199. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Paul H. Nitze
  • John B. Rhinelander
  • James P. Timbie

Nitze opened the discussion with a reference to the great amount of interest in what they had negotiated 15 years ago, but contrary to popular opinion, the central issue is not the broad versus narrow [Page 693] interpretation. Rhinelander agreed and said the real issue is, what is a component.

Nitze reviewed his conversation with Velikhov.2 They had identified a list of technologies that represented other physical principles (OPP), including lasers, particle beams, and kinetic energy. Rhinelander said kinetic energy could properly be considered OPP. Nitze went on to say that Velikhov’s approach would treat continuous and pulsed lasers separately. Within each category, thresholds would be identified to define component levels capability. The process is analogous to the use of 3×106 watt meters squared to distinguish radars constrained by the ABM Treaty from smaller radars not so constrained. Below the thresholds, testing would be unconstrained; above them, there would be agreement on what constitutes testing in an ABM mode. Finally, there would be a distinction between sensors and kill mechanisms, with no limit on testing sensors except in conjunction with kill mechanisms.

Rhinelander said he agrees with the approach, and believes the Soviets are indeed thinking along those lines as well.

Nitze said that absent such an agreement, testing of devices not yet agreed to be components is not limited. Rhinelander said that a rule of reason should apply. He gave as an example the Airborne Optical Adjunct. In his view, this system comes closest to the capability of a component, as it is close to being capable of substituting for a radar. He believes this and the Krasnoyarsk radar are the two key current questions concerning the ABM Treaty.

Rhinelander said he had not reviewed any documents for 15 years and was relying on his memory, but he recalled that the Graybeal/Karpov group had worked out Article V, and agreed that its scope covered both current and new technologies.3 Nitze disagreed, saying that what Karpov said was that Article V covered future systems; this was ambiguous as to whether future developments of systems based on old technology or also included systems based on OPP. Garthoff subsequently had a long discussion of OPP, but no examples were discussed. Only later was Garthoff authorized to mention lasers.

Rhinelander said the word “currently” in Article II makes clear that Article II applies to future systems. This was done in late 1970. Article III was completed later, in the spring of 1972. In about April 1972 he drafted an interpretive memo suggesting certain issues be looked at, including multiple warhead ABM interceptors and test [Page 694] ranges. It was decided not to go back to the question of Article V and future components. All agreed on what has come to be known as the historic interpretation.

Nitze responded that the question is, what did the Russians agree to. He had reviewed the record carefully, and had not seen anything that makes clear that the Soviets agreed that OPP systems are limited to fixed basing. Rhinelander said his recollection after 15 years was that lasers could only be at Sary Shagan or White Sands. Most of the discussion concerned adjuncts. Nitze said we had come a long way since 1972. No one thought of mirrors in space then. The ABM Treaty just doesn’t deal with such questions.

  1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, January–February 1987. Confidential. Drafted on February 2. Nitze initialed the memorandum beside his name on the list of participants. The meeting took place at the Department of State.
  2. See Document 196.
  3. Reference is to Sidney Graybeal, the U. S. Chair of the SALT Standing Consultative Commission of ACDA.