209. Letter From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to President Reagan1
I was deeply concerned by the trend of the discussion at this Tuesday’s NSPG meeting.2
The first item on the agenda was “early phased deployment.” From the beginning of SDI it has been obvious that an advanced defense system could not be deployed all at once, that the lift requirements alone would necessitate its being deployed incrementally. Therefore, there can be no doubt that, if such a deployment is to take place, it must be in increments. The real issue is whether or not you should at this time decide that the U.S. will deploy an advanced defense. The billboard effect of the stories in the press that there was a consensus for “early phased deployment” will be read as a consensus not only to deploy but to abrogate the ABM Treaty. It is possible to deploy such an ABM defense only if there has been an agreed amendment to the ABM Treaty (which is hardly likely) or U.S. withdrawal therefrom.
I do not believe the SDI program is ready for a determination by you approving deployment, nor are we at a point where we could persuasively justify such a determination to the Congress, which must fund the deployments, or to our allies. We have been saying for two years that we would decide to deploy only if our research indicated the technologies had met certain criteria. SDI research to date has not provided sufficient evidence to indicate those criteria can be met. Moreover, assertions by us to the contrary will look especially weak, until SDI has been through the Pentagon’s acquisition review procedures. I am told that it is the unanimous opinion of the Chiefs that the program is not ready for a deployment decision.
My regular consultations with Senate and House Observer Groups on the Hill indicate that a deployment decision now would elicit an extremely negative reaction from the Congress; we would probably receive no funding for deployment, and the Congress would reduce research funding below the levels they would otherwise accept. Similarly, the consultations I have held with our NATO allies at your behest indicate that they would vigorously oppose a deployment decision. Finally, such a decision now could end the possibility during your [Page 749] Administration for negotiated reductions in offensive arms, just as our efforts over the last six years are finally showing signs of bearing fruit.
We have a similar problem with respect to deciding now to restructure the SDI testing program to conform to the less restrictive interpretation. There is considerable opposition to that interpretation on the Hill and, although you alone can interpret treaties, the Congress can legislate restrictions on testing independent of our treaty obligations. I believe Congress would respond to a declaration now that we are moving to the broad interpretation by restricting us via legislation to testing that conforms to the narrow interpretation. Furthermore, I believe many of our allies, who have conditioned their participation in SDI on our conformance with the narrow interpretation, would cease their participation.
In order to determine whether a beneficial arms reduction agreement is possible, I think it important that we promptly clear the way for a substantive discussion with the Soviets on the issue of what testing of components based on what the ABM Treaty calls “other physical principles” is, or is not, prohibited by the ABM Treaty as it stands today. If our negotiators remain uninstructed for such a discussion, Mr. Gorbachev and his propagandists will have a relatively easy time putting the onus for lack of progress in the negotiations on the United States.
Finally, we don’t need to make a deployment decision now. The Congress will not be seriously addressing the FY88–89 defense budget for several months. In the interim, we can continue research, begin the DOD acquisition review process, determine if the current process in Geneva is likely to produce an acceptable agreement, and begin laying the groundwork for future decisions with the Congress and our allies.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987. Secret; Sensitive.↩
- See Document 206.↩