Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

207. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 4, 1987, 12:15–1:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Paul H. Nitze
• Colonel Robert Linhard

I had lunch today with Bob Linhard. Linhard asked me my impression of yesterday’s NSPG meeting.² I said I was disappointed at the way in which the issues were drawn. Carlucci and Weinberger had framed the first issue in terms of a decision on “phased incremental deployment.” The billboard effect of that phrase is the word “deployment.” This is bound to suggest abrogation of the ABM Treaty because, in the absence of amendment, deployment would require withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. I thought it would be nigh to impossible to get congressional concurrence with a program that was labeled “deployment.” I said that with respect to the LCI issue, Cap had been right when he had said that only the President has the right, under the constitution, to interpret treaties, but it is equally true that only the House can initiate legislation having to do with appropriations. The SDI program will not fly unless it can obtain the concurrence of Congress.

Linhard said that he was disappointed that we had not made a stronger fight against Cap’s presentation. I said I thought Secretary Shultz had made a clear and cogent attempt but had not received much support.

We then got into a discussion about preparation for next Tuesday’s NSPG meeting.³ He urged that we give close attention to a paper labeled GRIP 02⁴ which deals with the alternative approaches to the prohibited testing issue. I said I had read the paper and thought that, in general, it fairly presented the OSD and State positions; we in State would address it in greater detail. He suggested we also look at GRIP 03⁵ which deals with the process issue. He said it had a negative tone because a foreign ministers’ meeting followed by a summit meeting might be attractive to some. They wanted to be sure we are adequately protected before agreeing to that process. He said that as he saw it, the Soviets are now concerned because they see the clock ticking toward SDI deployment. They want that clock turned off; they intend to use the negotiating process to reverse its impact on the clock and thus dampen progress on SDI. In the meantime, they wish no progress on offensive reductions.

He said that on Tuesday he anticipated there would be a discussion on GRIP 02 and the timing of the consultation process. I said I had urged Abe Sofaer to call Meese to begin coordinating their work. Linhard said we also may need to be prepared for allied consultation. He had in mind that after the Tuesday NSPG meeting, Wednesday and Thursday should be used to settle on instructions, and that then I should be prepared to fly to Europe to consult during the week beginning February 16th and take either Fritz Ermarth or him with me. He rather thought it should be Ermarth so he would be free to go to Asia with Rowny. The focus of consultations should be on the participating countries plus Paris, plus the NAC. In addition, someone might go to Israel and someone to Canada. If the Tuesday meeting decided on no change in our position, then we should send no one but should communicate with the foreign offices that there had been no deployment decision. The technology had made progress, we had talked again about policy and about incremental deployment, but we had not changed our position, except to add two more criteria to the criteria about survivability and cost-effectiveness at the margin. These are that each phase of deployment would have to be consistent with the main line of our program, and that the specific military objective would be to introduce uncertainty into Soviet military decisions and thus increase stability.

I pointed out the inconsistency between various briefings I had received from General Abrahamson. During the first briefing on January 29, Abrahamson had told me that the first phase deployment would not include measures for survivability. He had also told me that they had not decided whether the 1992/93 target would be IOC or FOC. He also told me that he anticipated the first phase deployments would enable them to effect 6000 to 7000 intercepts from having deployed from 220–300 satellite missile launchers.⁶ When Abrahamson briefed me on Monday, February 2, it was largely on the progress that had been made in developing the technology pertinent to survivability. But when I asked him whether that technology would be incorporated in the Phase I deployment, he answered in the negative. The number of satellite missile launches to be deployed had gone down to 60; the anticipated number of intercepts to 2000. I said I had difficulty in understanding such fluidity in Abrahamson’s program.

Linhard explained that the changes had been due to his (Linhard’s) intervention. He had been briefed by Abrahamson and therefore had told Abrahamson he must concentrate on survivability in his briefing to the Secretary. He also proposed to Abrahamson that he concentrate on the IOC of the system and not on some point between IOC and FOC. It was for those reasons that Abrahamson briefings had shifted so rapidly. I said I had talked to some of Abrahamson’s people who had a much more cautious view about the program. I said I understood the Pentagon had agreed that SDI deployment decisions should be subjected to the same review process with designated milestones specified for other acquisition decisions. Once they had gone through that process, the answers to the pertinent questions should be available for use in testimony before the Congress.

Linhard outlined for me the way in which the first phase system was intended to work and what the timelines were. As he explained it, a Soviet capability to eliminate 15 objects in space would put a hole in the boost phase intercept system sufficiently large for a full Soviet offensive launch to escape damage in boost phase.

1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Nitze initialed the memorandum beside his name on the list of participants. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum.
2. See Document 206.
3. February 10. See Document 211.
4. See Tab E, Document 211.
5. Not found.
6. No minutes were found.