Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

198. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 23, 1987

Mr. Secretary:

The attached document provides the thrust of the OSD argument that will underly the SDIO briefing to you tomorrow:²

— they recommend the SDI program be restructured immediately to adopt a “phased deployment concept,” specifically to permit a decision by this Administration on development and early deployment.

— They recognize that this is a major shift in our standard line on SDI, which has foreseen a decision in the early 1990s, and argue that an early decision is the best chance to assure the program.

— They would adopt immediately the “broad” interpretation of the ABM treaty, so as to permit development and testing of mobile and space-based components within the limits of the treaty.

— OSD will deny having any specific system or development decisions in mind but desire the restructure to permit initial deployment by the early to mid-1990’s and presumably will present technical evidence to support such a move.

OSD needs to address for us the budgetary impact (on other Defense programs, and the overall deficit), the probability that the ABM treaty would not survive under such strain, and the arms control impact of a decision along these lines. Their proposal is also clearly designed to polarize the Congressional debate, with potentially dangerous consequences for many other Administration interests.

H. Allen Holmes³

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁴

Washington, undated

Issues Regarding OSD Briefing on SDI

Background

On 17 December 1986, the Secretary of Defense, Richard Perle and General Abrahamson briefed the President and a number of his senior staff on the implications of continuing to conduct the SDI program with a view to making development decisions in the 1990’s and subject to the limitations of the “restrictive” interpretation of the ABM Treaty. They recommended, in the briefing to be presented to the Secretary of State on Thursday, that the SDI program be restructured immediately so as to adopt a “phased deployment concept” (permitting developmental decisions to be made in the next two years) and allowing the development and testing to be performed in accordance with the “legally-correct” interpretation.

Key Issues

○ It is now clear that certain technologies are sufficiently mature to permit decisions on their development to be made during this Administration. While OSD is not, at this time, recommending any specific systems or development decisions, it is apparent that, if we are to take advantage of the opportunity for this President to leave behind an SDI program with a reasonable chance of being realized, we need to make some immediate decisions.

○ To varying degrees, these decisions will entail some adjustments in the “catechism” we have developed over the past three years to describe our policies regarding the SDI program. As this catechism is about to spelled out yet again in a series of reports⁵ due shortly on Capitol Hill, a driving consideration in the OSD effort promptly to focus senior-level attention on these decisions stems from the need for authoritative and coherent characterizations of our policy for these impending reports.

○ Phased Deployment: The first major decision involves a departure from our description of the program as leading to development decisions “by a future President, sometime in the early-to-mid 1990’s.” OSD believes it is possible, indeed necessary, to adopt a programmatic—and, therefore, policy—approach which gives this President the option of making some development decisions on the nearest-term, global defense system, leading to a deployment capability in the early-to-mid 1990’s. OSD will be prepared to give a description of what such a notional system would involve; it will not, however, be recommending that a development decision be taken at this time on this or any other specific system.

○ Legally-Correct Interpretation: The second decision sought by the OSD briefing is the adoption of the “broad” interpretation of the ABM Treaty which is identified in this briefing as the “Legally-Correct Interpretation (LCI).” OSD (including SDIO) believes that the adoption of the LCI will be critical to our future ability to demonstrate a workable, reliable and survivable strategic defense capability. Development and testing allowed under the LCI but prohibited by the “restrictive” interpretation will allow the SDI program to prove its viability more quickly, more confidently and at lower cost—without having to abrogate the ABM Treaty. Indeed, OSD believes it is the only way SDI will be able to achieve its goals.

○ It is obvious that the issues being raised in this briefing are contentious and of considerable significance for the Reagan Administration and for the President’s SDI program. OSD believes that decisions need promptly to be made not only to ensure that the program is managed and executed as efficiently as possible (all the more important in light of the reduced funding approved to date by the Congress) but also to minimize our exposure to self-inflicted wounds (e.g. flailing over the reports now in preparation) or Congressionally-imposed restraints (e.g. legislation which would oblige us to conduct the SDI program within the “restrictive” interpretation. The latter will be a particularly difficult measure to defeat as long as our policy remains one of observing such an interpretation).

1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, January–February 1987. Secret; Super Sensitive.
2. No minutes for a January 24 briefing were found.
3. Holmes signed the letter “Allen” above his typed signature.
4. Secret. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “Super Sensitive/Internal OSD Memo (PROTECT).”
5. These reports include: the annual SDI report to Congress (due 1 Feb), a report on the restrictive interpretation’s impact (due 1 Feb), a report on nearterm deployment options (due 1 March) and the annual ACIS (overdue). [Footnote is in the original.]