Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

231. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 7, 1987

SUBJECT

• Elimination of Ballistic Missiles

Issue

To respond to the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the transition to a world without ballistic missiles.

Facts

Shortly after you returned from Reykjavik you signed an NSDD–250,² setting forth the rationale for eliminating ballistic missiles and tasking the Joint Chiefs of Staff to devise a plan to eliminate such missiles by 1996. You specified that the plan should not increase the risk to the United States and should be accomplished within current fiscal controls of the Department of Defense budget.

Discussion

The JCS have now responded. They conclude that a transition to a zero ballistic missile world by 1996 is possible either with no increase in risk or with no increase in cost, but not both. They provide two plans, one maintaining risk constant, and one involving no increase in cost. The entire JCS response is over a hundred pages;³ an Executive Summary, which I have highlighted, is at Tab B. Secretary Weinberger’s forwarding memorandum is at Tab A.

The JCS note, correctly, that the Soviets have shown no interest in eliminating offensive ballistic missiles. In light of this, and of the costs the JCS consider necessary for a risk free transition to a zero ballistic world, the JCS recommend stressing such intermediate goals as a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. Such a stress is, of course, consistent with your policy of giving priority to 50 percent reductions as a necessary first step.

The JCS response provides us the necessary background to move toward a zero ballistic missile world should the Soviets accept your proposal. Given current Soviet unwillingness to do so, and your previous decision to give priority to the 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms, I believe no further analysis of the Reykjavik formula for reaching zero ballistic missiles is necessary or appropriate at this time. Once you have reviewed Tabs A and B, I will so inform the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of JCS.

Recommendation

OK NO

____ ____ That you review Secretary Weinberger’s comments at Tab A and the JCS report at Tab B, but that, pending some Soviet movement in that direction, we take no further action on analyzing the Reykjavik formula for a transition to a world without offensive ballistic missiles.⁴

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)⁵

Washington, March 27, 1987

SUBJECT

• JCS NSDD 250 Analysis (U)

(S) I thought it might be useful to add a few comments to the JCS response to NSDD 250, which I sent to you and the President some weeks ago. NSDD 250 tasked the JCS, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense to analyze the implications of the US proposal at Reykjavik to eliminate all ballistic missiles by 1996.

(TS) The JCS effort was an extensive and dedicated one. The Chiefs’ methodology (in part mandated by NSDD 250) included the following key assumptions:

○ The adequacy of the US strategic posture was evaluated for the contingency of an all-out Soviet attack on the United States. More limited nuclear attacks were not assessed.

○ [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

○ Useable tactical warning is assumed for the situation without elimination of missiles as compared with the missile-free situation. It is possible, however, that our warning system might be degraded, for example as a result of limited attacks during a conventional phase of a war. If so, our ICBMs would contribute less to our deterrent, and the elimination of missiles by 1996, hence, would subtract less from our deterrent.

○ The study did not compare the difference in levels of damage the US might suffer in the event of a NATO “first use” between:

(a) a 1996 situation with Soviet missiles reduced by 50% as called for in START and no air defenses added; and

(b) a 1996 situation with missiles eliminated and with the air defenses as proposed in this study.

With missiles eliminated and with such new air defenses, we would have regained—for the first time since the early 1960s—a significant capability to limit damage to the United States from Soviet nuclear attack. This makes it somewhat more possible that nuclear weapons might be used first, in the event a conventional Warsaw Pact attack could not be stopped. It would, as a result, improve deterrence of conventional attack.

○ Given the complexity of the analysis, the study could not fully assess risks of Soviet break-out.

(TS) The overriding conclusion of the report about which there can be no doubt is the enormous and really quite unachievable cost of our required responses to proposals such as came out of the Iceland summit. There are some other useful key conclusions from the JCS overall analysis:

(1) The lack of US air defenses would have to be rectified if we move to a strategic relationship without ballistic missiles. Given the substantial Soviet air defense capability that we project for the 1990s, we would have to build a much stronger air defense than we are now planning, since in a world without ballistic missiles the US-Soviet air defense asymmetry would become far more important.

(2) We would have to increase the numbers of “stealth” systems, in particular the Advanced Technology Bomber, in the event of the elimination of ballistic missiles.

(3) And if this elimination were to be completed by 1996, these adjustments in US air defense and stealth technology, as well as other force adjustments, would have to be compressed into an exceedingly short period of time. It is mainly these considerations that account for the added expenditures in our strategic forces that would be required, according to the Chiefs’ study, for such a radical and rapid transition to a missile-free world.

(4) SDI would be needed before 1996 to hedge against possible Soviet cheating. However, the terms of the Reykjavik proposal do not provide for an adequate SDI deployment prior to 1996.

(TS) The effect of the elimination of ballistic missiles on conventional deterrence is ambiguous. On the one hand, without the US missile forces, the risk of nuclear war might appear somewhat less dangerous to the Soviet leaders—hence, they might be less deterred. On the other hand, if we acquired the defenses the Chiefs suggest we would need, we would have a damage-limiting capability that could make our Flexible Response strategy more credible in Soviet eyes—hence we would have more deterrence. Moreover, as the attached Executive Summary points out, “Moscow may or may not find the resources to increase combat arms equipment or expand force structure beyond the increases they would carry out without the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.” In particular, if Moscow decided to increase their bomber forces to make up for the eliminated missiles, they would have fewer resources for their conventional forces. Perhaps the main point to be made is that we need to improve NATO conventional forces in any event, with or without the elimination of missiles.

(TS) The JCS analysis points out some of the adjustments needed for safely transitioning to such a world. However, accomplishing such a radical transformation within less than ten years (i.e., by 1996) would lead to impossibly increased costs and consequent risks. As a much longer-term goal, a world without ballistic missiles remains a valuable objective. For in such a world, the means for near-instantaneous nuclear attack would be reduced, risks of an accidental initiation of nuclear attack would be diminished, and Soviet surprise attack against key NATO facilities would be less effective. But such a world requires a Congress willing to spend vastly larger sums than any Congress we have seen.

(TS) Since continued Soviet rejection of the Reykjavik proposal makes the question of eliminating ballistic missiles somewhat academic, it would perhaps be more useful now to address questions more relevant to our current START and Defense and Space negotiations. In particular, I believe we should focus on:

○ The growing impact of the asymmetry in US and Soviet air defense capabilities as the role of ballistic missiles is being reduced through reductions and SDI.

○ The need to phase in SDI as missiles are being phased out, as a protection against Soviet cheating.

○ Implications of a possible Soviet break-out from a strategic reductions agreement.

(S) We are conducting studies of these issues and will keep you advised.

Cap

Tab B

Executive Summary of a Study Prepared in the Joint Chiefs of Staff⁶

Washington, undated

BASELINE PLAN

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 250 directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a plan that could be used to implement the US arms control proposal to reduce US and Soviet offensive nuclear weapons by 50 percent by 1991, and eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles by 1996. This was to be accomplished within the budget guidelines provided by the NSDD, which specified that available resources would not exceed current planning levels. The plan was also to hold the overall level of risk generally constant with that existing today.

The summary finding of this report is that a feasible plan cannot be developed that can meet these guidelines reliably. To compress this massive strategic change into the time period from the conclusion of the agreement until 1996 would require new defense programs to overcome possible new risks resulting from Soviet responses. The cost of the systems for a strategic defensive program could amount to $110 billion over the fiscal constraints of NSDD–250, and up to an additional $139 billion in adjustments for strategic offensive systems. The US responses required for maintaining conventional deterrence at the present level are difficult to anticipate. However, given the hazards of seeing 10 years into the future and of forecasting Soviet perceptions, the JCS believe it is necessary to include some conventional hedges to be implemented depending on Soviet actions. These could run in the neighborhood of $140 billion. This report, therefore, presents a baseline plan based on consideration of alternative force levels that either meet cost constraints or maintain the current level of risk, but not both.

While the plan would allow the United States to transition safely to zero ballistic missiles by 1996, there are no assurances that the Soviets will ever accept such a reduction. In fact, the likelihood the Soviets would accept such a proposal is extremely low. Therefore, it is important that force structuring priorities and decisions suggested in this plan not be taken out of context and used to justify proposed changes to current programs. Taking any assumptions made in this document out of the context in which they are intended could contribute to the Soviet goal of undermining current US force modernization programs. The programmatic decisions implied in the plan are only pertinent to this baseline plan under the provisions of NSDD–250.

Major findings of this report concerning a world without offensive ballistic missiles are shown below.

TIMING: NSDD–250 is focused on the year 1996 as the date when the elimination of ballistic missiles would be completed. Even if a complete, verifiable agreement had been quickly reached with the Soviets and ratified by both sides, the 10-year period for such a massive transformation of the US strategic posture would have been very compressed. Since the Reykjavik meeting, however, it has become clear the Soviets will continue to reject the proposed elimination of offensive ballistic missiles for the foreseeable future. Therefore, if and when the Soviets show interest in the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles, a new date should be established which allows for at least a full 10-year term to complete this massive arms reduction.

PHASING: As offensive ballistic missiles are phased out, it is essential the United States maintain credible deterrent forces throughout the transition period. This can be done both by adjusting US force structure to counter an altered Soviet threat and through additional arms control agreements. By making the potential threat more predictable, arms limiting agreements could reduce force structure imbalances and thereby lessen the risk of eliminating offensive ballistic missiles. However, arms control agreements that could likely be negotiated cannot alone substitute for offensive and defensive deterrent capabilities.

THREAT: If the Soviets accepted elimination of their ballistic missiles, they would probably begin a major buildup of other strategic offensive forces. By 1996, they would be expected to have about 450 bombers carrying 5,400 air-launched cruise missiles and bombs, and up to 2,000 sea-launched cruise missiles on 40–50 submarines. Using a combination of measures, the Soviets most likely could increase the size of their interceptor and SAM forces by some 20 to 25 percent by 1996. It is difficult to assess how this agreement might affect Soviet conventional forces. Such a prediction will depend on the emphasis the Soviets place on strategic force changes and their perception of the balance once ballistic missiles have disappeared. It is in the area of Soviet perceptions, of course, that prognostications are most hazardous. In essence, given the costs for changing their strategic forces, Moscow may or may not find the resources to increase combat arms equipment or expand force structure beyond the increases they would carry out without the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. Given these uncertainties, however, the United States cannot afford not to anticipate possible conventional changes in the Soviet forces and thinking. On the ground, we could very well see accelerated additions of a few low-strength motorized rifle and tank divisions in the western USSR as well as air defense improvements. At sea, the transition from SSBNs to SLCM submarines could result in the Soviets placing increased emphasis on defending against US SLCM submarines, attacking the SLOCs, or protecting Soviet forward-deployed or bastion-deployed SLCM submarines.

DETERRENCE: The basis for US nuclear deterrence would not change because the United States would remain [less than 1 line not declassified]. In spite of the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, [7½ lines not declassified]. On the other hand, the fundamental structure of US deterrent forces would be altered as the United States shifted to a dyad. Other vital aspects of the deterrence equation, e.g., the strategic defense imbalance, would become more significant and would need to be addressed. Whether or not the likelihood of conventional war with the Soviets would increase is an area of much uncertainty. There are many complex questions about the impact of zero ballistic missiles on the conventional force deterrent burden and they are more difficult to address than the strategic nuclear balance. Perhaps the most significant consequence of eliminating ballistic missiles would be the diminished US capability for rapid nuclear response. Clearly, the time lines of a nuclear attack would be extended and the threat of 30-minute extermination eliminated. The Soviets fear uncontrolled escalation, and increasing nuclear response time may reduce this fear. It can be speculated that the Soviets may perceive a reduction in the credibility of the US threat of escalation in response to a major conventional attack. Such a perception could arise from the simple fact that execution of a nuclear response takes longer, and more time is available to reduce both the probability and the impact of escalation. On the other hand, it would appear that the United States is much better equipped—by history, training, and culture—to wage bomber and submarine warfare than the Soviets. Moreover, without the threat of Soviet offensive ballistic missiles (nuclear or conventional), Soviet surprise attack against key NATO facilities would be less effective. On the other hand, key installations near the coast in the United States may still be vulnerable to short-warning SLCM attacks. Finally, if the United States acquired the air defenses envisioned in this plan, US damage-limiting capability would be significant compared to what it would be in 1996 without offensive ballistic missile elimination. Coupled with the strategic offensive, defensive, and nonstrategic nuclear force improvements recommended in this plan, this could raise Soviet uncertainty to the point that they are more deterred. The impact on the conventional arms imbalance, therefore, is uncertain and will depend primarily on how the Soviets perceive the willingness of the United States and its allies to escalate in response to a Soviet provocation.

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES: Ballistic missiles comprise nearly two-thirds of US nuclear forces. [3 lines not declassified] The cost of these strategic forces alone would exceed the guidelines of NSDD–250, as well as any realistic projection of near-term defense budgets. The Soviets, with only a limited bomber capability today, must also consider similar problems in determining the acceptability of the US arms control proposals and in implementing any such agreement.

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES: The Soviets have an extensive air defense system. In view of the US vulnerability to ballistic missiles and the past lack of a major air-breathing threat, the United States has chosen to maintain little air defense capability. If the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate ballistic missiles, the United States cannot be left defenseless against nuclear attack by bombers, cruise missiles, or “hidden” ballistic missiles. To do so would reduce stability and deterrence, and increase risk. Thus, there would be a requirement for a substantial investment in defensive systems that would contribute to deterrence through independent objective-denial and damage-limitation.

NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES: With or without elimination of nonstrategic ballistic missiles the United States would require some form of compensation to help counter the remaining unfavorable theater nuclear and conventional arms imbalance and, politically, to assure its European allies that the US-NATO linkage continues to be strongly supported. It would also require continued, and perhaps increased, allied support of nonstrategic nuclear forces.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES: There are complex questions about the impact of zero ballistic missiles on the conventional force deterrent burden. Adjustments to US land-based forces are dependent not only on Soviet actions but also on the share of the burden US allies are willing to assume. US sea-based forces are less dependent on the contribution of US allies and more directly tied to the changing requirements of the Soviet threat. If the goal were a more secure world than provided by currently programmed forces (which include ballistic missiles), conventional force adjustments would be required beyond currently planned modernization programs to both land- and sea-based forces as a hedge against Soviet actions. Likewise, US allies should accept their proportional share of the increased conventional requirements. Based on past precedent, the prospects of the allies doing so are not good. All conventional adjustments, however, would not necessarily have to be completed in 10 years, but some can be paced in anticipation of Soviet actions.

MODERNIZATION: With an agreement to eliminate (or sharply reduce) offensive ballistic missiles, the modernization of other elements of US strategic forces would take on increased importance. In particular, with or without ballistic missile elimination, [5½ lines not declassified]

With or without the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, the capability of Soviet land-based and naval conventional forces will continue to improve. The Soviets will continue current equipment modernization programs in order to provide first-rate weapon systems for their ground forces. They will maintain their quantitative superiority in frontal aviation and continue to improve theater air defenses, sea-based forces; short-range nuclear forces, and chemical-biological capability. All of these factors make it essential that currently planned conventional force modernization packages continue to receive full support.

In view of the above, the strategic, nonstrategic nuclear, and conventional forces in Table i–1, with a cost of approximately $390 billion more than the NSDD–250 guidelines, represent the level of effort required to support the US proposals. These forces fall between those that would meet the cost requirements of NSDD–250, but are totally inadequate in terms of deterrence and level of risk, and more fully developed, more effective, but more expensive forces that, while desirable, are not deemed necessary to maintain deterrence and risk.

Because the fiscal guidance of NSDD–250 cannot be met, this baseline report recommends that:

— The goal of transitioning to a world without offensive ballistic missiles within 10 years should be deferred.

— An intermediate goal of deep reductions (as in the 50 percent proposal) achieved in a reasonable period of time should be pursued as a more immediate alternative. This will allow significant arms reductions at affordable costs as well as time to address how best to associate strategic defenses with the reductions in strategic offensive arms. It will also provide an intermediate phase of strategic offensive-defensive deterrent strategy to provide experience for subsequent moves towards a possible future without offensive ballistic missiles.

TABLE i–1 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVES

Except for strategic nuclear offensive systems, shown below are “plus-ups” above current plans.⁷ Showing only additional strategic offensive systems would not reflect delayed retirements and accelerated procurement, which constitute most strategic offensive force changes. Although strategic offensive forces reflect the total number of systems as of 1996, the costs shown for these forces reflect only the “plus-ups” above the current plans.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS	Quantity	Cost ($ Billions)
[table not declassified]
Support
Accelerate KC–135R Conversion Program to Complete by 1996
KC–10B (for strategic offense)	119
	Subtotal $136.7
NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS	Quantity	Cost ($ Billions)
[table not declassified]
	Subtotal $ 2.7
TOTAL STRATEGIC/NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR		$139.4
STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS	Quantity	Cost ($ Billions)
Air Defense
Weapons
Additional Interceptors	288
Patriot Batteries	27
Surveillance
AWACS	51
Support
FOLs	5
DOBs	3
Tankers (for strategic defense)
KC–10B	55
Tanker Conversions	55
	Subtotal $36.22
ASW
Weapons
SSNs	18
Destroyers	18
TAGOS	12
VP Squadrons (4 Active/1 Reserve)	5
	Subtotal $37.0
Ballistic Missile Defense
Note: No space-based systems deployed prior to 1996.
Ground-Based Midcourse
Interceptor Missiles	100
Space-Based Interceptor Missiles	420
Boost and Midcourse
Surveillance Sensors	18
Sensor Probes	6
Ground-Based Terminal
Interceptor Missiles	60
Dedicated Radars	2
Annual Space Launches	7
Early Deployment Option (Treaty Compliant)
	Subtotal $37.18
TOTAL STRATEGIC	DEFENSE	$110.40
CONVENTIONAL FORCES	Quantity	Cost ($ Billions)
Intelligence
Photo/Elint Missions	4
Mobility
66 MTM/D Airlift Acceleration
C–17	8
Air-Refueling (for GP mobility)
Tanker Conversions	160
KC–10B	40
Amphib Lift
LCC	1
LHD	10
LSD–41/CVs	28
LCAC	65
Modernization
Army MLRS BN	3
Army FAAD BDE (-)/DIV	1
Army Decisive Systems
Army Deep Attack and Classified
A–7 Upgrade
E–8 JSTAR	7
Have Quick Secure Comm	2500
JTIDS	1140
LANTIRN	500
Sustainability
Army, Navy, Air Force
TOTAL CONVENTIONAL		$138.3
TOTAL COST OF RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVES		$388.1

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–94, NSDD 250. Top Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Brooks. Copies were sent to Bush and Howard Baker. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates Reagan saw it. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. Attached but not printed. See Document 152.
3. The full report is in National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–094, NSDD 250.
4. Reagan approved the recommendation.
5. Top Secret. Weinberger wrote “Frank” above the recipient line.
6. Top Secret; Noforn.
7. SLCMs costed in strategic offense, but shown here to reflect dedication to SACEUR. [Footnote is in the original.]