Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

211. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, February 10, 1987, 11 a.m.–12:04 p.m.

MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT

• Arms Control & SDI

MINUTES

ATTENDEES

• The President
• The Vice President Mr. Craig Fuller
• Secretary Shultz
• Ambassador Nitze
• Ambassador Rowny
• Secretary Weinberger
• Admiral Crowe
• Mr. Robert Gates
• Mr. James Miller
• Mr. Kenneth Adelman
• Mr. Donald T. Regan
• Mr. Will Ball
• Mr. Frank C. Carlucci
• Gen Colin Powell
• Col Robert Linhard

The meeting opened at 11:00 am in the Situation Room. Mr. CARLUCCI stressed the importance of security following these meetings. He noted that notes were taken by the NSC staff, in this case by Bob Linhard, and that meeting participants could come and review the notes as needed after the meeting. However, he asked that all notes taken by others at the meeting be left in the Situation Room.

Mr. CARLUCCI then began the agenda (Tab B)² and framed the first issue for discussion using the talking points attached at Tab C.

After this introduction, the following discussion ensued. (N.B. These notes reflect the thrust of the remarks made. And while the notetaker did try to capture the speakers’ words as closely as possible, these should not be considered verbatim notes.)

CARLUCCI: George (Shultz), I understand that you support Option C (see Tabs D/E). Would you like to say something in its favour?

SHULTZ: I think that we should not decide on Option C now. I would prefer we not discuss it in such an open meeting. It will leak, and we will lose it. I suggest that we use this option in some other mode, and that we not pursue it further in such a leaky meeting.

We are in a good position. Max is authorized to listen and probe. If pressed, he can simply repeat our position. I think that we should simply stay in this mode for now.

WEINBERGER: I think that Option C is a bad approach. The paper prepared (Tab E) suggests good criteria.

SHULTZ: [Interrupting] Don’t make me respond about Option C. We may need to be creative at some point soon, but not now.

WEINBERGER: It is important that we don’t negotiate what is permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty. And, we certainly should not suggest we are willing to conduct such negotiations in advance of having an end game in sight.

SHULTZ: I am not sure that we should discuss Option C now in this forum. Should we do so?

WEINBERGER: Whether now or later, it will have to be discussed.

The Soviets want to kill the SDI program. Option B offers the only option protecting what we want.

CARLUCCI: [Mildly interrupting] George, if you don’t want to talk about Option C now, when would it be appropriate?

ADELMAN: [Joining in the interruption] I agree. We should talk about it now.

WEINBERGER: [Continuing on his points] We agreed to reduce forces by 50%. Option B has this as an end by 1991. We would then be free to deploy, not negotiate.

We need to discuss the concept behind Option C because it will be discussed in Geneva.

The current structure of the SDI program is hurting us already. Delta 181 was designed originally to be an intercept. It is now redesigned to miss.

We need to decide on what we are going to do about the legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the ABM Treaty.

I agree that we have to consult with Congress and our Allies. But we don’t need to get into haggling with the Soviets over how many watts will be permitted for a laser and the like.

If we can keep them convinced that we will hold on to SDI, we will get them to agree to offensive force reductions.

THE PRESIDENT: To ensure that the Soviets understood that we were not interested in a 1st strike capability, I put on the table at Reykjavik the idea of making an agreement in advance that we would share the benefits of SDI. I made the point that it had to be an agreement in advance, so that it was clear to all that they agreed we could go forward with our efforts.

Since then, I’ve had another thought. Now, the Soviets want an agreement, but are determined to force us to give up SDI. How about looking at going forward with deployment, but of an international SDI, and international defense against any ballistic missile.

CARLUCCI: Mr. President, we are already staffing that general idea in the Arms Control Support Group (ACSG). [FYI: Actually, the work is being done under a special, compartmented study entitled THRESHER RAIN.]

THE PRESIDENT: This approach would take SDI out of the bargain. This done, I can see no reason why we could not move forward with reductions.

ADELMAN: We should not have this associated with the UN. If placed there, it would be a real loser.

We can’t forget that nuclear weapons are needed to deter war in Central Europe. We will not be able to roll that back [change the conditions so this is not the case] in our lifetime. We should not associate this idea with the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

THE PRESIDENT: [Delivered a series of remarks on why MAD was an unacceptable basis for the future.]

A major part of the way we deter requires rethinking and the associated arms control environments, renegotiation. The Soviets don’t want an all out arms race with both the US and NATO.

ADELMAN: However, Europeans still need nuclear weapons.

CARLUCCI: George (Shultz), what do you think about the idea of a broad international defense?

SHULTZ: The idea needs to be made more concrete before it can be fully evaluated. It must have sufficient detail to be as realistic as cuts in START and INF. This will need some definition.

I do think that the “non-deployment” period is the key; but delinked from the “0 ballistic missile” idea.

I don’t think that this is the moment to spring a new concept on the Soviets, but we need to be ready to deal.

WEINBERGER: If we did need to trade some defense for offensive reductions, we should remember that we offered them 10 years of non-deployment, plus sharing, and were scorned.

We don’t have to make such a trade! We should show them that it is in their interest, too, to seek offensive force reductions. If we bargain about how much SDI we will give up, we simply set ourselves up for a fall.

Once we signal that our approach involves such a trade, we have a real problem.

SHULTZ: You already offered 7 years of non-deployment [referring to the 25 July 1986 letter to Mr. Gorbachev].

WEINBERGER: That offer entailed no real cost to the SDI program.

THE PRESIDENT: I want to return to the idea that I just suggested.

From the very first, we made it clear that we were prepared for and argued that we should share the benefits of the SDI program for the benefit of all. Our public diplomacy themes have stressed that:

— we want to deploy SDI and render ballistic missiles obsolete, effectively eliminating them;

— we don’t intend to simply deploy more defense over our offensive capability; and

— we have offered to share the benefits.

The idea I have fits perfectly with these themes. We can make it clear that we intend to go forward, with no restraints, based upon an agreement in advance that we will seek a system that is designed to hit any missile. An international group can be established to monitor what we are doing.

With such an agreement on defense, then we can press forward with offensive reductions.

WEINBERGER: This would certainly put us in a high moral position. And, if the USSR does not agree, we could still go ahead. We would not wait to obtain Soviet agreement, would we?

THE PRESIDENT: Hell no! We would press forward.

WEINBERGER: I agree with Ken (Adelman). I think that the Europeans would not be happy about this.

NITZE: The Soviets would clearly try to gain control of the international group by loading it with those whom they can influence.

THE PRESIDENT: But it would take the SDI program out of the picture [i.e., remove it from controversy and delink it from offensive force reductions].

ADELMAN: We would still have the threat of suitcase bombs.

CARLUCCI: We will have this staffed thoroughly. As we do, we will add options as appropriate.

WEINBERGER: If someone still feels we need an option now, Option B is available. Don’t offer anything beyond 1991. In fact, I’d rather not offer anything so we can avoid giving any false impression that we are ready to trade.

CARLUCCI: We also need to consider some other actions. We need to:

1. start consultations immediately with Congress and Allies;

2. continue our legal research, which could take an additional 3 months;

VICE PRESIDENT: [Interrupting] On SDI?

CARLUCCI: Yes, on the legal aspects of ratification [whether the testimony to Congress in 1972 gave Congress the impression that they were ratifying the more restrictive interpretation of the treaty and whether this binds current action] and on case law [the issue of subsequent practice].

SHULTZ: [Interrupting] Yes, we need to do the consultations and the work; but you [Mr. President] need to be in a position of saying that you haven’t made any decision. If you are not in that mode, that it really isn’t consultation.

We need time to go through the appropriate records. It’s hard to determine how much time we will need to do this right. We can go through the legal homework in 3 months, but I have no idea how long it will take to lay the necessary foundation with Congress.

Nunn is already personally going through the negotiating record.

WEINBERGER: Nunn is already acting like a Presidential candidate.

If we delay for 3, 6 or 12 months, we will be blocking experiments that we need and increasing the hopes of those who want to block us permanently.

We need to be in the posture of taking steps to support the LCI, not arguing about its validity. Let’s not take actions that aid others to tie our own hands.

CARLUCCI: Cap (Weinberger), could DoD submit to the President a report on how, specifically, the SDI program would be restructured if authorized; including what changes to testing and why?

WEINBERGER: We would be glad to.

CARLUCCI: Mr. President, once again, we have a number of actions that we should agree to pursue. These include:

1. completing the legal research;

2. completing the DoD report on restructuring the SDI program;

3. beginning consultations with Congress and Allies; and

4. continuing our work on modifying our arms control positions.

Can we all agree on these are tasks to be accomplished.

[There appeared to be no objection.]

SHULTZ: Cap (Weinberger), you need to be sure that any money you plan to use in a restructured SDI program which goes beyond the restrictive interpretation is permitted by law. [FYI: Secretary Shultz is referring to concerns that the language of the Defense Appropriations Acts for existing funds do place such restrictions.]

CROWE: We need to be sure that we understand the terms of any consultation. We can do some additional staffing involved with programmatic details to buy some additional time. At the same time, the quicker we are free to move the program freely the better.

WEINBERGER: We can treat the restructuring the SDI as the basic proposal for consultation. The idea of sharing has always scared the pants off some.

SHULTZ: We need to remember to stress that we are offering to share the benefits of SDI, not the technology. The whole idea of going to “0 ballistic missiles” was that this was a clear way for all the world to share the benefits achieved by the SDI program.

ADELMAN: Frank (Carlucci), on your 4th point, the present situation is the best for now.

Option C would have been a good option in 1981. Now it is a swamp. It is unverifiable. On top of all else, it is not clear the Soviets themselves would be interested in this.

SHULTZ: Mr. President, I would strongly advise you not to go into Option C in a public meeting.

ADELMAN: The President asked my views on the options, and I am providing them.

Option B sets the date for the end of the non-deployment commitment period at 1991. This walks us back from Reykjavik.

I am not opposed in principle to negotiating what is permitted and prohibited during some non-deployment period, as long as there is a clear green light to deploy at the end of the period.

WEINBERGER: With respect to Option B, I see no inconsistency or problem with the Reykjavik proposal. The Soviets didn’t accept it when offered, so we can withdraw it. The situation has changed. We have had much more technical progress since then.

With respect to Option C, I think that we need to discuss this now!

SHULTZ: We can’t discuss Option C now. The technical work needed to do so is not done. I don’t think that we should task this work to be done either since the work will leak. Therefore, I don’t want to talk about this now.

ROWNY: The most important aspect of the consultations is the way they are done. We need not give the impression that our options and thinking is open-ended. We need to assert that the LCI is correct.

BALL: We can’t let Nunn manage us. We have maintained support for SDI, but we are working on some very thin margins. Reykjavik let us resolve 5 major issues associated with last year’s budget in a favorable way. We will not have that type of device available this year.

We will need allies on the bill. SDI funding will be a fight no matter what we do, but we also must consider that we will also need help on other key issues. We must consider the overall impact of the SDI funding fight.

THE PRESIDENT: If we were to approach the SDI program along the lines that I have suggested in this meeting [FYI: his view of an advance agreement on international sharing], then I would love to see Congress try to cut the funds for SDI.

SHULTZ: Yes, we need to build support to SDI into the very core of an arms control agreement that people want. It must become the insurance policy we need, and in turn, the agreement itself will insure SDI.

THE PRESIDENT: [The President then discussed some recent reading about Chernobyl].

CROWE: Mr. President, your idea about international sharing would require a new order of negotiation and a whole new set of specifics.

ROWNY: Mr. President, you must take steps to ensure that such a proposal is not viewed as being too far afield from the current negotiations, a diversion.

CARLUCCI: Mr. President, our time is up. I believe that we have reached agreement on the following points:

1. We should complete the legal research as quickly as possible.

2. DoD will provide a detailed report on the specific steps we would take if the President were to authorize the restructuring of the SDI program.

3. We will begin consultations with Congress and Allies as soon as possible, and as soon as terms of those consultations can be developed and approved by the President.

4. We will staff out the President’s new concept for a “compartmented” or closely-held priority study.

5. All will provide the President their views on the Options discussed today.

George (Shultz), you need to find an appropriate way to discuss your views on Option C so that the President can reach a view or decision on that option as well as the others.

[The meeting ended at 12:04 pm.]

Tab C

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council³

Washington, undated

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

TALKING POINTS

I. INTRODUCTION

— Mr. President, today we will continue last week’s discussion of the SDI proposals recommended by Cap by examining arms control aspects of the problem.

[Leaks]

— Before we discuss the specific arms control options, I believe it is worth reminding everyone of the need to keep these discussions confidential.

— The President and his programs are ill-served by the leaks that occurred from last week’s meeting. Those leaks are especially disturbing given the President’s request that last week’s discussion be kept strictly among ourselves and not be discussed with our staffs.

— We have asked for an investigation.

[Decision Context.]

[NOTE: The talking points do not lay out the explicit plan for proceeding that we have discussed, i.e., calling for the following:

— consultations from 16–20 February;

— a final decision by 27 February;

— an announcement on 2 March (tabling a new arms control initiative in Geneva at that time if appropriate);

— Sofaer completing the legal review by 26 March;

— completing consultation on legal issues with Congress by 15 April;

— completing a programmatic restructuring plan for the SDI program by 15 April;

— finalizing the decision to restructure and notifying both Congress and allies shortly before 2 May; and

— targeting final action to initiate restructuring by 2 May (prior to HASC/SACS authorization mark-up. They are designed to be consistent with such an approach, but not lay out the approach for discussion at this time. They are designed, however, to allow the participants to realize why we should consider an arms control initiative as a part of the above plan; and why, if this is a possibility the President wants to seriously consider, the discussion at this NSPG of the arms control options must be sufficient to permit him to select from among the options if he so desires.]

— One direct result of last week’s leak is that it has made it virtually impossible for the President simply to restructure the SDI program.

— We will certainly have to take additional time to ensure that the proper foundation is laid both with the Congress and our Allies before we take such a step.

— Later in today’s meeting, I would like to return to the questions of how to lay such a foundation and how much time should we spend in attempting to do so.

— As we take such actions, we should consider whether a complementary arms control initiative would also be helpful.

— Such a step, if carefully crafted, could serve to reinforce the President’s decision with respect to the SDI program.

— As a minimum, it could help take some of the bite out of the criticism that we may face from the Congress and some Allies as we position ourselves to move to the legally correct interpretation.

— It also may be able to help us forestall unwanted Congressional action.

— Finally, we should anticipate that Gorbachev will attempt to spring something on us, perhaps during his announced speech on February 16. We may wish to have an initiative prepared to counter this.

— So the question before us is whether we wish to consider making an arms control initiative in the Defense and Space area in the near future, perhaps before the end of the current round (March 8).

II. OPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

— The Arms Control Support Group has developed a series of papers in a new compartment called GRIP.

— I believe that we have all seen the first of these papers, GRIP 01, which laid out likely Soviet initiatives that we might face.

— Today’s discussion is based on the second of these papers, GRIP 02, which takes the possible Soviet initiatives and develops a range of options that the US could consider to preempt or to respond to Soviet actions.

— This paper offers us four options for our consideration.

[Criteria]

— But before turning to the options, the paper also recommends criteria by which we should evaluate the options available to the President.

— I believe that it would be worth spending a few moments reviewing. They are:

1. It would not be in the US interest to simply trade restrictions on the US SDI program (leaving the bulk of existing Soviet defenses and a vigorous Soviet R&D program intact) for the right to reduce US offensive forces in return for matching Soviet offensive force reductions.

2. The US should not take any step that would damage or significantly place at risk the ability of the US SDI program to achieve the President’s goals for that program.

3. We should be able to identify how any step considered facilitates the ultimate achievement of the goals set for the SDI program.

4. If possible, we should seek steps that:

(a) Further institutionalize support for the SDI program within the US (i.e., appropriate continuing levels of Congressional support via funding);

(b) Move the Soviet Union to formally recognize SDI as a legitimate activity and a cooperative transition to an increased reliance on defense as a mutually beneficial goal; and,

(c) Minimize the impediments to the US moving to exploit the fruits of the SDI program through development and deployment at some date certain in the future.

5. Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty must be rectified prior to the US making additional commitments concerning the ABM Treaty.

[Options]

— The Support Group has generated four options for further US Defense & Space arms control policy. Each of the options is predicated on a different view of the relative strength of the pressures we will be facing.

— Option A is to maintain the current US position, continue to focus on reductions in the START and INF areas, while using the positions currently on the table (and nothing more) in the Defense & Space area to respond to Soviet demands or new initiatives.

— This option is predicated on the assumption that it is the Soviets who are the demandeurs in this negotiation, that time is on our side, and that there has been no Soviet move or other event that should cause us to alter our position.

— A suggested variant of this option (Option A+) [FYI: supported by ACDA] is to express a willingness to pay an unspecified price in the Defense and Space area if acceptable START and INF terms are worked out. However no further substantive or procedural moves would be made.

— Option B [FYI: supported by OSD] would commit not to deploy advanced defenses before 1991, provided that 50% reductions are accomplished in START by 1991, and subject to the following conditions:

1. after 1991, either side will be able to deploy advanced defenses; and,

2. between now and 1991, there will be no restraints upon devices based upon other physical principles (OPP) above and beyond those imposed by the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

— This option is predicated on the assumption that the simpler the agreement, the better because: non-deployment is relatively easy to verify; and, discussing or negotiating the details of permitted and prohibited research, development and testing activities will inevitably lead to greater restrictions on SDI.

— Option C [FYI: supported by State] would continue the US offer of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1996 and the right to deploy thereafter unless otherwise agreed.

— Under it, the U.S. would propose an agreement on the treatment of advanced defenses during this period along the following lines:

1. establish thresholds for devices which are based on other physical principles (OPP) beyond which such devices would be considered “components;”

2. base these thresholds on physical phenomena (e.g., for directed energy devices consider power and the size of optics—for kinetic kill vehicles consider velocity);

3. agree that below the thresholds identified, there would be no constraints on testing, but above the thresholds testing would be subject to constraints to be agreed on testing in an ABM mode; and,

4. agree that sensors that would be able to support ballistic missile defense (other than radars) would be free from any constraints on testing, except testing in conjunction with a kill mechanism.

— This option is predicated on the assumption that we need to enhance support for SDI in Congress and with the Allies by working out a set of rules for identifying and testing components based on OPP which could permit SDI planning to proceed without increasing controversy and that we need to supersede likely unilateral action in Congress to force compliance with the restrictive interpretation or the ABM Treaty.

— Option D [FYI: initially suggested by Max Kampelman] would propose that in return for Soviet agreement that either side could deploy advanced defenses as it sees fit without further impediment (unless mutually agreed) after some date certain (e.g., 1995), the U.S. would commit:

1. not to restructure the SDI program to make use of the full flexibility of the legally correct interpretation, before some specific date (e.g. 1990), if the Soviets will observe similar restraint;

2. to continue to observe the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty before some later specific date (e.g. 1993), provided the Soviet Union makes a similar commitment; and,

3. not to deploy advanced defenses before 1995.

— I believe that Max Kampelman had proposed this option for reasons similar to those motivating Option C, but I understand that he now favors, at least for the present, a simple non-deployment option.

III. GENERAL DISCUSSION

— We have the opportunity now to consider the use of an arms control initiative for the purposes identified earlier.

— We should consider the options above primarily in light of our national security interests; but we should also consider if any could help us in the near-term with the Congress or Allies, or could help fireproof us against likely Soviet maneuvers which we may shortly face.

— George, I understand you prefer Option C. Would you like to comment on that option or on any of the options on the table? Do you think we could verify Option C?

— Cap? It is my understanding that if an option were to be selected, you would prefer Option B. Isn’t committing not to deploy before 1991 a bit short? And do you really want to force the 50% reductions to be completed by that date?

— Ken? I understand you like Option A+. That doesn’t seem to move us very far beyond our current position. How do you see this helping us?

— Does anyone support Option D? It strikes me that if that option were placed on the table, it would be more difficult for Congress to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the treaty since it would directly undercut the US negotiating position. Does anyone see such merit in this option?

— Does anyone else have any further comments on these options?

IV. OTHER ISSUES

— There remain a few loose ends from our previous discussion that we should use the remaining time to address.

— The first is the status of the continuing legal review regarding interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

— At our last meeting, Abe Sofaer suggested that six month process to lay the necessary legal foundation for the restructuring of the SDI program.

— At the time, Ed (Meese), you suggested that we may be able to cut that time in half.

— George, do you have anything more to report from Judge Sofaer on when they might complete their analysis? Can we get it done within 2–3 months?

[after any reaction]

— [If necessary] It would be helpful for the President to have a range of options to consider, in addition to the 6 month plan. Perhaps 2 or 3 month intermediate options?

[Allied and Hill Consultation]

— We have also been receiving a heavy dose of correspondence from both the hill and our allies about the current state of our deliberations.

— Once the President has reached tentative decisions on today’s discussion and the issues aired last week, it is in our interest to get to our allies and the hill and explain his thinking.

— In the past, we have sent teams to key capitals in Europe and Asia and to the hill. Unless someone has a problem with this approach, this is the way that I think we should proceed.

V. CONCLUSION

— Mr. President, unless you have any questions, that exhausts both our time and agenda.

— I would, again, encourage all to keep our discussion within this room.

Tab D

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group⁴

Washington, undated

Criteria. As we consider Soviet demands that the US make progress in the D&S area before the Soviet Union permits mutually beneficial offensive force reductions to begin, we must clearly identify what specific and appropriate benefits the US will obtain for any flexibility shown. In judging US options, in addition to our more general, long-standing requirements that any arms control proposal be equitable, verifiable, and provide for needed military sufficiency, certain other criteria, uniquely related to the Defense and Space and SDI areas, should also be applied:

1. It would not be in the US interest to simply trade restrictions on the US SDI program (leaving the bulk of existing Soviet defenses and a vigorous Soviet R&D program intact) for the right to reduce US offensive forces in return for matching Soviet offensive force reductions.

2. The US should not take any step that would damage or significantly place at risk the ability of the US SDI program to achieve the President’s goals for that program.

3. As a minimum, we should be able to identify how any step considered facilitates the ultimate achievement of the goals set for the SDI program.

4. If possible, we should seek steps that:

a. further institutionalize support for the SDI program within the US (i.e., appropriate continuing levels of Congressional support via funding);

b. move the Soviet Union to formally recognize SDI as a legitimate activity and a cooperative transition to an increased reliance on defense as mutually beneficial goal; and,

c. minimize the impediments to the US moving to exploit the fruits of the SDI program through development and deployment at some date certain in the future.

5. Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty (Krasnoyarsk Radar) must be rectified prior to the US making additional commitments concerning the ABM treaty. (S/G)

Option A—Current US Position. Continue to focus on reductions in the START and INF areas, while using the positions currently on the table (and nothing more) in the Defense and Space area to respond to Soviet demands or new initiatives. Avoid negotiation about the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty or about activities that would be “permitted and prohibited” under the ABM Treaty as it was applied to currently tabled US positions. (S/G)

Option A+. Express a willingness to pay a price (unspecified) in Defense and Space and SDI if acceptable START and INF terms are worked out and tell the Soviets that the US would not object to a package approach at that time. However, make no further procedural or substantive moves in the Defense and Space area beyond those made in the round subsequent to Reykjavik (e.g., we would not establish additional groups to work on specific aspects, and where working groups already exist, not engage in bargaining on what would be permitted/prohibited under this approach). Substantive moves to bridge differences would be concentrated in START and INF. (S/G)

Option B. Commit not to deploy advanced defenses before 1991 provided that 50% reductions are accomplished in START by 1991, and subject to the following conditions:

1. after 1991, either side will be able to deploy advanced defenses; and

2. between now and 1991, there will be no restraints upon devices based upon other physical principles (OPP) above and beyond those imposed by the legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the ABM Treaty (i.e., research, deployment and testing will be unconstrained). (S/G)

Option C. Continue US offer of a non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1996 and the right to deploy thereafter unless otherwise agreed. Propose an agreement on the treatment of advanced defenses during this period along the following lines:

1. establish thresholds for devices which are based on other physical principles (OPP) beyond which such devices would be considered “components”;

2. base these thresholds on physical phenomena (i.e., for directed energy devices consider power [watts of output] and the size of the optics [diameter in meters]; for kinetic kill vehicles consider velocity);

3. agree that below the thresholds identified, there would be no constraints on testing, but above the thresholds testing would be subject to constraints to be agreed on testing in an ABM mode; and

4. agree that sensors that would be able to support ballistic missile defense (other than radars) would be free from any constraints on testing except testing in conjunction with a kill mechanism. (S/G)

Option D. In return for a Soviet agreement that either side could deploy advanced defenses as it sees fit without further impediment (unless mutually agreed) after some date certain (e.g., 1995 [7+ years]), commit:

1. not to restructure the SDI program to make use of the full flexibility of the legally correct interpretation before some specific date (e.g. 1990) if the Soviets will observe similar restraint;

2. to continue to observe the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty before some later specific date (e.g. 1993) provided the Soviet Union makes a similar commitment; and

3. not to deploy advanced defenses before 1995. (S/G)

Tab E

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group⁵

Washington, February 5, 1987

GRIP 02E (U)

Introduction. The Arms Control Support Group (ACSG) SAGE 50 paper (which resulted in NSDD 251),⁶ the work that led to the instructions for round VII of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), and the recent decisions on INF treaty issues lay out in sufficient detail the options and agency views on handling anticipated Soviet probes in the START and INF areas. However, some feel there are new options in the Defense & Space (D&S) area. (S)

Criteria. As we consider Soviet demands that the US make progress in the D&S area before the Soviet Union permits mutually beneficial offensive force reductions to begin, we must clearly identify what specific and appropriate benefits the US will obtain for any flexibility shown. In judging US options, in addition to our more general, long-standing requirements that any arms control proposal be equitable, verifiable, and provide for needed military sufficiency, certain other criteria, uniquely related to the Defense and Space and SDI areas, should also be applied:

a. It would not be in the US interest to simply trade restrictions on the US SDI program (leaving the bulk of existing Soviet defenses and a vigorous Soviet R&D program intact) for the right to reduce US offensive forces in return for matching Soviet offensive force reductions.

b. The US should not take any step that would damage or significantly place at risk the ability of the US SDI program to achieve the President’s goals for that program.

c. As a minimum, we should be able to identify how any step considered facilitates the ultimate achievement of the goals set for the SDI program.

d. If possible, we should seek steps that:

1. further institutionalize support for the SDI program within the US (i.e., appropriate continuing levels of Congressional support via funding);

2. move the Soviet Union to formally recognize SDI as a legitimate activity and a cooperative transition to an increased reliance on defense as mutually beneficial goal; and,

3. minimize the impediments to the US moving to exploit the fruits of the SDI program through development and deployment at some date certain in the future.

e. Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty (Krasnoyarsk Radar) must be rectified prior to the US making additional commitments concerning the ABM treaty. (S/G)

Impact of Options on the ABM Treaty Interpretation Issue. The President has identified what was once referred to as the “broad” interpretation as the “legally correct interpretation” (LCI) of the ABM Treaty. At the same time, we have not restructured the SDI program to go beyond the limits of the “narrow” or “restrictive interpretation” (RI) of the treaty. Further, we have taken the position with the Soviets that the LCI is fully justified, that both sides knew what they signed in 1972, and, therefore, no further “negotiation” of an agreed interpretation of the treaty is needed. This position was intended to ensure that we maintain as much flexibility for the conduct of the SDI program as is legally available and reflects a view that “negotiation” of the interpretation of the ABM Treaty could only lead to additional narrowing of that flexibility. As the following options are considered, we should recognize the impact each of the options has on this issue of the interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Attached (Tab A)⁷ is a chart intended to present a summary of relevant data on the ABM Treaty’s restrictions. (S/G)

Additional Considerations/Observations.

a. We have identified the SDI program as a research and technology development program which will be conducted under the ABM Treaty. Clearly, any resulting advanced defensive components or systems could be deployed under the Treaty only after discussion and with the agreement of the Soviet Union. Absent such agreement, the US would have to withdraw from the Treaty to make such deployments. Of more importance, we should not forget that the ultimate purpose of the SDI program is to provide the tools for the broadest level of protection against all types of ballistic missile attack, and this purpose is incompatible with the stated purpose of the ABM Treaty. Therefore, as options are considered, we should take into account whether the near-term impact of an option on the ABM Treaty regime will make it more difficult to get full benefit from the fruits of the SDI program at a later time. (S/G)

b. During the current session of Congress, and irrespective of what we do, some will likely attempt to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Some feel that the Administration’s position in resisting such legislation will be untenable if, at the same time, we are continuing as a matter of policy to adhere to the restrictive interpretation and/or if we are pursuing negotiations with the Soviets which suggest that the restrictive interpretation is acceptable. Others believe that a premature restructuring of the SDI program to take full advantage of the legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the ABM Treaty would only add fuel to the Congressional opposition to the LCI. This affects each side’s view of the options presented below. As indicated in the discussion of the options, others disagree with this assessment. (S/G)

Options. The following are the main options currently supported. (U)

Option A—Current US Position (U)

Position. Continue to focus on reductions in the START and INF areas, while using the positions currently on the table (and nothing more) in the Defense and Space area to respond to Soviet demands or new initiatives. Avoid negotiation about the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty or about activities that would be “permitted and prohibited” under the ABM Treaty as it was applied to currently tabled US positions. (S/G)

Option A+ (U)

Position. Express a willingness to pay a price (unspecified) in Defense and Space and SDI if acceptable START and INF terms are worked out and tell the Soviets that the US would not object to a package approach at that time. However, make no further procedural or substantive moves in the Defense and Space area beyond those made in the round subsequent to Reykjavik (e.g., we would not establish additional groups to work on specific aspects, and where working groups already exist, not engage in bargaining on what would be permitted/prohibited under this approach). Substantive moves to bridge differences would be concentrated in START and INF. (S/G)

Advantages.

a. This would place even more attention, public and in the negotiations, on our main agenda (deep reductions in offensive nuclear forces) and less on the Soviets’ main agenda (undercutting support for SDI).

b. While showing some willingness to compromise if the Soviets prove serious about START and INF, some believe that it could postpone a decision on what specific price we might be willing to pay in SDI until: (1) we see what we will get in START and INF; and (2) we have the opportunity to review the impact various types of restrictions would have on the SDI program.

c. Some believe that it could put off our paying any price in SDI until an “end game.”

d. Some believe that it could ease pressures for moves in SDI now which could have significant adverse impacts on the SDI program and Congressional/public support for the program—particularly given the absence of a comprehensive, technical review of the impact various options might have on the program.

e. It would be the most consistent with current guidance to focus on reductions in offensive nuclear forces. (S/G)

Disadvantages.

a. By making the explicit basis of trade implied restrictions on SDI in return for reductions in START and INF, it may violate criterion “a” identified earlier in this paper.

b. Without knowing how we might be prepared to make good the general commitment to further restrictions on SDI, we may find it difficult to explain and sustain such a position. In fact, some believe that we may increase the danger of the US being boxed into restrictions under pressure that we would prefer to avoid.

c. This option runs the risk of being perceived here and abroad as greater intransigence on SDI despite the expressed willingness to compromise there if the START and INF areas can be solved.

d. It may well be perceived by the Soviets as an unacceptable way to proceed, arguing that progress should be made simultaneously in all three areas.

e. We would have to face up to some further moves or concessions in the Defense and Space area if the START and INF areas were worked out. (S/G)

Option B. (U)

Position. Commit not to deploy advanced defenses before 1991 provided that 50% reductions are accomplished in START by 1991, and subject to the following conditions:

a. after 1991, either side will be able to deploy advanced defenses; and

b. between now and 1991, there will be no restraints upon devices based upon other physical principles (OPP) above and beyond those imposed by the legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the ABM Treaty (i.e., research, development and testing will be unconstrained). (S/G)

Advantages:

a. Some believe that this option would maximize the chances for the US to achieve strategic defenses in accordance with the President’s goal by offering the most programmatic freedom for the US if successfully implemented.

b. It represents a simple, clear program for utilizing the arms control process to facilitate the introduction of strategic defenses.

c. Some believe that it strengthens the US negotiating position appropriately in light of the failure of the Soviet effort at Reykjavik (and subsequently) to force the President to give up SDI.

d. It is consistent with a phased deployment approach to SDI. (S/G)

Disadvantages:

a. This runs a greater risk of being perceived both here and abroad as increased US intransigence on SDI, particularly as it changes the offer and conditions the President made at Reykjavik. In this light, some believe that it could weaken, rather than maximize, the promise of SDI because, in taking this position, we could:

1. give the Soviets a propaganda tool in trying to garner international support for their position;

2. lead to increased pressure on the US; and

3. strengthen the hand of the critics of SDI in Congress. (S/G)

Option C (U)

Position. Continue US offer of a non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1996 and the right to deploy thereafter unless otherwise agreed. Propose an agreement on the treatment of advanced defenses during this period along with following lines:

a. establish thresholds for devices which are based on other physical principles (OPP) beyond which such devices would be considered “components”;

b. base these thresholds on physical phenomena (i.e., for directed energy devices consider power [watts of output] and the size of the optics [diameter in meters]; for kinetic kill vehicles consider velocity);

c. agree that below the thresholds identified, there would be no constraints on testing, but above the thresholds testing would be subject to constraints to be agreed on testing in an ABM mode; and

d. agree that sensors that would be able to support ballistic missile defense (other than radars) would be free from any constraints on testing except testing in conjunction with a kill mechanism. (S/G)

Advantages:

a. Some believe that this option could enhance support for the SDI program by working out a set of rules for identifying and testing components based on OPP which could permit SDI planning to proceed without continued further controversy—helping to institutionalize the SDI program.

b. If successfully implemented, some believe that this would supersede the “legally correct interpretation” vs. the “restricted interpretation” question, and thus, help avoid unilateral Congressional action on this subject.

c. If mutually agreed, it would provide more assured flexibility for space-based testing and permit currently planned tests to proceed without further controversy.

d. It would resolve a major, outstanding difference in the NST negotiations.

e. It takes advantage of indications of Soviet interest in such an approach, some believe turning it to the US advantage.

f. Some believe that it would shift the issue of what is permitted/prohibited, both under the ABM Treaty and in the preferred US approach to the future, into a channel which, in their opinion, can be controlled to the US advantage. (S/G)

Disadvantages:

a. The idea of establishing performance thresholds for devices based on other physical principles (OPP) is relatively new to the Administration and has received only minimal technical review on an interagency basis, and the related significant issue of the US ability to monitor and verify Soviet compliance requires study. Detailed analysis of the specific thresholds and the levels for each has yet to be accomplished on an interagency basis.

b. Effect on the US program depends upon the levels set for the thresholds and this would likely be very difficult to negotiate. This approach could entail complex and drawn-out negotiations and would likely result in some additional limitations on SDI (especially the testing in space of weapons based on OPP), and it would also violate criteria set forth earlier.

c. Some believe that this approach will not prevent Congressional action; to the contrary, they feel that the Administration’s critics would be justified in interpreting this approach, if it were chosen, as a vindication of their view that the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty is invalid.

d. Some believe that US willingness to pursue thresholds on OPP systems, even in the absence of any agreement with the Soviet Union, will encourage Congress to take steps to ensure that we do nothing in our SDI experiments which would breach our own proposed thresholds.

e. Verification of the proposed thresholds for space-based OPP devices has not been studied rigorously. Preliminary assessments indicate that, with current and programmed intelligence assets, we would have very low confidence in detecting test of many of these devices—let alone measuring the relevant parameters. Verification of “power” more precisely than a factor of two would be difficult, and we have found this level of precision clearly inadequate in the nuclear testing limitation area (i.e., TTBT yield monitoring). Some believe that the difficulties we would have in determining that the Soviets had breached thresholds as we have seen with the TTBT, to say nothing of the problem of succeeding in obtaining corrective action once such a determination is made as we have seen with the Krasnoyarsk radar issue, would pale by comparison. (S/G)

Option D (U)

Position. In return for a Soviet agreement that either side could deploy advanced defenses as it sees fit without further impediment (unless mutually agreed) after some date certain (e.g., 1995 [7+ years]), commit:

a. not to restructure the SDI program to make use of the full flexibility of the legally correct interpretation before some specific date (e.g. 1990) if the Soviets will observe similar restraint;

b. to continue to observe the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty before some later specific date (e.g. 1993) provided the Soviet Union makes a similar commitment; and

c. not to deploy advanced defenses before 1995. (S/G)

Advantages:

a. If accepted by the Soviets, some believe that it would:

1. Institutionalize a process which would permit the US to restructure the SDI program at a date certain;

2. this, in turn, would also allow planning to make full use of this relief from the restricted interpretation of the treaty in advance of the change in US programmatic developmental/testing practices.

b. Some believe that it may postpone or put us in a better position to successfully manage a Congressional fight over the restructuring of SDI, while also minimizing the problems we would face with Allies. (S/G)

Disadvantages:

a. In effect, if proposed but not accepted by the Soviets, the first phase would tend to delegitimize the legally correct interpretation (LCI), and this, some feel, could make it virtually certain that no future President will be able fully to take advantage of our rights under the ABM Treaty to conduct development and testing of mobile or space-based devices based on other physical principles (OPP).

b. Like Option C, this option will reinforce the ABM Treaty which is antithetical to the President’s goal of realizing the full benefit of effective, deployed nation-wide defenses. This leads some to believe that it will not lay the groundwork for the ABM Treaty’s replacement with an arms control regime which permits and facilitates a defense-dominant strategic balance. (S/G)

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–111, NSPG 0143 [SDI-ABM]. Top Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Linhard.
2. Attached but not printed at Tab A is the Meeting Attendance List. The meeting memorandum at Tab B is printed as Document 210. The agenda also at Tab B is attached but not printed.
3. Secret. All brackets are in the original.
4. Secret; Grip. All brackets are in the original.
5. Secret; Grip. All brackets are in the original.
6. NSDD 251 was quickly superseded by NSDD 256, which provided guidance for the seventh round of the Nuclear Space Talks, and is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 182.
7. Not attached.