Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

283. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 22, 1988, 3:30–6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s Meeting with Shevardnadze—Second Small Group Meeting: Arms Control Issues

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
  • Colin Powell, National Security Advisor to the President
  • Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor on Arms Control Matters
  • Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)
  • Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
  • Alexander R. Vershbow, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs (notetaker)
  • John M. Evans, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs (notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

• USSR

  • Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Viktor P. Karpov, Directorate Head, Soviet MFA
  • Sergey Tarasenko, MFA
  • Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
  • Yevgeniy Gusarov, MFA (notetaker)
  • Pavel Palazhchenko, USA & Canada Department, Soviet MFA (interpreter)

DEFENSE AND SPACE/ABM TREATY

The Secretary suggested that they begin with strategic arms and invited Shevardnadze to open the discussion. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said there was reason for some satisfaction about the results achieved to date. We not only had completed the INF Treaty but also other useful agreements. Moreover, despite our great differences in START, positive assets were increasing gradually. It would be desirable to make the process more dynamic, but he understood the objective reasons why this was not possible.

Shevardnadze said that the President and Gorbachev had both said many times that it was necessary to use to the maximum the existing opportunities, to make good use of the experience we had gained. The question was what we needed to do to conclude our interaction with real progress. He wanted to begin with the most difficult problems where the prospects were not very bright. He had in mind the situation with regard to the ABM Treaty. Time had shown that the road we mapped together in searching for an agreement on the ABM Treaty was the only possible basis for agreement. This was what the joint statements of the Washington and Moscow Summits made clear. In the future we needed to stick to the same course: the provisions and the language agreed upon in Washington. One of the most important fundamental issues was the relationship between adherence to the ABM Treaty and START. He wanted to reemphasize the Soviet Union’s fundamental approach.

Regarding the specific problems that had emerged, Shevardnadze said he wanted to begin with the problem of sensors. The Soviets had considered very carefully this question and all aspects of the U.S. proposal. They had concluded that unlimited permission of sensors in space would seriously undermine the ABM Treaty. It would not be consistent with our objectives. At the same time the Soviets could agree to discuss the problem in hopes of finding a mutually acceptable agreement. The Soviets proposed that this question be considered in the context of Soviets suggestions that had been made earlier with respect to reaching an agreement on a list of devices that would be permitted in space. At the outset the sides would have to agree that the launching of space based sensors would be conducted under conditions of verification with inspections. On this basis the Soviets would be prepared to continue the dialogue in the working group and in the negotiations in Geneva.

The next question, Shevardnadze continued, concerned the sides’ mutual concerns with respect to the ABM treaty. Our two leaders had discussed this question thoroughly. It was very important not to permit our differences to result in an undermining of everything we had achieved through mutual efforts. The U.S., Shevardnadze said, was aware of the most recent proposals by General Secretary Gorbachev at Krasnoyarsk. The U.S. was also aware of the Soviet side’s other suggestions regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar. The Soviets were very sincere in trying to set aside everything that stands in the way of solving this problem. Soviet proposals called for creating on the basis of that radar a center for international cooperation for peaceful space research.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to tell the Secretary frankly that the Soviets had not wanted to make a public statement and would have preferred to address this issue at the working level in private confidential discussions. They had made it public, however, because of certain propagandistic steps by the U.S. with respect to Krasnoyarsk by the Administration (an “uproar of accusations” against the Soviet Union alleging violations and, indeed, statements that Krasnoyarsk was almost a material breach of the Treaty). Because of these statements the Soviet side had to react publicly. Shevardnadze explained that the space center would be included in the system of a world space organization and that it would be possible for many countries to participate in its research efforts. The Soviets were ready for experts from the U.S. and the USSR to lead the way in the process of practically implementing this decision. This would imply visits to Krasnoyarsk and joint work to look at the equipment there.

Shevardnadze added that another Soviet proposal was still on the table. If the sides were able to agree on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty the Soviets would dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar. This, however, would be a pity because the radar provided a good basis for joint use for peaceful purposes. But he repeated that the old proposal was still in effect. It would be helpful if the U.S. side were to consider Soviet proposals and respond in kind. He had in mind Soviet concerns about the U.S. radar in Greenland as well as the rocket probe launch facility at Shemya Island. He urged that the U.S. let Soviet experts visit these facilities. While he was no expert, Shevardnadze said Soviet specialists were certain that these were clear violations of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets had permitted members of the U.S. Congress and scientists to visit Krasnoyarsk, so it was quite logical to expect the U.S. side to respond similarly with visits to its facilities.

Secretary Shultz replied by saying he was sorry the Soviet delegation had responded negatively to the U.S. sensors proposal. He noted Shevardnadze’s expression of readiness to continue the discussion on this proposal, however, and said the U.S. intended to pursue it further. In the U.S. view, it was impossible to distinguish between the functions of sensors of different kinds. It would lend itself to serious disputes if we tried to differentiate. This was why we thought our proposal would be helpful and fit the situation well. As we had looked at the situation in the defense and space talks it seemed to us that the length of the non-withdrawal period, based on discussions between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev, should fall into place without difficulty. The U.S. also felt that the question of what happens after the period of non-withdrawal had been settled at the Washington Summit by Gorbachev’s statement (he had said that, at the end of the period, each side would be free to decide its course, while in the meantime the ABM Treaty would remain in effect). In Geneva, however, disagreement had broken out on this question.

The most difficult question, the Secretary continued, continued to be what would occur during the non-withdrawal period. The sensors proposal was an attempt to address that along with our proposed confidence-building measures. Much good work had been done with respect to the predictability protocol, and we should instruct our negotiators to get that portion of our work completed. Many things already had been agreed, such as data exchange and observation of tests. We did not think mandatory on-site inspection would work, however—we had sensitive facilities and so did the Soviets. But there was a lot of good material in the Protocol and we should get it done to pass along to the next group.

The Krasnoyarsk radar, the Secretary said, was a very troublesome issue. There was a wide bipartisan consensus that the radar, because of its location and orientation, was a violation of the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze had said this issue had the potential to be a major disruptive force, and he believed the Minister was right. Shevardnadze interjected that he had not said that. The Secretary rejoined that, in that case, he would say it! We had to consider what we would do in the absence of any agreement on this issue. We had studied the General Secretary’s letter² and would like to raise some questions about his proposal.

The problem with the Krasnoyarsk radar, the Secretary said, was that it is one of the critical items identified in the ABM Treaty as representing a long lead-time item for a territorial ABM defense. The ban on LPARs except on the periphery was a sort of insurance policy against ABM breakout. The existence of the radar was the problem. It might be used for other purposes, but it could easily be reconverted to an LPAR. Thus, knowing the origins of the LPAR limits, we had to ask what Gorbachev had in mind:

— Was he proposing to dismantle the radar and establish a space science center in its place? If so, we might “dig into that one.” We didn’t see the location as ideal for such research, but if that was the proposal we could look at it.

— Another variation was that Gorbachev meant the radar would be completed, with additional parts added for space research purposes. For reasons he had already explained, the Secretary said, that would not do the job.

We needed to know whether the plan was to dismantle the radar and put something else useful there, or whether it was something else. The Secretary added that the U.S. had no problem with salvaging equipment from Krasnoyarsk and recovering it for other uses.

There was also a major problem, Secretary Shultz continued, with Soviet activities at Gomel. The movement of radars from a test range to another site was, in itself, a violation. We did visit the site, and the Soviets had explained their plans; now those plans were being carried out. Ambassador Karpov had spoken about a “radical solution” to Gomel during the ABM Treaty review, and we would like to know what was meant by this.

With respect to Thule and Fylingdales, the Secretary said, these radars had been grandfathered under the ABM Treaty. We did not regard them as in any way parallel to Krasnoyarsk.

Shevardnadze asked whether the radar in Greenland was a phased-array type. The Secretary said he could not give a description. General Powell intervened to say that this question was irrelevant. The point was that the radar was at a site in existence at the time the ABM Treaty was signed; the Treaty allowed such radars to remain and modernization was permitted under the Treaty.

Shevardnadze asked whether, if it was an LPAR and was outside national territory, it was not a violation. The Secretary replied that it was not a violation as long as the Treaty grandfathered such radars. Shevardnadze said he agreed that modernization was permitted, but using the site for an ABM radar was a violation, in the Soviet view. Karpov added that, after signing the ABM Treaty, the sides were barred from building outside their national territory phased-array radars with a potential greater than 3 million.

Shevardnadze suggested that the U.S. let the Soviet side visit Thule. If there were no violation, the Soviets would take the issue off the agenda. The Secretary replied that “what you see is not as important as what we say.” The radar was there before the Treaty was signed and could be modernized. If the Soviets visited, they would see that it was being modernized. The same thing occurred with the U.S. visit to Krasnoyarsk: the Congressmen took photos; the visit confirmed what we already knew: that an LPAR was being built at that location.

Shevardnadze asked the Secretary to imagine the Soviet side had violated the ABM Treaty with the Krasnoyarsk radar. Then, after the two countries had agreed in Washington and Moscow that the ABM Treaty would be observed for a specified period of time, the Soviets put forward a proposal: if that issue was settled, the Soviets would dismantle the radar. This seemed to solve the problem. And now, the Soviets were offering a further step: to transfer the radar to the use of Soviet, U.S., Indian, Japanese and other scientists. If these scientists found elements that confirmed the radar was a violation, those elements would be removed and the building used for scientific purposes. Shevardnadze added that the Soviets could present this case to any audience and it would agree the U.S. position was indefensible. Why destroy the radar if it could be used for science?

The Secretary replied that there was a reason why not: Under the ABM Treaty regime, there were provisions aimed at making it difficult to break out of the Treaty. The chief one was the prohibition on battle management radars inside national boundaries and pointed inwards. Since it took a long time to build such radars, we could see them coming. That was the theory underlying the Treaty and that was why we regard Krasnoyarsk as a serious problem. It was not just a technical violation without real meaning; it had a lot of meaning.

Shevardnadze asked what would be so bad about making the radar into a laboratory for the use of world science or a world space organization, a place for peaceful research, for tracking space objects, to be used collectively not only by Soviet scientists? If there were certain elements of the radar that are inconsistent with the ABM Treaty, these could be removed. If not inconsistent, then all other devices and instruments could be used for peaceful purposes. This was a very noble idea and a reasonable solution, taking care of both the political problem and the interests of scientists. Shevardnadze asked the Secretary to please think again about the proposal, as it opened up an interesting prospect. As for the Greenland and UK radars, the Soviets believed they could seriously and earnestly say that these were violations of the ABM Treaty. If LPARs were there, they were violations. If no LPARs were there, then let the Soviets visit to confirm that there were no grounds for complaint.

Karpov said that when the Secretary spoke of modernization, one had to note that there were five radars at Thule and Fylingdales when the ABM Treaty was signed, but not one of them was a phased-array radar. Now LPARs with a potential much greater than 3 million were being built. These could have been built legally in Connecticut or Washington, but they should not have been built at Thule or Fylingdales.

Shevardnadze noted that Gorbachev had not conditioned his proposal on the U.S. doing the same thing to its disputed radars as Gorbachev had proposed to do with Krasnoyarsk. Secretary Shultz replied that he had noticed this. We contend that no matter what exists at Thule and Fylingdales, these were permitted, modernized radars. When it came to using Krasnoyarsk as a site for scientific research, however, there was a question as to what existed there. If it was an LPAR, then it was a problem. If there was a significant proportion of what is needed for an LPAR, it was also a problem. If the LPAR was gone, that would be a different story. This was why he had asked whether the Gorbachev proposal entailed dismantlement or substantial alteration of the radar. Whatever the Soviets might say about Thule and Fylingdales, the Secretary added, they were far away from U.S. national borders.

Shevardnadze said he had been told that, when scientists met at Krasnoyarsk, they would be able to decide what kind of equipment could be preserved and what should be taken away. If there were elements that represented a violation of the ABM Treaty, then the Soviets would remove them. He reiterated that keeping the radar functioning would be useful for world science. Many countries’ scientists would jointly determine its use as a laboratory. With some emotion, Shevardnadze stressed that he thought this was a good idea. If there were elements of concern, the Soviets would be ready to dismantle them and convert the installation. The aim, he said, was to remove this problem from contention as well as to make the radar available to help implement the plans our countries had for space exploration. This was a mission that could only be accomplished by big countries like the U.S., Soviet Union, and Japan. Shevardnadze noted that there was a big building at Krasnoyarsk, with much costly equipment—all of this could be used. But the Soviets had made a political decision: they were ready to do something useful for world science and were surprised the U.S. had reacted so negatively.

The Secretary said his reaction was not negative, but one of questioning what will be at Krasnoyarsk under the Soviet proposal. If the LPAR were there, in whole or in part, then the problem would not be solved. If something else was implied, then we could work it out. The Working Group should delve further into this idea. But if the idea was to use an LPAR for scientific purposes, this would be a problem.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to confirm the Soviet aim: to preserve at Krasnoyarsk only that equipment needed for scientific purposes. Karpov added that he had told General Burns that various options existed for converting the radar. They had discussed dismantling the transmitter antenna and replacing it with a parabolic antenna. This was a radical solution, one which would remove any concern about the radar’s use for early warning of ballistic missile launch.

The Secretary suggested that the Working Group continue this discussion. He could not say he was very optimistic, but he accepted that it was a good faith effort to resolve the problem. He asked again for the Soviets to explain what would be a “radical solution” at Gomel.

Karpov replied: To eliminate what exists there—to eliminate the base for the antenna. Shevardnadze broke in to say that “Gomel is not a problem; let me assure you of this. Let us not fan that issue into a big problem; it’s a matter that can be taken off the agenda quickly.” As for Krasnoyarsk, Shevardnadze continued, he wanted to ask the U.S. again to take a very careful look at the Soviet proposal—to think of what the U.S. would want to see done so that it was sure Krasnoyarsk was only a research center. Let us allow our experts to work on the problem. Do not dismiss the Soviet proposal out of hand: that would shape public opinion in a way that the U.S. would find difficult to cope with, he warned, since the U.S. would have trouble explaining what was wrong with the Soviet proposal for a genuine scientific research center at Krasnoyarsk. If the U.S. didn’t trust the Soviets, then it could come and see the radar for itself. Let the experts come and decide, Shevardnadze concluded.

The Secretary said that the Soviet proposal would be a great idea if it meant there would be no LPAR at Krasnoyarsk, in whole or in part. There might be ways to change the physical characteristics of the radar such that it would be dismantled in terms of its ability to operate as an LPAR.

Ambassador Ridgway, referring to Shevardnadze’s comment that the Gomel issue should not be allowed to become a major problem, commented that our concerns had been exacerbated by the fact that construction work was continuing at Gomel. This made management of the issue more difficult.

Shevardnadze asked what U.S. experts had found at Gomel. If there was a violation, then why would the Soviets have invited experts? The fact was that they did not find anything. But he repeated that Gomel was not a big problem, since there was not a big structure involved. Krasnoyarsk was much larger. Gomel was a simple matter that could be solved. Karpov noted that at Gomel there was simply a rotating tower on which a mirror antenna had been placed.

Shevardnadze invited U.S. experts to visit Gomel again, and quipped that he was considering visiting Gomel himself. Regarding Krasnoyarsk, he again urged the U.S. to look carefully at the Soviet proposal. It was a serious one presented in good faith. When Krasnoyarsk becomes a facility for space cooperation, perhaps the U.S. could do the same thing at Thule.

Secretary Shultz said that his understanding of the Gomel problem was that, while the sides were allowed to have ABM radars at test ranges for experimental purposes, they were barred from moving them to other locations. So simply moving the radar was a violation. Beyond this, one must ask why the negotiators had made this a violation. The answer was that they did not want lesser radars to proliferate, since a large number of such radars could add up to a significant capability. Therefore, when the radar was moved, it was a technical violation. Now that we were seeing the parts reconstructed, it exacerbated the situation. Karpov said the Soviets were not building at Gomel.

General Powell noted that, in the fall of 1987, we seriously considered whether the Gomel matter constituted a violation. We judged that, on technical grounds, there was no doubt, although we reported to Congress that this was a minor problem. Inspectors subsequently visited Gomel. But the problem had since become more serious with the renewal of assembly activity there. In December we would need to report again to Congress on the status of the issue, and this activity would turn a small problem into a big one.

Shevardnadze suggested that the sides decide on the following course: At Gomel, where there was nothing that constituted a violation, the U.S. should come and visit once again and have its experts take another look. The Soviets had a vital interest in removing all irritants in this area. The inspectors could go for 10 days or two weeks, if they wished. In our joint statement, we could note the readiness of the Soviet side to allow this to happen.

The Secretary replied that it was not a secret what was happening at Gomel. When our people visited, they were openly shown the plans, and now we were seeing those plans carried out. It was not as though we were mystified about what was going on. It was the fact that the radar was there that posed the problem. We had no problem verifying what the Soviets had been telling us.

General Powell explained that it was the simple presence of those components that was the issue. The simplest solution would be to remove them to a test range or destroy them. The question was not the purpose of the radar, but its location. And if the work continued, this meant more of a problem for our December compliance report.

The Secretary said that what the Soviets called a van was, in fact, a radar. Shevardnadze said it really was a van. The Soviets may have done something they shouldn’t have, taking it from one place to another. But if they had wanted to violate the Treaty, then why would they have invited U.S. experts to come inspect the facility? Did the Secretary think the Soviets were naive or trying openly to provoke the U.S.?

The Secretary said he did not think Gomel was a big enough deal to warrant all this trouble. Shevardnadze said: “I have an interest in resolving the issue.” He said he would ask Karpov and the highest authorities to go there to see the site. Removing one van was not going to be a problem. General Powell said it was more than just one van that was involved. Other components that had been moved to Gomel also had to be eliminated. We now knew what’s there based on our experts’ visit. He added that, before we had included Gomel in our compliance report, we had raised this issue with the Soviets privately in an effort to resolve it.

Karpov said he wanted to point out that there was no radar at Gomel of a kind deployed at test ranges, but only a rotating tower on which mirror antennas and other devices had been placed. This was not the same kind of antenna as was located at test ranges.

The Secretary said he would like to tell the Soviets again precisely what we considered a violation. Powell argued that this was surely a problem we could solve. Shevardnadze said he agreed. The Soviets recognized the concerns of the U.S. side and wanted to find a solution. He confirmed the Soviets’ readiness to receive U.S. experts again at Gomel, after which, he joked, they could all go together to Greenland. Secretary Shultz said this should wait until the summer. Shevardnadze said he was ready to go even in winter. The Secretary said they would need to ask Danish Foreign Minister Elleman-Jensen.

Shevardnadze suggested that the sides think of language on Krasnoyarsk, to see what might be possible here. The Soviets were not sure what the U.S. wanted, what conditions had to be satisfied. He had confirmed the Soviet Government’s readiness to ensure that it becomes a scientific facility. If this approach was acceptable, we could say this in the joint statement.

The Secretary said the U.S. was looking for something that fixed the radar so that, from a physical and operational viewpoint, it was not a phased-array radar in whole or in part. This was the essence of the problem. If, in the process, something useful was created, this was fine—a creative idea. But if what was being proposed was to have scientists use the LPAR, Gorbachev’s proposal would not solve the problem.

The Secretary recalled the Soviets’ Moscow offer that, in connection with a satisfactory arrangement on the ABM Treaty, they would dismantle the radar. Of course, we hadn’t been able to work this out. On the other hand, if we could resolve the problem by accompanying dismantlement with a statement that expressed satisfaction with the ABM Treaty as it stands, leaving aside what we were negotiating in NST, we could do that too. If this idea was of interest, then there were several solutions to explore. But the essence of the question was that we cannot wind up with something that had the physical characteristics of an LPAR in whole or in part.

Shevardnadze said: “We agree on this.” Let us give the task to the experts to find a way to do this. Of course, an inventory would need to be taken of the equipment and structure to see what elements were incompatible with the Treaty. These would need to be dismantled. What was not incompatible could stay in place and be used for science. On the basis of the Secretary’s proposal, Shevardnadze concluded, work could be done.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to the ABM Treaty.]

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow and John Evans (EUR/SOV); cleared by Ridgway. Vershbow initialed for both Evans and Ridgway. The meeting took place in Shultz’s office at the Department of State. The complete memorandum of conversation is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 173.
2. See Attachment, Document 281.