Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

206. Minutes of a Meeting¹

Washington, February 3, 1987, 1:50–3 p.m.

MEETING OF THE SENIOR PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORS

February 3, 1987

SUBJECT

• The SDI Program

MINUTES

ATTENDEES

• The President
• The Vice President Mr. Craig Fuller
• Secretary Shultz
• Ambassador Nitze
• Ambassador Rowny
• Secretary Weinberger
• Mr. Edwin Meese
• Admiral Crowe
• Mr. Kenneth Adelman
• Mr. Donald T. Regan
• Mr. James Miller
• Mr. Frank C. Carlucci
• Gen Colin Powell
• Col Robert Linhard

The meeting opened at 1:50 pm in the Situation Room. Mr. CARLUCCI announced that Mr. Gates, unable to attend, had sent a short statement. Mr. CARLUCCI then read the statement that highlighted, once again, that the Soviet Union:

— was continuing work on its own ABM systems;

— was working on a new generation of both offensive and defensive systems; and

— was pressing forward towards significant heavy lift capability.

Mr. CARLUCCI then began the agenda (Tab B)² and framed the first issue for discussion using the talking points attached at Tab C.³

After this introduction, the following discussion ensued. (N.B. These notes reflect the thrust of the remarks made. And while the notetaker did try to capture the speakers’ words as closely as possible, these should not be considered verbatim notes.)

WEINBERGER: If we want to deploy SDI, especially in light of continued Soviet activity, we need to consider the most effective way to proceed.

We have nothing to deploy now, nor do we anticipate anything upon which to base a deployment decision in the next year. There is nothing we should take “off-the-shelf” and consider for deployment. Rather, we need to focus on deploying something that is both effective in its own right and a part of a later, integrated system.

We have been looking at options, various paths and degrees of concurrency. The progress that we have made is astonishing.

Space-based Kinetic Kill Vehicle (SBKKV) technology is most promising, and the most likely to yield earliest results. We are in a position to recommend further testing of SBKKV, looking at the possibility of an initial deployment in the 1993/4 timeframe.

We don’t need to decide more about this now than to decide that we should focus on deploying a phase of SDI capability as an initial deployment. We will be unable to achieve our overall objectives at once.

We should see if, with proper testing and development, we can recommend an initial deployment of 60 garages carrying SBKKVs capable of killing some 2,000 weapons in boost phase. So we will need to be in a position to give the OK to the necessary testing and development.

We will need to be able to conduct realistic tests. The Delta 180 test proved that we could distinguish metal [i.e., the booster] within the plume [generated by the engine’s firing]. Delta 181, having found the missile in the plume, should test if we can hit the missile. We can’t conduct such an intercept under the restrictive interpretation (RI). However, under the legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the ABM Treaty, we can do the Delta 181 test and see if we can hit the missile. If the answer is yes, then we are well on the road to a useable technology.

We should think of the concept of phased SDI deployments like building a house. The 1st phase deployment is like laying the foundation of the house. The 2nd phase can be like putting up the walls; the 3rd, the ceiling.

We need to be able to move to planning for such activity now. Specifically, we need you, Mr. President, to decide the following:

1. that the concept of phased deployments is OK;

2. that you would like to deploy the 1st phase as soon as we can; and

3. that we can immediately restructure the SDI program to follow the LCI.

[At this point, Secretary Weinberger read large sections of NSDD 192, which was the October, 1985, decision document covering the President’s initial judgment on the interpretation of the ABM Treaty.]⁴

WEINBERGER: In October, 1985, you set certain criteria for moving to the LCI. It is now February, 1987, Mr. President, and the costs of maintaining the RI are now very high because of the astonishing success of the SDI program.

We could move to the LCI immediately. There may be no need for an announcement. You could simply allow us to do the planning under the LCI to prepare you to decide if you feel we can really support the 1993 option that I have suggested. Other options may also arise and be OK.

We don’t need you to announce a deployment decision or a date. All we need is the OK to press on under the LCI and the associated funding.

There is no rush to field something before the end of your Administration.

However, without an OK to move to the LCI, I fear that we will have to conduct ineffective testing and, as a result, we may lose funding for the SDI program.

CARLUCCI: Cap (Weinberger), the first issue under discussion is simply the concept of phased deployment.

WEINBERGER: Well, on that, phased deployment is the only way to go. We simply will never be able to do it all at once. Programmatically, it is the only way. The Soviets may get there first.

I am not interested in a point defense. The 1st phase deployment must be an area defense.

CARLUCCI: What do you say to the arguments on the hill that phased deployments could lead to instability?

WEINBERGER: The logic of the argument is faulty, and that is key. The same players argued that we should not deploy MX without a defense.

SDI may be the only thing that keeps the Soviets at the negotiating table. They agreed to the ABM Treaty only after ABM passed the Senate by 1 vote.

The Soviets may not sign any agreement if we don’t press forward. We should press forward. It will provide much better leverage.

As long as the 1st phase involves a boost-phase capability, it is not destabilizing.

CARLUCCI: Do others see any problems with the concept of phased SDI deployments?

CROWE: The Chiefs support SDI and the concept of phased deployments. They do feel that SBKKV technology is very promising. However, they feel that they simply do not have enough information now to decide to deploy anything in 1993.

WEINBERGER: I agree. We don’t know enough now to decide.

CROWE: I agree. We do have problems yet to resolve, especially in C3. The software issue is very tough. At this point, the single biggest challenge may be battle management.

WEINBERGER: However, we are making great strides in computational capabilities to: discriminate decoys from warheads, and to compute the trajectories needed to kill vehicles in flight. We are experiencing a real expansion of knowledge.

CROWE: But it still remains a challenge. In addition, a heavy lift vehicle is needed, both for general national needs and to meet the challenging requirements of a 1993 deployment option. We need more information on whether we can build a suitable heavy lift vehicle by 1993.

WEINBERGER: The Soviets are already building heavy lift capability.

THE PRESIDENT: Didn’t we already approve pressing forward towards heavy lift capability in NASA’s management plan?

CROWE: That was based on a different timetable.

VICE PRESIDENT: But, was that for SDI?

WEINBERGER: It supports both civil and defense needs.

SHULTZ: I didn’t know that the Secretary of Defense had made specific recommendations [as outlined in CARLUCCI’S introductory talking points] in December; or, for that matter, that the President was briefed on this subject. However, I have informed myself on the issues involved. General Abrahamson has briefed me several times lately on the status of the SDI program.

In my view, we have done well on the issue of survivability. I also share the sense that we have accomplished many important things.

I am equally impressed by the unanimity of the view of the Chiefs, expressed on several occasions, that it is not to the US benefit if the Soviet Union departs from the ABM Treaty.

Phased deployments will require that we depart from the ABM Treaty. It is my view that we should not start on phase one unless you know what will follow in the entire integrated system. This must be considered prior to any deployment decision. However, once you satisfy our conditions, the only way to proceed is in a phased manner. This is very sensible to me.

But we are not in a position to decide on a phased deployment now. I agree with the Chiefs that there are problems to be resolved, like C3, and we need more information on phases two and three.

So, Mr. President, in summary, I agree both with Cap and with Bill Crowe.

CARLUCCI: Do you mean that you agree conceptually with the idea of a 1st phase, on which phases two and three could build?

SHULTZ: We need to know the next steps [phases two and three] before we cross the ABM Treaty [by deploying phase one]. If phase one is simply countered by the Soviet Union breaking out, that is not good.

WEINBERGER: Mr. President, there is not a lot of daylight between our positions [Shultz-Weinberger]. By the time we need to consider a real deployment of phase two or three, we can determine if we need more SBKKVs or something based on other technologies. By 1993, we will be in a position to make such a decision.

We need to keep our options for 1993 open. There is no need to decide today. There is no need to decide today even if the initial deployment should be SBKKVs.

The Soviets could counter SBKKVs only with great effort, and in the process, our defenses would introduce great doubt into their military planning.

It is not our idea just to deploy a phase one system and stop; but to go on make ballistic missiles obsolete. The first phase system should make a start and contribute to this overall goal. We should only deploy something if it will be an integral part of the whole system.

We are making great strides. . . .

SHULTZ: [Interrupting] With respect to the 1993 option, it is my sense that, when questioned, General Abrahamson smiles as he says 1993. Others, who have managed other similar programs, say we should add a few more years to that estimate. 1993 is, at best, the earliest possible date; the most likely date is later. This must be kept in mind because it plays with what we do in Geneva.

WEINBERGER: Only a few years ago, the earliest projections were 1998/9. It is now realistic to talk about 1993.

I base my estimates not only on General Abrahamson’s view but also on the view of my oversight group. It has recognized Abe’s optimism, and feels that it is realistic.

ADELMAN: It would be imprudent to go forward with phase one if we needed phases two through four to maintain stability. We must judge that phase one is good for us on its own merits.

WEINBERGER: I agree; and I believe that we can meet that challenge.

SHULTZ: If we are to protect the 1993 option at all, we will need heavy lift capability; so we should press on with the pursuit of that heavy lift capability now.

CROWE: We could get along for a while [in 1993] without a new heavy lifter.

WEINBERGER: We could use available Titan IVs.

MILLER: Do we need a different heavy lifter than NASA wants?

WEINBERGER: No.

REGAN: But are we talking about two vehicles: one for OSD and another for NASA?

WEINBERGER: No, just one vehicle.

[At this point, CARLUCCI used his prepared points to move the discussion to the issue of the legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the ABM Treaty. He turned to Secretary Weinberger to begin this discussion.]

WEINBERGER: The issues of the LCI and the program are interlocked. To move to phased deployment, we need the most economical and effective way to test. For example, under the restrictive interpretation (RI) we have to use Delta 181 to test, trying for a near miss. This is a silly way to test, especially if the LCI is legally correct.

The ABM Treaty forbids the deployment of ABM components based on other physical principles (OPP) without prior agreement. But even in the absence of such an agreement about deployment, it places no restrictions on the development or testing of such devices. This position has been sustained by our legal experts. We should be able to do anything we wish short of deployment.

It would be a monstrosity of logic to follow the RI for some number of years and then attempt to shift to the LCI. We should opt now to go for the most effective path.

CARLUCCI: Do we need integrated testing now?

WEINBERGER: Yes. We don’t need a test this year; but we need to begin planning for such a test this year. The first such test could come in 1988/9.

CARLUCCI: You don’t mean 1988. The budget is already submitted.

WEINBERGER: It could be 1988. We could reallocate funds.

CARLUCCI: So you hold the possibility of such a test in calendar year 1988?

WEINBERGER: I don’t know the exact date; but I do know we need to begin planning for it now.

MEESE: It seems that we have general agreement from all Administration lawyers that the LCI is acceptable.

ADELMAN: Yes. We had. But there is new evidence. We need to look at the new evidence to be prudent. It may not have a bearing on the issue, but we must be sure.

WEINBERGER: There were discussions by Ellis; loose conversation at the SCC some 13 years after the treaty was signed. Ellis should be retired.

SHULTZ: We need to adopt a strategy to support the LCI because we need the LCI to achieve the full potential of SDI.

We need a strategy because we need to garner support effectively, in a manner that can be supported by Congress. Nothing will be gained by an announcement or reprogramming if Congress cuts SDI funds.

I believe that there is a way to accomplish this via a process of discussion with the Senate and the House, and with our allies also. Judge Sofaer sent me a copy of a memorandum⁵ tasked by the NSC staff which provides such a plan.

Three main issues must be handled; and this can only be done in collaborative way with Congress if we are to avoid having our water cut off:

1. Sofaer has already focused on the negotiating record and we have made this available to some in Congress. Attacks from these quarters have diminished. We need to make this record available to others in Congress so they can see for themselves.

2. We need to consider the common law of treaties. We must examine more fully the practice and understand what both parties have been doing under the treaty over the years.

— The ACDA General Counsel recently put out a paper on this and Sofaer began receiving calls about it before he even had a chance to read it himself.

ADELMAN: That was just a compilation of the various statements collected.

SHULTZ: It was released on the record and made immediately available to the press. So this needs to be dealt with. Sofaer has completed a draft memorandum on this subject, and he is confident that we have a case, but he requires more time to work on it and prove that it is correct.

3. Representations were made at the time of ratification that also must be dealt with. Secretary of Defense Laird did say that the US understood the treaty as presented under the narrow interpretation when he was asked. Some in the Senate are now claiming that that is the interpretation that the Senate ratified. We need to work this through carefully before engaging on this point so that we put ourselves in a position so that we can successfully assert our position in light of what we and the Soviets have been doing.

In short, I agree with Cap. Cap is right. We need to move to the LCI. However, we need to do it effectively. We need to convince and win support before we move.

At the same time, it is conceivable that the negotiations could result in an agreement on prohibited activity that would help us, especially on moving to the SDI testing we desire, and would build support for SDI.

Max is now authorized to listen and probe; but to adhere to our position that the LCI is legally correct and that’s that. He will continue to do this. This is a satisfactory tactic for now; but we may find a moment in the near future where movement is a good idea.

Right now we are not ready or able to examine options internally.

We also need some sort of process to allow the implementation of the LCI.

Sofaer suggests a 5–6 month program. I don’t see why 5–6 months is a problem. There is nothing we need to do to the FY88 budget for now, and current Congressional appropriation language limits us to the narrow interpretation.

I fully agree with your hope, Mr. President, of moving to a world with fewer nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The proposal made at Reykjavik was a good one. The immediate agreement to reduce offensive arsenals by 50% would be even better.

If we are able to deploy a perfect SDI shield, great. It would mean that we have achieved the “0 ballistic” situation called for at Reykjavik. That is where the SDI program is going, and we should recognize it.

This possibility also means that we will need enhanced defenses against cruise missiles, bombers and conventional forces. All of this will cost more money, in addition to the costs of SDI deployments.

The level of real spending for the Defense budget is orders of magnitude too low. We need to get this reality in play. We need, and will need more than 3% growth. There is no reason why higher levels can’t be supported by our economy. We need to make the public realize that if they want a safer world, they have to pay for it—and it will be more expensive. We need to get this into play while we have some time to go.

In summary, I support the LCI. We need a process so that we can implement it effectively, so that it will be supported. We also need to show our public where SDI is taking us and what our future needs will be.

WEINBERGER: I like the part about your supporting Cap. We do have a major disagreement on the subject of negotiating what is prohibited. To engage in such a negotiation, we will eventually have to prohibit something; and I don’t know what that could be.

SHULTZ: We need to see if there is anything. We can’t discuss this now within the Administration, so we can’t prepare to negotiate. If the Soviets realize our situation they will see they are in clover. They will be able to press us knowing we will never agree. [The notes of the last two sentences of the Secretary’s remarks are very brief and the resulting reconstruction may not be accurate even in its basic thrust.]

WEINBERGER: The Soviets want to strengthen the ABM Treaty. If we sit down to negotiate, they can only conclude that there is something that we are prepared to prohibit. But we have a position under which nothing which is based on OPP (save deployment) is prohibited.

Further, I believe that 5–6 months of study will impact on our program and is unnecessary. The common law of treaties is not applicable here. It has only been since 1983/4 that we have had the possibility of using other physical principles. Laird’s remarks should not bind us. He was talking about traditional technologies. We really don’t need to spend 6 months working up good arguments.

We need to stay away from negotiations on what is permitted and prohibited.

George (Shultz) is correct that we can never leave ourselves with our deterrent down. We will need air defense and improved conventional capability. It is vital that we don’t take down our strategic offensive nuclear capability before enhanced conventional capability is in place. Therefore, we need to watch the reductions schedules.

In any case, all agree that any additional prohibitions are almost certainly going to be unverifiable. There should be no additional agreements on prohibitions. We should prepare a strong case for the LCI and press on.

ADELMAN: All agree to the need to move the program to the LCI. To make a deployment decision, we will need integrated testing. You would not buy a car based on the assurance that all the individual pieces were fully tested, but the car was never assembled and driven.

We need to do three things:

1. We need to look at all the legal evidence to ensure that we are correct.

2. We need to have clear idea of the specific tests under the LCI vice the RI, and why each is needed.

3. It is fine to talk about activities in the ABM under the ABM Treaty, as long as we are trying to get the Soviets to buy the LCI.

We should go nowhere beyond the LCI. Anywhere beyond LCI is a wilderness, a swamp, especially since we don’t really know what the Soviets are doing [in advanced defenses] and what they are driving for.

MEESE: The 5/6 month study that Sofaer suggests can be done in 3 months. We should consider concurrently going forward with the planning needed to restructure the program.

The idea we should pursue is not to see if we can sell the LCI, but to sell it. We will need a massive, big deal sales job—and it should be seen as a big deal.

Go up and do it. Make the effort massive if needed. I will help with assets. If it really looks like it will take 4 months, let’s find out by pressing for 3 months.

[Secretary Shultz left the room to go to the Hill for a Congressional hearing.]

THE PRESIDENT: Why couldn’t we just go ahead [and restructure the SDI program] without making any announcement? We could let others bring up any problems, and we could respond to them.

We could, and should point out that we are not going as far as the Soviets have gone “under” the ABM Treaty. We may have only 5 years to prepare, since the Soviets are already installing battle management radars.

If the Soviets press on with both their offensive and defensive improvements, we will be hurting.

Why should we go to Congress, just do it?

CARLUCCI: You already issued an NSDD [192] which made commitments.

THE PRESIDENT: But how does that NSDD read?

[Secretary Weinberger gave the President a copy of NSDD 192 to review. The President read portions of the NSDD aloud. He noted that it was a good position, well stated, and had stood the test of time. He also noted that it permitted him to move as he had suggested.]

WEINBERGER: You will note, Mr. President, it sets as one of the conditions “adequate funding.”

CARLUCCI: The problem with your approach, Mr. President, is that if we surprise the Congress, they could simply cut SDI funding.

ADELMAN: I agree. We should not attempt to bushwack the Congress. It will simply result in funding cuts.

[The President returned to reading NSDD 192 aloud.]

ROWNY: Mr. President, the SDI program is now approaching critical mass, so it would be good to announce your intention to restructure the program.

NITZE: To build the support that we will need, Mr. President, you must inform them of your restructuring.

WEINBERGER: You don’t need to ask them; but in order to support your action, you do need to tell them.

[The President continued reading NSDD 192. He completed reading the section involving Soviet violations.]

THE PRESIDENT: The whole story is in this NSDD. It covers the Soviet violations. It explains that I evaluated the price involved in my decision. It sets the criteria that “as long as the program receives adequate support.” It’s all laid out.

The NSDD makes it clear that my decision not to restructure the program in 1985 was temporary, but that I clearly retained the right to move to the broader interpretation when needed.

CARLUCCI: Mr. President, we are agreed on a number of points.

1. We are agreed on the concept of phased deployments.

2. We are agreed on the need for more priority on the heavy lift vehicle.

3. We are agreed on moving to the LCI when the correct foundation is laid.

We now need to discuss the arms control aspects, including the issues of negotiating permitted/prohibited activities, and the process of implementing the points made above. We will carry on this discussion at next week’s meeting to focus on these areas.

We need to be able to implement our decisions effectively; and the only way we can do this is if our deliberations on this sensitive issue stay within this room.

MEESE: I want my lawyers to get with Sofaer to see how we can help.

THE PRESIDENT: We do need to effectively work this issue with the Congress.

WEINBERGER: Don’t forget you, Mr. President, and not the Congress, interpret treaties. The Congress can’t impose an interpretation of the treaty on you because of Constitutional grounds.

CARLUCCI: Our next meeting will be next Tuesday.⁶

[The meeting was completed at 3 pm.]

Tab C

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁷

Washington, undated

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

I. Introduction (5 minutes)

— Mr. President, the purpose of this meeting is to consider Cap’s recommendations made initially on 17 December concerning phased or incremental SDI deployments. The concept, which has been briefed to George and others, raises several important issues for decision.

— Some of these decisions, including the very concept of incremental deployments, are basically programmatic.

— But a related and more difficult issue for decision is whether or not to restructure the SDI program to take advantage of our full legal rights under the ABM Treaty. This question raises important considerations of program needs, political timing, and Congressional and Allied reaction.

— We will try to get through the programmatic issues as expeditiously as we can to allot about half of our time to the treaty issue.

— The basic programmatic issue is the concept of incremental deployments. This concept raises subsidiary questions about illustrative architectures, possible deployment dates, and the need for a Heavy-lift Launch Vehicle.

II. Concept of Incremental Deployments and Early Options (10 minutes)

— From the preliminary discussions most of us have had, the concept of incremental deployment of strategic defenses seems to make sense both militarily and technologically. It provides a path toward our ultimate objective of comprehensive strategic defenses protecting U.S. and Allied populations.

— We would want to ensure that each step moves us toward this goal and that each step improves strategic stability by complicating Soviet attack planning and confounding their confidence that an attack would succeed.

— Would anyone like to comment on the concept of incremental deployments itself?
(After discussion)

— Cap, if I correctly understood the briefing I received, you are not proposing a definite system or deployment schedule, but instead you have provided an example of the type of deployment option that may be available. Is that correct?
(If the question of criteria for deployment is raised)

— When we make initial deployments, we must be able to make the case that we are achieving an interim improvement in strategic stability. The President’s criteria of military effectiveness, survivability and cost effectiveness answer potential criticism that strategic defenses are destabilizing. If we cannot answer this criticism, we may put at risk the whole SDI program.

— Furthermore, I think it is quite encouraging how far we have come toward meeting the criteria for deployment. While more work may need to be done before a specific system can be analyzed, I for one, am confident that the SDI program can meet the tough standards we have set for it.
(If there is discussion of the cost-effectiveness criterion)

— We have made it clear repeatedly that this is far more than an economic consideration. It seems to me that the bottom line is that the system we choose should not allow the Soviets to easily defeat the system simply by proliferating their offense.
(If there is consensus on the concept of incremental deployment)

— Mr. President, it seems that there is consensus that the best course for ultimately deploying strategic defenses is through incremental deployments, building toward a comprehensive system.

III. Need for Heavy-Lift Capability (10 minutes)

— Like the concept of incremental deployments, we may also have a consensus on the need for a Heavy-lift Launch Vehicle. A new cargo-carrying rocket would be imperative for strategic defenses with space-based elements, and would boost other military and civil space programs as well.

— Does anyone have any comments on the need for an HLV?
(After discussion)

— Mr. President, there may remain some questions about program management and specific design for the HLV, but there seems to be consensus that the U.S. needs such a system.

IV. Restructuring the SDI Program (30 minutes)

— Cap believes we should move now to take advantage of our full legal rights under the ABM Treaty, allowing, for example, integrated testing of space-based kinetic interceptors. This is perhaps the most important decision on SDI that you will make over the next two years. In weighing your decision, you may wish to take account of six factors:

— the program costs of sticking with a more restrictive interpretation;

— the best timing for taking advantage of the legally correct interpretation (LCI);

— dealing with Congress, including likely action by Levin and others to try to legislate the restrictive interpretation (RI);

— Allied views;

— the effects on the Geneva arms reduction talks; and

— any other Soviet reactions.

— Cap, can I turn to you first to summarize your rationale and the program needs, and to give your thoughts on the factors I mentioned?

— George, would you like to comment?

— Does anyone else have thoughts on this issue?
(After discussion)

— I understand there is a newly discovered problem involving U.S. statements to the Soviets in the Standing Consultative Commission prior to the President’s October 1985 decision on the LCI. I know that the General Counsels of the relevant agencies are studying the situation and that the earliest we can expect an opinion is in about two weeks.

— Ken (Adelman), I understand you have taken a personal interest in this, how serious a problem is this?

— Mr. President, you may also wish to study this issue from another angle. There are now several options on the table with respect to possible new U.S. arms control proposals. Some of these options would have an effect on our ability to exercise the LCI. Those proposals will be a topic for discussion by the near future, perhaps as early as next week.

V. Summary (5 minutes)

— Mr. President, this has been a good discussion. It has shown some important areas of consensus, such as the concept of incremental deployments and the need for an HLV. It has also revealed some important differences of opinion.

— We will continue to work on tying up the loose ends identified by this session. Thank you all for coming.

Tab D

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁸

Washington, February 2, 1987

ISSUES FOR NSPG DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

Mr. President, this paper is designed to prepare you for potentially very significant NSPG on the future conduct of the SDI program which will be held tomorrow afternoon. The agenda for the NSPG is based on the major recommendations made to you about the SDI program by the Secretary of Defense in a briefing given to you on December 17, 1986. There are three main agenda items; and this paper deals first with the third item on the agenda since it is clearly the most difficult.

AGENDA ITEM 3: RESTRUCTURING THE SDI PROGRAM

Introduction

In 1983, when you directed the establishment of the SDI program, the US believed that the ABM Treaty should be interpreted with respect to future “exotic” advanced defensive systems in a fairly “narrow” way. At the time, we believed that we would likely have to use a series of more limited experiments to “establish the feasibility” of such defenses sufficiently to permit a future President to make a decision to press on (beyond the ABM Treaty’s bounds) to move toward the deployment of advanced defenses because full scale, integrated testing of such systems was not permitted under the Treaty. We were not certain that the Soviet Union agreed with this view; and in fact, the Soviets had resisted it to some degree in negotiation. However, it was the US view. As a result, the SDI program was initially structured to achieve its objectives while operating under this “narrow” interpretation of the treaty.

In the fall of 1985, you reviewed the ABM Treaty and decided that a “broader” interpretation of the treaty was “fully justified.” At the same time, you determined that as long as the SDI program was capable of reaching its objectives, as a policy matter, we would not restructure the SDI program to exercise the added flexibility provided by the “broader” interpretation of the treaty. However, at that time, you clearly reserved the right to restructure the SDI program in accordance with the “broader” interpretation if needed later. Further, you directed that the Secretary of Defense provide to you a report at the end of every quarter, beginning in December, 1985, which outlined the costs in terms of program opportunities lost by maintaining this policy. (You have never received any such reports.)

You took the position you did in 1985, based upon the recommendation of the staff, because it was judged to be too risky to move the program to the “broad” interpretation of the ABM Treaty at that time.

The Immediate Issue

On December 17th, the Secretary of Defense recommended that you take that step now and that you authorize him to immediately restructure the SDI program to take full benefit of the “broad” interpretation of the ABM treaty, an interpretation that we have begun to refer to as the “Legally Correct Interpretation” or “LCI” for short. The issue of restructuring the SDI program is likely the most significant and difficult strategic issue that you will face as President over the next two years. It is certainly the toughest strategic issue that your staff has faced in meeting its responsibilities to recommend a course of action to you; and it is so not because the issue is both significant and complex (although it is), but because it is so heavily based on a series of key political judgments that, in the end, only you are best qualified to make.

All of your advisors agree that if we could restructure the SDI program along the lines of the “broader” or “legally correct interpretation” now, the program would be cheaper, quicker and more certain (e.g., technical uncertainties reduced before decisions need be made on any specific deployment). It would permit us to conduct “integrated” testing of prototype advanced ABM systems, and do so without hobbling the individual components: testing which, as we will shortly explain, is not permitted under the more narrow interpretation. This would result in fewer tests since in a single test we could evaluate new sensors and kill mechanisms together, at full capability, under realistic conditions, and thus allow us to move forward faster, save both time and money, and significantly reduce technical risk in the process.

Finally, and most importantly, if we could institute this interpretation, it would mean that a future President could decide to move to deployment of specific advanced defensive systems, a step that would clearly require him to move beyond the ABM Treaty, based on a full-up test of the prototype of such a system, a test which could be conducted while staying under the ABM Treaty only under this interpretation of the treaty. Without this, a future President would have to base a decision to either, (1) move beyond the ABM Treaty to conduct full prototype integrated testing prior to making a decision to pursue deployment, or (2) move beyond the treaty and (in effect) make a deployment decision, based on a series of tests involving less than an integrated system operating under realistic conditions.

Whether a future President could make such a decision without full, integrated prototype testing is questionable at best; and the risk of putting a future President in that position is the “future risk” we would like to avoid by restructuring the SDI program now.

However, some feel that such an action runs very significant “near-term” risks, including the risk of:

— Congressional legislation locking us into the “narrower” or the “restrictive interpretation” of the treaty;

— retaliatory SDI program funding cuts and the renewal of debate about whether to pursue SDI at all;

— adverse Allied reactions and problems, including increased pressure on our friends like Thatcher and Kohl and perhaps with an adverse impact on Allied participation in SDI;

— a retaliatory Soviet slow-down in any negotiating activity in the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva;

— other negative Soviet propaganda initiatives or programmatic reactions like an acceleration of their offensive modernization and/or more traditional ABM programs; and

— a more difficult time in handling an emerging technical legal challenge to the US view of the “legally correct interpretation” of the treaty which we will explain later.

The issue, therefore, is whether we can restructure the SDI program at this time without significant damage to the program as we know it.

You will likely find the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense at odds over this issue. Once it becomes public that you are considering such an action, you will also hear from Congress with strong views expressed by both key members on the right and left. You will also certainly hear from Mrs. Thatcher; and you will also likely hear from other allied leaders, especially those whose nations now are a part of the SDI program: UK, Italy, FRG, Israel, and Japan (which now is almost a participant).

The reason, then, that this is such a critical issue is that the momentum of SDI is at stake; and with it, quality of national security for near-term. Unless we can institutionalize the SDI program, the next Congress or President could kill the current program; so we must put a premium on actions which can protect SDI even if those actions involve risks. On the other hand, the program itself is still in its relative infancy, and we have to worry about asking it to move too quickly lest we stunt its growth, or worse still, contribute to the “crib death” of the current program.

So, in many respects, we are trading the extent to which we are exposed to near-term political risks (associated with the health and survival of the current research program for a potential reduction in future political risks (associated with our ability to move from SDI to the deployment of advanced defenses).

And, we are talking about dangers to the current program and the risk of a loss of momentum, rather than dangers to the future US ability to deploy advanced defenses, because even if the current SDI program were killed, it would have to be reinvented and reborn, after a very damaging delay, because under such conditions the Soviet Union is going to continue to press ahead in both offense and defense and the United States will have no acceptable alternative national security response except the reestablishment of the SDI program. This basic reality is the reason that you have long recognized how central to future US and Western security the SDI program is, and why, as long as the Soviet Union remains the type of government it is and no matter what concessions the Soviet Union may offer, the promise that SDI offers can never be bargained away at the negotiating table.

We will return to this critical issue, whether to permit the SDI program to be restructured to use the full flexibility provided by the “legally correct interpretation” (LCI or “broad interpretation”) of the ABM Treaty, after a short review of ABM Treaty’s provisions in this area.

Differences Between the “Legally Correct Interpretation” (LCI) and the “Restrictive Interpretation” (RI)

As we think about the terms of the ABM Treaty, we should keep in mind one basic fact that we can’t escape: while the basic purpose of the ABM Treaty was to improve security and stability (goals shared by the SDI program), the method chosen and the explicit thrust of the ABM Treaty is to block the deployment of nation-wide or large area “active” defenses, exactly the types of defenses that we seek in the SDI program. No matter what we do, we will always have to deal with that basic incompatibility.

You have committed the US to conduct the SDI program in accordance with the ABM Treaty: therefore, short of the deployment of such defenses, the Soviet Union will try to force us into the most restrictive interpretation of how much development and testing of such defenses can be conducted without forcing the US to renege on the commitment that you have made. The more restrictions on the development and testing of advanced defenses, and especially those which can provide wide-area or nation-wide defense at reasonable cost (like boost-phase, space-borne systems), that the Soviet Union can force us to accept, the more difficult it will be for the US to use SDI to reverse the current trends, shift the “correlation of forces” (as the Soviets like to say), and achieve your vision of the future.

Before we talk about the specific restrictions, we should note that the situation does provide a “loophole” that the Soviets can (and have been using). The ABM Treaty restricts a large-area or nation-wide “active” defense. It does not restrict “passive” defenses like hardening or dispersing things you want to protect. The Soviets, if left unchecked, can use this “loophole” because you can protect certain types of things with hardening and dispersal; things like a leadership cadre, the forces needed to maintain that leadership’s coercive power to control, or a selected portion of a much larger population. This ability gets even better when you can then use terminal defenses to protect the bunkers and hardened shelters. We can’t follow this path because you can’t harden our cities, and you really can’t defend any city (vice something buried under a city) with traditional ABM terminal defenses even if you believed that our society would permit us to deploy such systems in very large numbers.

So this brings us back to the simple fact that the Soviets need to keep us trapped under a very restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty so that they can continue to work on their 18 year program to defend what they value while we cannot. They will try to “strengthen” those existing provisions of the ABM Treaty that block our ability to use active defenses to protect what we value, especially advanced, mobile (and especially space-based) defenses, while leaving the way open for them to gradually continue to improve active, fixed land-based defenses which, when used with their extensive program of passive defenses, can protect what they value. If they succeed, at some point, the combination of their improvements in offense forces and both active and passive defenses, which are already eroding deterrence, will let them clearly undercut the basis of deterrence as we now know it, and do so to their advantage.

This returns us to the argument about how to interpret the specific provisions of the ABM Treaty.

The ABM Treaty places restrictions on ABM components, devices which are capable of substituting for ABM components, and systems which are made up of components. In its basic provisions, it identifies ABM components in terms of the technologies available in 1972 when the treaty was signed. It says an ABM component is an ABM interceptor, ABM launcher, and an ABM radar or any device which is capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor, ABM launcher, or an ABM radar. The ABM Treaty places no restrictions at all on the research, development, testing or deployment of any device that is not an ABM component. For ABM components based on the technologies known in 1972, and specifically for ABM interceptors, launchers and radars based on such technologies, there is no doubt that such components can only be:

— developed if they are fixed, land-based;

— tested at agreed ABM test ranges in a fixed, land-based mode; and

— deployed under restrictions identified in the treaty.

However, Agreed Statement D of the treaty recognizes that, in the future, devices could be invented based on “other physical principles” (OPP) not considered feasible at the signing of the treaty. The heart of the argument is what restrictions the ABM Treaty places on devices which are based on “other physical principles” in terms of their development, testing and deployment.

Both interpretations of the treaty agree that such systems, if they have the capability to substitute for ABM interceptors, launchers or radars, cannot be deployed without further agreement.

Under the “legally correct interpretation” (the “broader interpretation”), other than not being able to be deployed without further agreement, none of the other restrictions of the ABM Treaty apply to such systems. Therefore, whether fixed/land-based or not, you can develop such systems, test them anywhere you wish, even if the test device could be interpreted as having a capability to substitute for a traditional ABM component, as long as you did not deploy such devices without agreement. So, under this interpretation, the US could test fully capable space-borne sensors or kill mechanisms based on other physical principles, and it could even conduct a integrated test of sensors and kill mechanisms together to see if a system composed of such components would work.

Under the “restrictive” (or the “narrow” interpretation), devices based on other physical principles with the capability to substitute for more traditional ABM interceptors, launchers or radars, could be:

— developed only if they were fixed/land-based;

— be tested only as fixed/land-based devices at agreed ABM test ranges; and

— be deployed, after further agreement, only as fixed land-based components under the restrictions for traditional systems under the ABM Treaty.

So, for as long as the SDI program remains structured as currently, all the advanced devices that we develop or test, except for those which are fixed/land-based, must have their capability restricted so that it is clear that they cannot substitute for traditional ABM interceptors, launchers or radars. This means that we must cobble any device we may want to make mobile so that it can survive (like airborne optical sensors) or any device which we test in space. This also means that the Soviets remain free to develop full capability prototypes and conduct integrated tests of the fixed/land-based systems that they prefer and that their extensive network of passive defenses make useful, while we are blocked under this interpretation from doing the same for the types of advanced defenses, especially space-based systems, which we wish to pursue.

When the ABM Treaty was negotiated, and as late as just prior to your 1985 decision, the US argued vigorously for the “restrictive” interpretation of the treaty and most believe that the Soviet Union resisted this and supported a position that we would now call the “legally correct interpretation” of the treaty. With the advent of the SDI program, and a detailed review of the ABM Treaty and the associated negotiating record, the public positions of the US and the Soviet Union flip-flopped. This is the main argument that we are now having with the Soviet Union, and the main reason why this argument is so critical to the future of the SDI program and our long-term national security.

There is one other issue with respect to the interpretation of the ABM Treaty which is just starting to emerge within the Administration. Article VI of the treaty states that sides will not give missiles that are not ABM interceptor missiles the capability to counter a ballistic missile in flight. The issue here is whether the Space-Based Kinetic Kill Vehicles (SBKKVs) that the Secretary of Defense described in his briefing on December 17th, and which are the primary space-based kill mechanisms in the concept he presented, are “missiles” and therefore covered by this restriction. This issue is not central to the problem of the interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and the staffing is not yet mature, but it is something that affects the concept offered by the Secretary of Defense and something that bears monitoring.

The Risk Trade-Off

As you can see, if the SDI program is successful, we will bump-up against the ABM Treaty at some point. Until 1985, we didn’t have the “legally correct interpretation” and the possibility to conduct full prototype, integrated testing which should certainly provide sufficient information, in an unambiguous form, to support a decision to deploy an advanced defense, and do so at the expense of the ABM Treaty if the Soviets do not agree. Before that time, we pursued the SDI program on the belief and hope that we could evaluate the feasibility of advanced technologies sufficiently to permit us to make any needed decision to move beyond the treaty based on the results of more limited testing which could be conducted under the “restrictive interpretation” of the ABM Treaty. In pursing the SDI program under those rules, our knowledge has grown quickly, but we anticipate that learning curve will flatten out as [we] ask our scientists to extrapolate more and more from limited testing.

Most advisors still hold the view that this course can lead to a sufficient level of information that a future President could make a decision, but the time and cost needed to get to that point, and the level of technical and political risk associated with making a decision then to press on could be reduced if we moved to the “legally correct interpretation” now. In short, we may never have to go to the “legally correct interpretation”; but the question facing us is whether we should choose to do so now, trading increased risk to the survival of the program now for decreased risk that a future President will be unable to act later.

Some advisors may argue that this characterization of the problem is no longer valid, and that given current circumstances, we will never get sufficient information for a future political decision if we stay under the “restrictive interpretation” of the treaty. In short, those who hold this view would argue that we will have to face the risks of restructuring the SDI program at some point before we are in a position to make a deployment decision, therefore, the issue is whether we are better positioned to take those risks now or later.

If we accept this second assessment, we should consider the logical consequences of Congressional legislation that locks us into the “restrictive interpretation.” The question to ask of those who hold this assessment is that should a situation like that come to pass, and therefore the game is lost, would they support trading the program at that point for as much as possible? If the answer is no, then as a minimum, the strength of the argument to move now in restructuring the SDI program based on this assessment is weaker than it may initially appear.

Other Risks

In addition to the risks associated with being able to move from the SDI program to a deployment decision at some time, we must also consider the risks entailed as an immediate consequence of restructuring the program now. Assuming authority is given to restructure the program as requested, you should consider the likely immediate outcomes.

With respect to the program itself, it is still unclear how quickly such a decision would result in an action, a test, which is both needed to keep the pace of the program and which is now inhibited by the “restrictive interpretation” of the treaty. We have asked this question in a number of ways, and gotten fairly general answers from the Department of Defense. We have not asked the converse question: if authority is given, what specific changes would be made in the program and when? This is a question that we may still wish to ask.

The Congress could respond in a number of ways to such a decision. It could simply accept it and we would face the normal budget battle for funds. However, as the impact of the decision is felt in subsequent years, we may be in a better long-term position on funding and support. On the other hand, we have been told that some members intend to introduce legislation which would limit the US to the “restrictive interpretation” of the treaty regardless of our policy on restructuring the SDI program. Some advisors feel that a decision now to restructure the program would give this group the opportunity to do so and claim it was a response to an Administration action, rather then unsolicited Congressional meddling in national security, and thus make the situation more difficult. Other advisors feel that we will face this action by Congress no matter what we do, and we would be in a better position if we were to take the initiative because our supporters in Congress will not battle hard on our behalf if they believe that we are not going to restructure the SDI program and that as a matter of policy we intend to continue to restrict the SDI program even if the legislative restrictions are defeated. Finally, if we restructure the program now, some advisors worry that those in Congress who wish to restrict us could simply watch the programmatic actions attempted and selectively cut the funding in any “restructured” area of the program.

Our allies, also, will react to this decision if taken. Again, the best outcome we could expect is acceptance and support. Even in this case, we should recognize that supportive Allied leaders, like Mrs. Thatcher, will come under strong criticism within their own countries if they support the US on this score. On the other hand, we could face a rift with key allies over this issue, and the participation of some allies in the SDI program itself could suffer.

The Soviets will also react, certainly at the negotiating table and perhaps with propaganda or programmatic initiatives as well. For example, they could use the decision to slow activity in Geneva or even condition further progress on a reversal of the decision. At the extreme, they could use such a decision as an excuse to accelerate their own more traditional programs, increasing the risk of a near-term ABM breakout based on those systems.

While it is clear that a decision to restructure the SDI program may have the risks suggested, we should also remember that the very fact that you are considering such a decision means we run many of the same risks even if you decide not to restructure the program. For example, we will still face the risk of Congressional legislation. We may have allies tell us that if we ever make such a restructuring, they will take negative actions. We may have the Soviets make the maintenance of the “restrictive interpretation” a condition for the future. In fact, the Soviets may interpret a failure to move now as an assessment that we judge we can’t move, and take even harder positions.

In short, because this decision will be public, if we do not choose to restructure the program, we should expect to see some drawn lines in the sand to attempt to lock us in further for the future.

Related Arms Control Issue

We need also consider the relationship between this issue and recommendations that have been made on how best to proceed in the Defense and Space area of the Nuclear and Space Talks. The Arms Control Support Group is currently working on a paper evaluating the views of your principal advisors.

The Secretary of Defense is arguing for a position in which the only restriction that we would offer to the Soviets in this area is a commitment not to deploy advanced defenses for some period of years. During this period, the US would be free to follow the “legally correct interpretation” of the treaty.

The Secretary of State has asked you to consider an option which would:

— identify those devices based on “other physical principles”;

— negotiate criteria for judging whether such devices could substitute for more traditional ABM components;

— exclude sensors from further restriction; but

— negotiate agreed restrictions on kill mechanisms that meet the identified criteria.

This approach implies that negotiation of restrictions which would, in certain areas (i.e., sensors), be much more permissive than the “restrictive interpretation” but which could focus or space-based kill mechanisms and which likely would be more restrictive than the “legally correct interpretation” in these critical areas. Options for integrated testing of space-based sensors and kill mechanisms would certainly be affected.

The Arms Control Support Group paper will be completed shortly, and it could support a follow-up NSPG discussion of this related area in about one week.

The Legal Problem

In addition to all of the above, there is also a related legal issue to be considered. When the decision on the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty was made in 1985, it was based upon the discovery of ambiguity in the treaty with respect to devices based on other physical principles described earlier. To support the US position, our chief legal advisors used the negotiating record to resolve the areas of ambiguity in the treaty text. While the statements made by US officials during Senate ratification were studied and fully considered, and some review of the records of the SALT negotiations and the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) was completed, a full review of the entire SCC record as not completed at that time.

The continuing review of the SCC has recently uncovered the fact that the US SCC Commissioner, in May of 1985 and before the change in the US position with respect to the interpretation of the ABM Treaty, made at least one statement that laid out the US understanding of the application of the treaty to devices based on other physical principles in a way that could be very damaging to the current US position. This is even more of a problem because such statements are usually considered under international treaty law as evidence of “subsequent practice” by the parties of a treaty. In turn, international treaty law recognizes “subsequent practice” as a precedent for interpreting ambiguities in treaty text on a par with examination of the text itself. On the other hand, recourse to examination of the “negotiating record” is viewed as a much less authoritative source.

Our best legal experts are still assessing the seriousness of the problem we face. Judge Sofaer, the State Department legal counsel, currently thinks that the “legally correct interpretation” remains valid and the situation is manageable, but that time will be needed to address this in a professional manner. His assessment is that about three weeks to a month are needed.

We do know that the press is aware of this potential legal problem, so any action related to the interpretation of the treaty is likely to immediately cause the story to break before we are fully prepared (although we run the risk of this story breaking at any time).

In sum, there is an additional risk to be considered in approving a restructuring of the SDI program with the extent of this fundamental problem not fully known.

Issues of Timing

All of the above introduces an issue of near-term timing into any decisions about the issue of restructuring the SDI program. The Secretary of Defense argues for an immediate decision in favor of restructuring both because, in his view, it inhibits the progress of the program, and because he would like to reflect such a decision in legislatively mandated reports, the first being the annual report on the program which was due to the Congress on February 1st.

On the other hand, we have identified a relationship between this decision and decisions on arms control options for the Defense and Space area which we should be able to discuss next week. We also need time to get a better handle on the legal problem recently raised by the discovery of the SCC statements made in May 1985. Finally, we could use additional time to do a better job at trying to reduce some of the uncertainties in critical areas identified above.

All this argues that tomorrow’s NSPG serve as a discussion in which you can listen to the arguments and judge their strength, but not a decision meeting on this issue.

AGENDA ITEM 1: PHASED SDI DEPLOYMENTS

Approving the Concept

Turning to the remaining NSPG agenda items, the first involves the recommendation by the Secretary of Defense that you endorse and approve the concept of “phased” or “incremental” SDI deployments. We see little difficulty in your endorsing this concept, and much merit in doing so.

The Secretary of Defense’s approach helps the SDI program in giving us an explanation why we should not ask the first system of advanced defenses based on SDI to do entire mission of rendering ballistic missiles obsolete. He correctly notes that if we burden the program with such a challenge, it would certainly mean we would never make an initial deployment decision.

The Illustrative System

In proposing the concept of phased SDI deployments, the Secretary of Defense described an illustrative system which he feels should provide the focus for the SDI program over the near-term. He told you that we could be in a position to begin deploying this system by the 1992/3 timeframe. The initial deployment would be completed by about 1995 and be composed of the following elements:

— 300 Space-Based Kinetic Kill Vehicle (SBKKV) Carriers.

These would be platforms armed with 8–10 small rockets (called Space-Based Kinetic Kill Vehicles {SBKKV}) that could guide in and kill missiles by hitting them (like “smart rocket”) as the missiles were in their boost-phase of flight or shortly thereafter. This network of 300 SBKKV carriers would be organized into 12 orbital “belts” around the globe, with 25 SBKKV carriers in each belt spaced some 250 seconds apart. As they pass over the Soviet Union, half the belts would flow north to south; the other half, south to north. At any one time, some 30 SBKKV Carriers (10 in each of three belts, with a total of about 240 “smart rocks”) would be passing over the Soviet Union in range of ICBM fields. In turn, about half of the SBKKVs in range could engage missiles in boost-phase; the other half would be able to engage the missiles shortly after boost-phase. If every one of the 240 SBKKVs in range hit an SS–18 missile before it began dispensing its warheads, this system could kill 2400 hard target warheads enroute to the US. This would certainly be the best case, and even then it [would] not cover the entire threat that could be launched, but it would certainly break-up any secret ability to plan a coherent first strike.

— 5 Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS) Satellites.

These are sensors placed to geosynchronous altitudes which detect an enemy launch and pass needed information to the SBKKVs platforms which are at a much lower, near-earth orbit.

— 500–1000 ERIS Interceptors

These are land-based rockets that could engage another 500–1000 targets that escaped the SBKKVs as they enter the late midcourse phase of their ballistic flight. These could be well used to add additional uncertainty into Soviet planning to preferentially defending critical US installations.

— 40 Long Wave Infrared (LWIF) Probes

These would be rocket mounted sensors which could be launched to give additional targeting data to the ERIS kill vehicles, helping them to distinguish between real targets and decoys.

The Secretary of Defense estimates that such a system could be developed and deployed for under $60 billion. He has not asked for a “deployment decision” on this system. Rather, just your endorsement of the concept of phased deployments.

A number of your advisors are skeptical of our ability to begin deployment of such a system in the 1992/3 timeframe. One problem is the availability of space lift capability to put the system up at the price quoted. To do this, the Secretary assumes that he will have available a new heavy-lift launch vehicle (which is the subject of the remaining agenda item to be discussed). Most advisors would add about 2–3 years to the estimate of when the earliest such a system could begin deployment.

Criteria For Initial Deployments

One issue which may arise has to do with the “criteria” use to judge whether a deployment decision is made. The Secretary of Defense feels that we should have criteria for initial deployment, and that the primary criteria should be that the deployment contributes in a militarily effective and meaningful way and that it be the type of system that could be built upon to move towards a later phase of deployment more capable to reaching our long-term goals. In this way, we would be increasing our capability incrementally, as additional phases of SDI are deployed.

We have long had identified criteria for judging options for initial SDI deployments. NSDD 172 identified three main criteria: military effectiveness, survivability, and cost effectiveness on the margin. The latter two (survivability and cost effectiveness on the margin) have been incorporated into authorizing legislation associated with the SDI program by Congress. Also, since these last two criteria were first publicly discussed by Paul Nitze, and have subsequently been associated with him, Nitze has taken attacks on the wisdom of these criteria (especially cost effectiveness on the margin) as attacks on his professional reputation and judgment. This is unfortunate, because the Secretary of Defense has led a personal crusade against the use of the phrase “cost effectiveness on the margin” to the point that winning his position on this issue has become almost a point of honor for each of the two players.

The criterion of “cost effectiveness on the margin” was initially articulated by Nitze. He was drawing on his experience using this same criterion during the ABM debate in the late 1960s. It had a very heavy economic dimension in that debate in that the costs of ABM interceptors were compared to attacking missiles. This degree of economic flavor made some sense then because ICBMs only carried one weapon and trading the costs of small interceptors against additional ICBMs on one-for-one basis could have some merit. But the criterion failed even before the advent of the MIRVed ICBM, when strategic attack planners realized that they could attack the “eyes” of the ABM defense, the ABM radars, in ways that undercut the trade-off.

When the initial SDI debate began, staff recommended adopting the criterion, though, in a much less economic sense, to deflect the argument that all SDI will do is to provide incentives to the Soviets to retain additional forces to overwhelm or saturate the defenses. As stated in NSDD 172, we stressed that this idea was much more than an economic criterion, although counted in economic terms. Rather, cost effectiveness meant to convey that criterion that any deployment should not provide incentives for the retention of offensive forces.

For example, if the Soviets were to rapidly produce and deploy a number of the ABM interceptors that they have around Moscow, the most logical US reaction would be to retain additional offensive warheads to directly attack the interceptors. We would have little choice, and we have a number of older POSEIDON C–3, 40kt warheads that we had planned to retire that could be retained at reasonable cost for this purpose. Certainly, such a deployment would not meet our cost effectiveness criterion; not because of the economics, but because it clearly provides incentives for the retention of additional offensive forces to counter the defense. On the other hand, if we were to deploy the SBKKV system suggested by the Secretary of Defense, and as long as the SBKKV carriers are reasonably survivable (not easy to attack directly), the problem the defense poses for the attacker is one of uncertainty of a type that retaining additional weapons will not easily solve. This means it provides disincentives to retaining excess warheads to attempt to defeat the defenses, and therefore, could be considered “cost effective.”

When properly interpreted, this criterion has served us well. It should be retained. Staff can square this problem away provided that we can keep both the Secretary of Defense and Ambassador Nitze from making this more of an issue than needed.

In summary, then, for this agenda item, you should have no difficulty indicating that you can endorse the concept of phased deployments and the use of the illustrative system as a means of focusing the SDI program. You should avoid any attempt to gain your commitment to the illustrative system in any more substantive way at this time. Finally, should the issue of “criteria” come up, we can accept the addition of the criteria that the Secretary of Defense has suggested (i.e., any initial phased deployment should be militarily meaningful and contribute to a more capable later system), but we cannot abandon the other basic criteria of military effectiveness, survivability and cost effectiveness. We would recommend that you avoid being drawn into the issue of the retention of the criterion of “cost effectiveness on the margin.”

AGENDA ITEM 2: HEAVY LIFT SPACE VEHICLE

In his December 17th briefing, the Secretary of Defense highlighted the need for an immediate priority on the development of a heavy lift space booster. A US heavy lift vehicle is needed both to protect the option of deploying an initial phase of an SDI along the lines the Secretary of Defense argues may be possible in timeframe he suggests, and to so within the costs estimated (i.e., under $60 billion). It could also help other US space programs and match a growing Soviet heavy lift capability.

When this was last discussed, it was supported by all of your advisors.

There are issues associated with the heavy lift vehicle program. For example, there are two candidate vehicle types: one a shuttle derivative (favored by NASA); and the second, a booster based on all new technology (favored by OSD and SDIO). The management of the development and acquisition of this capability is also an issue. The options are that the program could be managed by NASA, by OSD, or jointly by OSD-NASA. The proper role of the military services (e.g., the Air Force) and the SDIO also need to be determined. Whose budget carries the funds for this also is an issue. However, all of these issues should be well below the Presidential level of concern.

Recommendation

On this issue, while you may listen to some discussion, as long as no objection to placing priority on this program is made, all you need to do is direct that this be made a priority program and that staff/agencies work out the most efficient way to provide the US the capability needed.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–111, NSPG 0143 [SDI-ABM]. Top Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The President’s Daily Diary for February 3 lists this meeting as that of a National Security Planning Group. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)
2. Attached but not printed at Tab A is the meeting attendance list. The meeting agenda and meeting memorandum at Tab B is printed as Document 201. Tab E, a “Post-meeting Package on Leaks,” was not attached.
3. Not found.
4. See Document 76.
5. See Document 203.
6. February 10.
7. Secret.
8. Secret.