Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

282. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, undated

Limitations on OPP ABM Testing In Space and U.S. Objectives

Introduction. The Washington Summit Joint Statement of December 1987 explicitly acknowledged that the United States and the Soviet Union may conduct “research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” To date, the United States has not developed a way in which it intends to carry out development and testing, while fulfilling its obligation not to deploy ABM systems or components not authorized by Article III of the ABM Treaty. (S)

This paper defines a set of basic objectives the United States should meet in clarifying the Washington Summit Joint Statement and proposes a limitation on U.S. space-based testing which would serve as the guideline for future U.S. activities to ensure that such activities would not constitute deployment prohibited by the ABM Treaty. The proposal outlined below is compatible with SDI programmatic objectives through 1996. (S)

Additionally, a statement of this limitation in the Defense and Space Talks might serve as an explanation of the SDI testing program, in the context of Article III(1), draft Defense and Space Treaty, which states, “Both Parties shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war.” This statement would be a statement of current policy and would assume Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty. (S)

Objectives. The following are broad U.S. objectives in this area and more specific objectives derived therefrom:

— Promote robust SDI research and development.

○ Accept no limitations on ABM activities beyond those the United States accepted in 1972.

○ Protect the U.S. right to conduct realistic feasibility tests of integrated space-based ABM systems based on other physical principles and of space-based components of such systems capable of substituting for traditional components.

○ Obtain [indication of] (JCS would delete) Soviet acceptance of the U.S. right to test in space ABM systems and components based on OPP.

— Retain the ABM Treaty until the United States is ready to make a conscious decision to move beyond it.

○ Conduct, within the ABM Treaty, as much ABM research, development and testing as required.

○ Build sufficient confidence through testing to support an informed deployment decision.

— Protect non-SDI programs.

○ Permit no on-site inspection of any spacecraft.

○ Provide no launch information on space systems’ functions prior to launch.

○ Do not designate specific orbits or regions of space as the only locations for conducting ABM tests.

○ Avoid restrictions on non-SDI space-based sensors.

— Ensure that the United States has a comprehensive and defensible Defense and Space position.

○ Provide a logical approach to showing that planned ABM development and testing in space would not constitute deployment. (S)

Proposal. In conjunction with Soviet acceptance of the U.S. space-based sensor proposal, the United States would make the following statement (A) and seek Soviet concurrence with the Predictability Protocol, including the addition associated with the U.S. statement (A) provided at (B) below. (S)

A. U.S. Unilateral Statement. In conducting research, development and testing, as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, as acknowledged in the December 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, parties to the ABM Treaty may test space-based systems in accordance with the Treaty. At the same time, the Treaty is clear that no such system can be deployed except pursuant to the procedures specified in Article XV and Agreed Statement D of the ABM Treaty. (U)

In order to ensure that the testing of space-based components capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, does not generate concern that this activity represents the deployment of such components, the United States is prepared to confine such permitted testing to designated ABM test satellites. Any platform based in space from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile is tested to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory shall be designated as an ABM test satellite. Further, the number of U.S. designated test satellites in orbit simultaneously shall not exceed 15, a number well short of that associated with any realistic concern about such ABM test satellites serving as a deployed capability. [No more than 3 of those ABM text vehicles would be used for testing a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for more than 1 ABM interceptor missile.] (ACDA add) (S)

Given this U.S. commitment, the United States proposes the following addition to the Predictability Protocol currently under negotiation. (S)

B. Addition to Predictability Protocol. Parties shall provide to each other the following data:

a. identification of each ABM test satellite no more than 12 hours after launch;

b. notification of the removal of each ABM test satellite from its orbit within 12 hours of re-entry or change in orbit; and

c. notification of a test using an ABM satellite to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory no less than two hours prior to the conduct of any such test in an ABM mode. (S)

Discussion of Terms. In order to assess the impact of the above proposal, a clear understanding of certain of its terms is required. With the exception of the term “ABM Test Satellite,” all terms are drawn from the ABM Treaty, specifically Article II and Agreed Statement D. Agreed Statement D permits the testing and development in space of certain ABM systems and components. (S)

An ABM test satellite is a platform based in space from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile is tested to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory. (S)

The guidelines described in the proposal above, based on Agreed Statement D, affect only ABM systems including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars:

a. which are space-based; and,

b. which are tested in a mode to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory. (S)

Issues. There are five outstanding issues associated with the testing in space proposal.

1. Should the proposal be a unilateral declaration or should it be negotiated with the Soviets? State, ACDA, and JCS feel strongly that Soviet agreement to this approach would be extremely useful in gaining support for SDI in Congress and with the public. A unilateral statement, however, would not be helpful. Therefore, they favor negotiating the proposal with the Soviets. Moreover, they believe we could make such a proposal without abandoning our right to do this unilaterally at a later date. (S)

OSD, Amb. Cooper, and Amb. Rowny believe that we should declare the proposal as our means for conducting OPP ABM tests in space, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, while fulfilling our obligation not to deploy OPP ABM systems. They argue that negotiating the proposal would inevitably lead to limitations beyond those of the ABM Treaty as signed and ratified in 1972. Moreover, they believe that if the Soviets were to accept a notification of testing requirement in the predictability protocol, it would constitute Soviet acceptance of OPP ABM testing in space. (S)

2. Should non-OPP interceptors be included in the proposal? State believes that Soviet agreement to test OPP systems in space would not clear the way for space-based interceptor testing because we have thus far been unable to characterize kinetic interceptors to be based on OPP. Although the U.S. has reserved judgment on this issue, OSD believes that for compelling reasons kinetic interceptors are based on OPP, and therefore their testing in space is clearly permitted. Ambassador Rowny concurs. Moreover, they believe that including non-OPP systems would go well beyond the original intent of the proposal, which was to delineate a “safe harbor” for testing within our rights under the ABM Treaty. Such a step would require negotiations which could cause us to forego our current rights under the ABM Treaty. (S)

3. Should tabling the proposal on ABM test satellites be contingent on Soviet acceptance of the sensors run free proposal? JCS believes that unless the Soviets accept the sensors run free proposal that clearly exempts early warning systems, the testing in space proposal is unworkable. State and OSD believe that there is no need to link the ABM test satellite proposal to Soviet acceptance of the proposal to remove all restriction on space-based sensors. They argue that we would prefer that the Soviets accept our proposal that space-based sensors run free. If the Soviets finally reject this proposal, the U.S. can refrain from testing OPP ABM sensors in space until we have defined acceptable guidelines for future sensor activity that avoids prohibited deployment. (S)

4. Should there be a sublimit of 3 covering test satellites from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for more than one ABM interceptor missile is tested? ACDA believes that such a sublimit may be necessary for advanced directed energy weapons in order to ensure that an illegal ABM deployment is not undertaken. All others believe that because of orbital geometry even fifteen test platforms carrying advanced directed energy systems would not provide sufficient coverage for a meaningful ABM system. They note that for anticipated directed energy weapon power levels, roughly four times as many systems as could be tested simultaneously would be necessary for initial capability, and six to eight times as many for an optimal capability. They further argue that the question is moot because neither the U.S. nor the Soviets would be able to deploy such systems during the non-withdrawal period.

5. Should we table this proposal at the upcoming Ministerial meeting, or should it be delayed? Those who favor tabling the proposal now believe that it has had sufficient study over the past year and a half, and particularly intensive study from the period prior to the Moscow summit to date. They believe that the proposal is necessary to explain how we intend to conduct ABM tests in space consistent with the Washington Summit Joint Statement. And they believe that this option is superior to past proposals for setting ground rules for testing. OSD and State each favor tabling their (differing) versions of the proposal now. (S)

Ambassador Rowny favors delaying placing this on the table until some date after the Ministerial and then only after coordinating the timing with whatever actions we may take re: Krasnoyarsk. Some who favor delay believe that we have not had sufficient time to study the proposal and question why the proposal is necessary now given that our draft treaty has been on the table since January. The Joint Staff believes that the USG has not addressed in sufficient detail those questions which the Soviets would raise following the tabling of this proposal. For example: Are the test platforms for the interceptors to be tested ABM launchers? Does the number of designated platforms include targets that might be launched from ABM test satellites as part of an ABM test? Does the United States maintain that if one more designated test satellite were in orbit, then deployment has occurred, or that this would be laying the basis for a territorial defense? (S)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, ACSG (Arms Control Support Group), 09/27/1988. Secret. All brackets are in the original. An unknown hand wrote “9/20” in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. Linhard, Tobey, and Brooks sent the paper to Powell under cover of a September 21 memorandum. (Ibid.)