Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

196. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 22, 1987, 12:15–1 p.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Velikhov
• Mr. Sergey Rogov
• Ambassador Paul H. Nitze
• Norman G. Clyne
• Dr. James Timbie

Velikhov opened the conversation by referring to the possibility of an agreement on offensive and defensive arms. He said the principal obstacle at Reykjavik had been the laboratory question, the confinement of testing of defensive systems to laboratories. Nitze recounted his recollection of Shevardnadze’s presentation in Reykjavik, which implied all activity outside the walls of laboratories would be prohibited.

Now Velikhov was thinking of another possible solution, to which he would like Nitze’s reaction. The idea is to establish a quantitative boundary. Below this boundary there would be room for research. For lasers, the boundary would be a certain level of brightness. For particle beams, there would be perhaps a different level of brightness, and energy would need to be taken into account as well. Under this approach, a powerful laser (over the threshold) could be tested outside the lab on the ground, but not in space. This would permit research but prevent testing as a component of a space-based system. He asked Nitze what he thought of this idea.

Nitze responded that the problem with trying to apply the ABM Treaty to systems based on other physical principles was that the Treaty provides no definition of “component” for such systems. He summarized the steps in Velikhov’s concept to see if he understood it:

— identify a list of systems based on OPP

— these would include lasers, particle beams, and kinetic energy devices

— distinctions could be made between continuous and pulsed lasers

— for each major component of such system, establish a quantitative boundary below which testing would be permitted and above which such devices would be subject to the Treaty’s constraints on testing in an ABM mode

— agree on what would constitute testing in an ABM mode with respect to OPP components which exceeded the threshold

— sensors could be treated differently from kill mechanisms

Velikhov said Nitze had understood precisely and asked for his opinion. Nitze replied that he could not respond for his Government, and in any event the proper place to agree where such discussion should take place was between Kampelman and Vorontsov. Velikhov agreed.

Rogov asked what to make of the publicity over early deployment. Nitze replied that the SDI program was making progress. Velikhov said that all potential systems were far from the criteria on survivability and cost-effectiveness Nitze had advanced. The High Frontier systems do not meet the criteria, and neither do lasers. Nitze said some of them may have the promise of doing so.

Nitze raised the Krasnoyarsk radar as another obstacle to progress. Velikhov said the radar was not operating. Nitze said the radar limits were designed to provide early warning of breakout, and that warning was slipping away. Waiting for operation defeats the entire purpose of the constraint. In addition, the “space-track” explanation is not consistent with the characteristics of the radar. Velikhov said this issue could also be discussed. He suggested Krasnoyarsk, Thule and Fylingdales all be grandfathered. Nitze explained why Thule and Fylingdales are consistent with the Treaty, and Krasnoyarsk is not.

Velikhov thanked Nitze for the opportunity to present his ideas.

1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987. Secret. Nitze initialed the memorandum beside his name on the list of participants.