Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

286. Memorandum for the Record¹

New York, September 27, 1988

SUBJECT

• Burns-Karpov Conversation, 27 September 1988

1. MGen William F. Burns, Director, ACDA, and Ambassador Victor Karpov met for breakfast at Karpov’s request at the Pierre Hotel, New York City, from 0900–1030 on 27 September 1988.

2. After a few minutes of general conversation, Burns asked Karpov if the Soviet side had considered the positions of the sides on the Krasnoyarsk radar issue since the Ministerial. Karpov said it had and asked Burns if the U.S. had considered the Soviet proposals, particularly the use of Krasnoyarsk as an international space scientific center. Burns responded that the U.S. was primarily interested in eliminating the radars at Krasnoyarsk as a violation of the ABM Treaty; what the installation could be used for after such correction is a matter for the Soviet Government to decide. Burns cited concern that no progress had been made at the Ministerial in Washington and indicated that time was passing.

3. Karpov asked if the U.S. were interested in the Soviet proposal to dismantle only the transmission antenna. Burns replied that he had only considered destruction of both the transmitting and receiving antennas. Karpov responded that Soviet experts see the transmitter as the key. The radar at Krasnoyarsk is useless without it. Burns asked, why, then, keep the receiver? Karpov said that it could be used for space research. He stated that he did not know the technical details, but Soviet experts believe that a non-LPAR transmitter could be used with the LPAR receiver for limited, space-oriented research. Burns suggested that an LPAR was the wrong type of radar for space research.

4. Karpov argued that the Soviets wanted to keep as much of the facility as possible because of sunk costs—“perhaps as much as a billion rubles”—in the facility. There was considerable opposition in the Soviet Union to any kind of dismantlement. Karpov readily acknowledged that the decision was made to build the radar under Brezhnev; now, the present Soviet leadership was willing to provide whatever assurances are needed that the installation will have no ABM function, but at the same time the leadership wants to recoup as much from the site as possible.

5. Burns responded that the U.S. side needs to understand exactly what the Soviet side is proposing with regard to dismantlement. U.S. technical experts see destruction of both radar buildings as the only certain solution to the problem.

6. Karpov stated that the Soviet side has been giving some thought to the problem. Soviet technical experts have come up with a proposal that would eliminate the antenna face of the transmitting radar building. In their view, this would preclude the use of the facility in an ABM mode. Burns was skeptical of this approach; how could one ensure that the transmitting radar components could not be installed again in short order? As a rule of thumb, reconstruction of the facility to perform in an ABM mode should take at least as long as it would take to build such a facility at Krasnoyarsk from scratch. In any event, there are technical problems associated with such a judgement as well as problems with the use of the receiving antenna. Again, U.S. experts were doubtful that such a solution as suggested by Karpov, was feasible.

7. Karpov suggested that the two sides could reach agreement that the “radar at Krasnoyarsk would be dismantled.” This should resolve the U.S. concerns about possible violation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet side would also include destruction of the radar parts at Gomel in the bargain. Then, the sides could meet, soon if that is what the U.S. preferred, in technical discussions to determine the best way to dismantle the capability.

8. Burns answered that he believed that the U.S. side would need a much more substantial commitment to what is meant by the Soviet side in an agreement to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar. He argued that the only sure method was to destroy the buildings housing the transmitting and receiving antennas. While he will report the results of this conversation to Washington, he needed assurances that what he just said would be reported to Moscow. In Burns’ view, it is extremely important that Moscow understand the seriousness of the present situation with regard to Krasnoyarsk. Karpov indicated that he would so report. Karpov also stated that he would like to get an authoritative statement from Washington on the Soviet proposal (para 7). Could Burns meet with him again before he returns to Moscow on Sunday (2 October)? Burns responded that he did not know. He would not return to Washington himself until the weekend, but he assured Karpov that he would report this conversation immediately. Karpov asked if Burns thought that the U.S. would reply by Friday. Could he speculate whether or not he thought the U.S. might be interested? Burns replied that he doubted U.S. interest in the proposal as Karpov stated it since it did not meet essential U.S. conditions. Neither could he speculate on the technical aspects of the Soviet dismantlement proposal. At this point, conversation turned to non-substantive matters.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Files, SECDEF Carlucci’s Library, Subject—1988: Countries—USSR. Secret. Drafted on October 4 by Burns. Copies were sent to Shultz, Carlucci, Crowe, Webster, Powell, Linhard, Timbie, and David Fite, Manfred Eimer, James McNally, and Richard Toye (all in ACDA). A stamped notation indicates Carlucci saw the memorandum on October 5.