Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

281. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 16, 1988

SUBJECT

• Gorbachev Letter on Krasnoyarsk

Soviet Ambassador Dubinin called on me today. He delivered a Gorbachev letter responding to your August 12 message² on Krasnoyarsk (an unofficial translation is attached). Gorbachev:

— writes that we should not let “mutual” complaints about ABM Treaty compliance undermine what we have achieved;

— recalls the Soviet offer to dismantle the “equipment” at Krasnoyarsk if we agree to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972;

— repeats alleged Soviet concerns about U.S. radars at Thule and Fylingdales Moor (although without linking these directly to Krasnoyarsk) and the Soviet request to visit the Thule radar; and

— offers to discuss measures to convert Krasnoyarsk into an international space research center, and invites U.S. scientists to travel there to explore this.

There is no suggestion of any physical changes to the radar facility in the process of its proposed conversion to a “center for international cooperation in peaceful space activities.” I put the question directly to Dubinin; he could not answer.

The Soviets appear to be seeking a fig leaf to resolve the Krasnoyarsk issue. At first glance, this seems little more than a variation of the “joint manning” idea informally floated to General Burns during the ABM Treaty review. If so, our response can only be negative: it neither corrects the violation nor lengthens the lead-time for ABM breakout that the Soviets have gained through construction of Krasnoyarsk to date. In fact, conversion of the radar to a “research center” would presumably entail our agreement to completion and activation of the radar.

Whether Gorbachev’s letter represents the final Soviet word or an opening gambit setting the stage for Shevardnadze to offer something more substantial next week remains to be seen. I intend to press Shevardnadze hard on meeting our concern over Krasnoyarsk, and tell him that this idea does not suffice.

Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan³

Moscow, September 13, 1988

Dear Mr. President,

I have read your letter of August 12 very carefully.

I would like, in the frank and constructive spirit that characterizes our dialogue, to share with you my thoughts regarding the question of ABM Treaty compliance raised in your letter.

This question has been repeatedly discussed both by ourselves and by our experts, most recently during the latest consultations to review the ABM Treaty. In the course of the negotiations the sides have stated their concerns regarding compliance with the treaty. Regrettably, thus far the US representatives have failed to provide persuasive answers to the questions we raised, while the Soviet side has clarified in great detail the situation surrounding the radar which was under construction in the Krasnoyarsk area, having reiterated that it is not a missile attack warning radar. In light of our answers the complaints expressed again and again by the US side cause perplexity and suggest that, perhaps, there are some other, more far-reaching calculations behind them.

I think you will agree with me that it would be impardonable if our mutual complaints about the violations of the ABM Treaty were to undermine all that we, thanks to the efforts of both sides, have succeeded in accomplishing to improve US-Soviet relations. With the aim of not allowing this to occur we have, as a gesture of good will, not only discontinued the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, but have also expressed willingness to dismantle its equipment, if our countries reach agreement to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. Such a solution would represent a true confirmation of the commitment of the sides to the ABM Treaty, a commitment about which you, Mr. President, have repeatedly spoken and written to me.

At the same time I cannot fail to emphasize that we are increasingly concerned over the situation that has arisen in connection with the construction of US radars in Thule and Fylingdales Moor. In the assessment of our experts, the now operational Thule radar is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. Your specialists deny that. But, as you know, an American proverb says: “Seeing is believing”. So we are hoping that you will agree to a visit of this radar by Soviet specialists.

As for the Krasnoyarsk radar, I wish to inform you of our decision which will once and for all put an end to all speculations about its nature, to wit: we are ready to establish on the base of this radar a center for international cooperation in the interest of the peaceful use of outer space. This center could be incorporated into the system of a World Space Organization which we proposed, so as to make it possible for all states to participate in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

We are prepared to discuss with United States’ representatives, as well as with other interested countries, the concrete measures that would make it possible to transform the Krasnoyarsk radar into a Center for International Cooperation in Peaceful Space Activities. I would like, through your intermediary, to invite American scientists to visit the Krasnoyarsk radar in order to discuss the questions connected therewith.

In conclusion, I wish to express my hope that your administration, Mr. President, will be guided in its practical actions by the desire to preserve the ABM Treaty as an important instrument for maintaining strategic stability in conditions where our two countries—I believe the agreement on that is not far away—will be implementing the 50 percent reduction in their strategic offensive arms. In this context, we will expect the US side also to take practical steps which would remove our concern over the US radars in Greenland and Great Britain.

Respectfully,

M. Gorbachev

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8890725, 8890750). Secret; Sensitive. According to the NSC correspondence profile, Reagan noted the memorandum and letter on September 20. (Ibid.)
2. See Document 273, and footnote 1 thereto.
3. No classification marking. Printed from the official translation prepared in the Division of Language Services, Department of State, which bears Gorbachev’s typed signature.