208. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- SDI
The development of our SDI program will at some point require going beyond the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. We must proceed, however, in a manner that the Congress will support, since substantial growth in funding for the program is essential to its success. If we proceed correctly, we have an opportunity to lock in the solid base of support the program needs to reach its goal; if we don’t, all that has been achieved will be in jeopardy.
Given the record of the last fifteen years, it will not be easy to obtain Congressional support for the broad interpretation. At the time the ABM Treaty was ratified in 1972, the Nixon Administration made statements to the Senate supporting the restrictive interpretation. As recently as 1985, this Administration made statements in the SDI report to Congress and to the Soviets in the SCC consistent with the restrictive interpretation, which was then the agreed position of the Executive Branch. A majority of the Congress still believes the restrictive interpretation is the more valid. If we summarily begin to act in a way that many believe contrary to our treaty obligations, we will strengthen the opponents of the SDI program rather than win them over.
We have a well thought out strategy for obtaining the necessary support and we must follow it. Judge Sofaer has drawn up a plan for completing our analysis and consulting with the Congress. It includes (1) giving the Senate an opportunity to review our position on the negotiating record, (2) completing our analysis of subsequent conduct by the Parties and permitting the Senate to respond to our conclusions, and (3) a careful legal analysis of the practical implications of shifting to a program based upon the broad interpretation. We have also told our Allies we would consult with them before moving to the broad interpretation. Something along the lines of Sofaer’s plan is the best way to establish the broad interpretation as the legally correct interpretation.
This means that for the near term our program will continue to be carried out within the same constraints the program has respected from the beginning. Given the current status of the research, this should [Page 747] not be a major problem for us. The important point is that if we do this job right, the result will be to lock the SDI into our defense and arms control program. Congress cannot interpret the ABM Treaty, but if we jump to a decision without having gone through a deliberative process, funding for SDI could be lost.
As we proceed to work with the Congress according to Judge Sofaer’s plan—and on the timetable he and Ed Meese will work out—we should also prepare to negotiate an understanding with the Soviets on what activity with respect to advanced defenses is prohibited. It would be in our interest to work out an understanding on prohibited activity that would allow necessary SDI testing to go forward, and supersede the question of broad versus restrictive interpretation. Max Kampelman can continue to draw concessions out of the Soviets, but at some point we need to be prepared to offer ideas of our own. If such a settlement could be achieved, it would secure Congressional support for SDI and help us advance on the path to the more than fifty percent reduction in strategic forces and eighty percent reduction in INF outlined in Reykjavik.
While it will not be easy to negotiate an understanding with the Soviets that permits SDI testing to go forward, we should give Max the time and the flexibility to try. Persuading the Congress the broad interpretation is the correct one will also be difficult, and by pursuing both paths we minimize the risk to the program.
As for a commitment to early deployment, we are not yet to the point of proposing a system that meets the statutory criteria for survivability and cost-effectiveness at the margin. While the program is beginning to identify what can be done early, we do not yet understand the subsequent phases necessary for a full system that meets these objectives. We should not commit ourselves to deployment of the first phase before we understand the subsequent phases and are certain the first step leads in the direction we want to go.
Deployment will require withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and we should not underestimate the consequences of a commitment to this step. The JCS have expressed to me their views that it would not be in the interest of the United States to break away from the Treaty at this time, as the Soviets are in a better position than we are to expand their defenses beyond the very limited system they now have around Moscow.
Our approach should be to start moving toward wide support for the broad interpretation, and at the same time prepare to try to reach an understanding with the Soviets on prohibited activity. Another step we can take to advance the SDI program is to give strong support to the heavy lift launch vehicle, which will be needed for SDI deployments and will give us more reliable access to space for other important missions as well.
- Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987. Secret. Printed from a copy that indicates Shultz initialed the original on February 4. A typed notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “Hand-carried to President by Secretary 2/4.”↩