Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

159. Memorandum From Linton Brooks and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, November 21, 1986

SUBJECT

• NSPG Meeting on Interim Restraint, Tuesday November 25, 1986

Attached at Tab I² is the Meeting Memorandum for the National Security Planning Group Meeting scheduled for Tuesday, November 25, 1986. The Agenda is at Tab A.³

The Meeting Memorandum states that no decision is necessary at the meeting. We believe, however, that, in view of the short time until the overhaul of USS ALEXANDER HAMILTON, a decision will need to be made later the same day. The presentation of that decision, both in terms of timing and of rationale, is probably at least as important as the decision itself. We will provide you, well in advance of the meeting, some suggestions on presenting a possible approach, which we understand you have discussed with Al Keel, to decommission, but not to dismantle HAMILTON and USS WOODROW WILSON, rather than to overhaul them.

Recommendations

That you approve and forward the NSPG Meeting Memorandum provided at Tab I.⁴

That you use the talking points at Tab II in conducting the meeting.⁵

Bob Linhard concurs.

Tab II

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Washington, undated

National Security Planning Group Meeting

DRAFT TALKING POINTS

I. Introduction (5 minutes)

— Mr. President, on May 27 you decided that, in the future, the United States would base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on the flawed, unratified and expired SALT II Treaty that has been continually violated by the Soviet Union.

— At that time you noted that, as we continue to press for agreement on deep reductions in US and Soviet nuclear arsenals, and assuming no significant change in the Soviet strategic threat, the United States would continue to exercise utmost restraint by not deploying more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than did the Soviet Union.

— Finally you stated that, in late 1986, the United States would equip its 131st heavy bomber (a B–52) for cruise missile carriage, without undertaking compensating dismantlements under SALT II. At that time we would no longer be technically in observance of the SALT II sublimits.

— The 131st ALCM carrying bomber is currently scheduled to depart the conversion facility in mid-December, at which time, absent other action, we will pass out of technical observance of SALT II.

— In addition, two Poseidon submarines, identical to the two you elected (for cost effectiveness reasons) to dismantle in May, are due for overhaul this fiscal year. The overhauls begin on November 30 and next June.

— These facts make it appropriate for you to review the situation with your senior advisors.

— In view of the cost of the overhauls, the substantially reduced Defense Department funding levels finally approved by Congress for fiscal year 1987, the comparatively limited military utility of this older system, and the politically sensitive concern among our European Allies that we not discard SALT II sublimits even as we put SALT II behind us, it may be prudent to consider whether these submarines should be retired instead of overhauled.

— Retirement could be accompanied by dismantling the submarines, thus continuing technical observance of SALT II, but appearing to alter your decision of May 27 not to undertake compensatory dismantlements.

— Alternatively, it could simply entail decommissioning without dismantlement, thus making clear you were not complying in any way with the obsolete SALT II Treaty, while making it equally clear you were exercising fiscal prudence and utmost restraint with regard to our strategic forces.

— Obviously, whatever course you elect will have implications with our allies, the Congress and the public.

— Before we turn to discussion of the specific courses open to us, I think it would be useful to have a review of the current status of the 131st bomber and of the Poseidon submarines involved. Secretary Weinberger?

II. Review of Status of 131st Bomber And of Submarine Overhauls (10 minutes)

NOTE: FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR IN THE COURSE OF SECDEF’S PRESENTATION. IF NOT, YOU MAY WISH TO RAISE THEM.

— Submarines involved are USS ALEXANDER HAMILTON (SSBN–617) (overhaul begins 30 November in Puget Sound, Washington) and USS WOODROW WILSON (SSBN–624) (overhaul begins mid-June 1987; shipyard not selected).

— Each overhaul will cost around 170 million dollars and will result in each submarine being out of service for over two years.

— Decommissioning (with or without dismantlement) costs about 20 million dollars per submarine (not dismantling saves about 2 million dollars).

III. Discussion (25 minutes)

— Thank you. I think it would be useful to hear from Secretary Shultz on the foreign policy implications of any action you might take and then from Admiral Crowe on the military implications. Secretary Shultz?

NOTE: Discussion should bring out:

(1) that our allies would oppose breaching the SALT II sub-limits (even though Soviets have continually breached SNDV numerical limit and other SALT II provisions),

(2) that we cannot accept selective Soviet adherence or unilateral US adherence,

(3) that the submarines involved carry the Poseidon missile, an older, relatively less accurate, low yield (ten 40 kt warheads per missile) system, not well suited to engaging the Soviet targets of greatest military interest, such as hardened silos.

IV. Timing Considerations (2 minutes)

— In the time we have remaining, I’d like to turn to timing and presentation considerations.

— Major NATO ministerial meetings will be held in December. Defense ministers meet as the NATO Defense Planning Committee on 4–5 December; foreign ministers hold a session of the North Atlantic Council on 11–12 December.

— Dave Abshire, our Ambassador to NATO, urges that deployment of the 131st ALCM carrying bomber not occur close to these major meetings.

— Since the overhaul of the first submarine we have been discussing begins in a week, we would need to act promptly to minimize the disruption should you elect not to continue with the planned overhaul.

— Finally, whatever your decision, we will require careful explanation of it to the public, Congress and allies.

— Perhaps we could now have thoughts on when and how this subject should be presented.

V. Discussion (15 minutes)

VI. Summary (3 minutes)

— Mr. President, we are obviously in agreement that, whatever course we take, we must make it clear we have put SALT II behind us.

— We are also in agreement that careful management of our allies, Congress and the public will be necessary whatever your decision.

— Ultimately the decision we face is twofold: how to use scarce resources most efficiently, and how to maximize the benefit of whatever decision you make.

— We are confident that, no matter what your decision, it will not eclipse the major strides we have been making toward moving beyond the era of SALT toward genuine arms reductions.

— Thank you all for coming.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–111, NSPG 0140, 11/25/1986. Secret. Sent for action.
2. Printed as Document 162.
3. See footnote 1, Document 162.
4. Poindexter initialed his approval.
5. Poindexter initialed his approval.
6. Secret. The document notes that the meeting was scheduled for Tuesday, November 25, from 3 p.m. until 4 p.m.