Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

219. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, February 26, 1987

SUBJECT

• JCS Briefing on Response to NSDD 250

The JCS briefed their response to the tasking in NSDD–250 to Secretaries Weinberger and Shultz and to Mr. Carlucci at 1115 on 25 February. The following summarizes the discussion generated by the briefing.

The briefer pointed out that the JCS analysis showed a requirement to spend roughly $388B (then year dollars) above the 3% real growth baseline in order to meet the NSDD’s stipulation that risk levels should be maintained constant (at the 1986 level). Secretary Shultz pointed out that this meant that at an added cost of approximately $30B a year in constant dollars “we could say to the public that represents the cost of getting out from under this terrible threat.”

[2½ lines not declassified] Under these circumstances neither side would have enough strategic force capability remaining to achieve damage goals and would, therefore, have to increase their air-breathing strategic forces substantially. At the same time, we should not reduce our ongoing strategic modernization programs. We would need hot production lines for the MX and D–5 in particular to provide the capability to maintain balance with Soviets should the drawdown to zero ballistic missiles (ZBM) be aborted as a consequence of Soviet actions. Mr. Carlucci asked whether, in estimating the risk, likely Soviet actions had been projected ahead, throughout the 10 year drawdown period. Admiral Crowe replied that they had been, but noted that calculations of risk are tenuous and imprecise at best.

Secretary Shultz commented that he found the briefer’s viewgraph² reassuring because it showed that throughout the ten year period we always had more weapons than the target base required and that, post-1990, the situation gets even better. Admiral Crowe replied that result was built into the analysis. The tasking was to determine the force required to maintain risk at a level no greater than that in 1986, so it was a given that we would maintain an adequate number of warheads throughout the ten year period. What this portion of the briefing shows is the increment to the 3% real growth budget necessary to maintain risk at the postulated level. In other words, the analysis is constrained by risk but not by cost. That is why, at the 1996 end-point, the ZBM and non-ZBM warhead-to-target ratios are essentially the same. Secretary Shultz said he understood that, but noted that if you put the U.S. and Soviet charts side-by-side,³ it looks pretty good for us. The differential moves in our favor. “It’s a hell of a deal,” he said. Admiral Crowe replied that, while the U.S. figures are good, the Soviets’ are even better. They wind up with [less than 1 line not declassified] the number of warheads they need relative to the U.S. target base.

The briefer went on to note that a ballistic missile defense capability would be needed even in a ZBM world in order to hedge against the possibility of the Soviets’ cheating. Given the reduced scale of the probable threat, however, the scope of the defenses would be significantly limited. Shultz commented that “an insurance force against cheating was very much a part of the President’s proposal at Reykjavik. I was at the table.” He went on to comment that he thought “you people over here are really not doing your job properly when you just give up on air defense.” He felt defenses against the bomber/cruise missile threat should be pursued whether we go to a ZBM world or not. Weinberger agreed we should do more, and Carlucci pointed out that it’s a resource trade-off issue.

The briefer then went on to point out that since strategic deterrence would be less certain under ZBM, the Chiefs had decided that a stronger conventional defense capability would be a necessary hedge. Shultz asked what the total real growth rate would be to support all the Chiefs’ recommendations. General Wickham replied that it was about 8%. Others argued it would be higher—on the order of 10 to 13 percent. Referring to the final viewgraph⁴ which expressed the Chiefs’ view that it would [be] unrealistic to assume the necessary funding will be available, Shultz said that was not a military judgment but a political one. Weinberger argued that it was an appropriate military judgment. The fact is that the prospects for even the 3% annual growth postulated in the NDDS are poor, to say nothing of the $388B increment beyond the 3% growth rate which the Chiefs are talking about. Shultz replied that the correct formulation would be to say “X% real growth is required, and that the military judgment of the Chiefs is that, at that level of funding, we could maintain a constant level of risk.” The military judgment relates to the force structure required to maintain the prescribed risk level, not to the prospects of funding that force level. Whether we would be successful in obtaining the funding depends, among other things, on how the issue is presented to the American people. If we go to them and say, “here is a way to get out from under this especially destabilizing kind of warfare, and the cost isn’t that much,” the people might be willing to pay the price. It’s not unimaginable that we could get the desired support, Shultz concluded.

Summing up, the briefer noted that the JCS’s recommendation is that that the goal of transitioning to a world without offensive ballistic missiles within ten years be deferred. Shultz again noted that he did not consider that an appropriate military judgment. Crowe strongly disagreed. To go to ZBM without the intermediate step of, say, a 50% reduction, “to try it out, to see what effect it has, what the uncertainties are” is an appropriate application of military judgment in his view. Weinberger observed that the analysis’s estimates of likely Soviet actions could be conservative. To assume the Soviets won’t do more would be dangerous. Shultz returned to his earlier theme, observing that we must factor in public attitudes in reaching judgments about supportable funding levels. The public is concerned about nuclear weapons in general, and those which are the most destabilizing in particular. We are feeding that sentiment with our discussions about the importance of SDI—and justifiably so. Moreover, things like Chernobyl do make a difference in public attitudes—including the Soviets’. It seems to him, he continued, “that we must give some credibility to the possibility that public sentiment will force a reduction in ballistic missiles and nuclear weaponry.” Look at the effect of Gorbachev’s nuclear test proposals, for example. They have had a heavy political impact. It’s a simple argument. We need testing if we are to have nuclear weapons; therefore, if we stop testing, the weapons will go away. We have effectively countered much of the Soviet propaganda—as evidenced, e.g., by deployment of our LRINF systems to Europe; but there remains a strong underlying public sentiment in favor of nuclear weapons elimination.

“Where is SDI taking us?”, Shultz asked. Assume that by ’96 we know how to protect against ballistic missiles. The evidence is powerful that if we can do it, the Soviets can do it too. If that happens, then we both will have (ballistic) missiles and a defensive system. But we will have effectively neutralized the ballistic missile force, so we then have to go forward and do all these other things (outlined in the JCS analysis.) It’s realistic, he continued, to look ahead and say (to the public) that “the orders of magnitude being looked at in projected defense budgets are not right, given the assumptions we have to make about the Soviets’ progress and continued aggressiveness.” Somebody in the world of politics needs to ask: what is the right amount of resources to defend the country? No presidential candidate today shows the slightest inclination to say: instead of the (FY88) $312B plus 3% real growth we need considerably more. Recall that in the ’70s we had a debate about defense requirements, “and those of us who felt they were not being adequately addressed came out on the losing end of the argument.” Then sentiment started to shift. There was the Committee on the Present Danger, with Paul Nitze, and that had an impact. The Carter Administration began to turn around. Then the President came down hard during the campaign on the need for strengthening defense, and it became part of his mandate when he was elected. That has been a very important thing, and it came out of politics. There’s another gestation period going on now, perhaps. For the last two years we’ve been beaten on defense. That may have stabilized now, Shultz felt. We should therefore try to set our political sights higher at this point. If the President’s proposals at Reykjavik have done nothing else, they have caused the people to think seriously about a world without ballistic missiles, or at least one with fewer nuclear weapons; and that kind of world is a more expensive world. The question that must be asked—and it is a good political question—is: in a situation where the world can be blown up around us, what is it worth to have the risk held constant but in a safer way? Why are we not willing to pay a little more for that? The American economy is so big and dynamic it’s awesome, Shultz continued. “As I’ve been in Washington, and seen the dimensions (of the economy) it’s dawned on me that we could be discussing defense budgets substantially larger than those which are being discussed.”

Weinberger replied that it is necessary to keep in mind certain essential differences between the U.S. and Soviet systems. Even with a superb campaign to get more resources for defense the results are likely to be short-lived. This is not true in the Soviet Union. There is no body politic there to restrain the Government. Budget decisions require the approval of only three or four people. That puts us at a disadvantage. Realism demands that we recognize how difficult it is to keep the U.S. properly focussed on the need for increased defense. We can never do it more than two years at a time. This year’s hearings, so far, suggest little change. In the absence of war, there’s no political likelihood of getting an increase for more than two or three years in a row. ZBM in ten years is simply not feasible, practical, or safe.

Shultz replied that he is not going to give up trying to get people to think bigger about what needs to be done. “Cap is right in the short run,” in his view, but our task is to make the political case for what needs to be done.

Carlucci said he assumed that the Chief’s analysis and recommendations would be formally transmitted to the President, at which time it might be appropriate to have a meeting. Secretary Shultz can articulate his views in writing, or at the meeting. We will welcome other views as well, he indicated.

Wickham noted that Shultz’s position is an attractive one, but the reality of things showed it is often difficult to generate the political support for adequate defense. NATO is a classic example. The MC 14/3 “flexible response” strategy is an excellent strategy, but the NATO nations have never been willing to ante up the money to support it. Shultz replied that his point is different. If you don’t build the case, you obviously won’t get the result you’re looking for. The point is to get to the people who vote and make the case to them. If you don’t do that, “you’re holding an empty bag.” Attitudes can be changed. In this regard Shultz thought it was significant that the SASC had just voted to support 3% real growth, “and that’s because people have banged away at it.”

(In an aside, Admiral Crowe remarked to me after the briefing that he thought it had been an excellent session—particularly good for the interchange with Secretary Shultz. He felt the Chiefs should make an effort to interact [with] him more frequently.)

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 94, NSDD 250. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Cockell. Cockell sent the memorandum to Carlucci under cover of a February 26 memorandum: “Attached at Tab I is my Memorandum for Record on yesterday’s meeting with the Chiefs. I did it primarily for Colin Powell’s information, since he was unable to attend. With your concurrence, I will let Bob Linhard and Lint Brooks read it as well.” Powell approved the recommendation to share the memorandum with Linhard and Brooks, and wrote “Thanks Bill, super.” (Ibid.)
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