIS and EXDIS Memorandums, Lot 94D433, 1988 NODIS and EXDIS Memorandums: September 16–30, 1988. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates Shultz saw it.
2. See Documents 283 and 284.