284. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- The Secretary’s Meeting with Shevardnadze—Third Small Group Meeting: Regional Issues, Gorbachev’s Krasnoyarsk Speech, Nuclear Testing, Conventional Arms Control, Krasnoyarsk Radar
PARTICIPANTS:
U.S.
- George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
- Colin Powell, National Security Advisor to the President
- Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State*
- Richard Solomon, Director, Policy Planning Staff*
- MGEN William Burns, Director, ACDA*
- Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)
- Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
- Paul Robinson, U.S. Ambassador to the Nuclear Testing Talks*
- Charles Thomas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)*
- Jay Castillo*
- Alexander R. Vershbow, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs (notetaker)
- William Hopkins (interpreter)
USSR
- Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
- Vladimir Polyakov, Head, Near East Department, MFA*
- Viktor P. Karpov, Head, Arms Control & Disarmament Directorate, MFA*
- Sergey Tarasenko, MFA
- Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
- Igor Palenykh, Soviet Ambassador to the Nuclear Testing Talks*
- Oleg Grinevskiy, Ambassador at Large, MFA*
- Yevgeniy Zolotov, Soviet Embassy (notetaker)
- Pavel Palazhchenko, MFA (interpreter)
- * for portions of the meeting only
The meeting opened with an exchange of pleasantries about the ongoing Olympic Games. Shevardnadze commented that it was good the games were proceeding normally. The atmosphere was good. He knew the U.S. had had some concerns, but it seemed that order was being maintained and he hoped it would continue.
[Page 1036]The Secretary suggested that the nuclear testing Ambassadors be summoned for discussion with the Ministers. He said he had also asked ACDA Director Burns and our verification expert Jay Castillo to talk with Ambassador Karpov about the Krasnoyarsk and Gomel problems. Ambassador Dubinin confirmed that they had already begun to talk. Shevardnadze reiterated that he had an interest in achieving real clarity on this question so that there was no misunderstanding. The Secretary remarked that we had great confidence in our people.
Shevardnadze asked whether they should wait for the explosives people to arrive or begin with regional issues. The Secretary noted that he had asked Under Secretary Armacost to join for the regional discussion. Shevardnadze sent for Ambassador Polyakov.
Shevardnadze said there was one question he had not covered the previous day. While he understood the U.S. was not very enthusiastic about it, at some point our countries would have to begin at least at the expert level to discuss the problem of naval activities. He knew this was not a simple problem for the U.S. but we would have to begin sooner or later.
[Omitted here are discussions not related to the ABM Treaty.]
KRASNOYARSK RADAR
Burns and Castillo joined the discussion. General Burns reported that he had discussed the Krasnoyarsk and Gomel issues at length with Ambassador Karpov. They agreed that the Krasnoyarsk problem needed to be resolved, but they disagreed on the extent of dismantlement and destruction that would be required. The Soviets argued that only the transmitter antenna had to be dismantled; they claimed the building could be retained and only the face of the antenna destroyed. The Soviet side also agreed that the Gomel issue could be resolved in the context of a solution to Krasnoyarsk, although the sides were unable to agree on words to reflect their present positions.
Ambassador Karpov said he would like to add that the Soviets had taken into account in their proposal the concerns expressed by Burns. The main difference was in the scope of the possible dismantling of the LPAR at Krasnoyarsk. The Soviets believed these questions should be given to experts for further consideration. Based on the mission of the future space research center, they could determine what should be done to the radar. To write into the text of the joint statement today the scope of the future dismantlement effort would not be possible.
The Secretary replied that he accepted that this might be the case, but that he believed our experts would need clear instructions. Part of their guidance should specify what space research activities would be allowed; and they should also have negative guidance, that is instructions specifying the kinds of equipment that could not be present at [Page 1037] Krasnoyarsk when it was converted to a space research center. In short, the experts could not have an entirely free hand but rather needed instructions on the negative and the positive side.
Karpov said the Soviets had suggested language to the effect that their side was ready to have experts meet to develop specific measures to ensure that the Krasnoyarsk radar would be converted to an international space research center; that this would include dismantlement and destruction of specific devices there, including elements of the phased array and of the structures, along with the introduction of other equipment. This language would make clear that the only difference between the sides was the exact scope of the future dismantlement. The Soviets believed it was desirable for the experts to look at the complex aspects.
The Secretary said that perhaps some different language would offer a way out of the problem. Burns said that the sides had already discussed language and it seemed unwise to provide so general an instruction to the experts. Some rather fundamental decisions had to be made. We needed agreement that the LPAR as it currently existed—with a transmitter and a receiver—needed to be dismantled. At the same time, the U.S. had no objection to the removal of the electronics for other uses.
The Secretary asked whether language could be devised which spoke of dismantling those elements which lend themselves to the long lead-time problem.
Burns replied that there were a number of structures at Krasnoyarsk that were suitable for use as a space research center; only two structures were of concern, the transmitter and receiver. By eliminating these structures all advantages for ABM breakout would be removed. If these were not eliminated, on the other hand, there would still be some ABM potential. The Soviet side, Burns explained, had suggested two things: that the transmitter be eliminated and the receiver maintained. This would preserve the less egregious half of the LPAR, but would not eliminate the whole threat. If the structure were eliminated, on the other hand, it would restore more of the lead time. In sum, there was no way the problem could be resolved if the structure were not affected in some major way.
The Secretary asked whether Burns meant to say that any language agreed had to make clear it was a particular structure which had to be dealt with. Burns replied that this was correct: there was only one structure involved; we were not talking about the power plants, offices or any other building that might be useful for scientific purposes.
The Secretary suggested that the sides reflect on this. The Ministers now needed to break to have lunch and return for the working group reports.
[Page 1038]Shevardnadze said that the ministers should clarify the general approach. The Soviet side had expressed a readiness to work closely so that all elements and components would be rendered exclusively for the use of the international space research center. If the sides could not agree on language for the joint statement, they could not mention the subject at all.
The Secretary said the words we are looking for should state that Krasnoyarsk would not be available as a phased array radar. Shevardnadze urged that the sides look for more general language. The Secretary responded that we understood that the Soviets wanted a positive twist and we were not afraid of that. That was what we should try to achieve.
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Ridgway. Vershbow initialed for Ridgway. The meeting took place in Shultz’s office at the Department State. The complete memorandum of conversation is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 175.↩