Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

162. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 24, 1986

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

I. PURPOSE

To review possible steps in a setting of major fiscal constraints and in furtherance of your policy of interim restraint on strategic offensive arms. Specifically, to consider whether two Poseidon ballistic missile submarines currently scheduled and funded for overhaul should instead be retired through decommissioning.

II. BACKGROUND

On May 27 you decided that, in the future, the United States would base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on the flawed SALT II Treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union. At that time you noted that, as we continue to press for agreement on deep reductions in US and Soviet nuclear arsenals, and assuming no significant change in the Soviet strategic threat, the United States would continue to exercise utmost restraint by not deploying more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than did the Soviet Union. Finally you stated that, in late 1986, the United States would equip its 131st heavy bomber (a B–52) for cruise missile carriage, without undertaking compensating dismantlements under SALT II. At that time we would no longer be technically in observance of the SALT II sublimits.

The 131st ALCM carrying bomber is currently scheduled to depart the conversion facility in mid-December, at which time, absent other action, we will pass out of technical observance of SALT II. At this point we need to review the situation.

Two Poseidon submarines, identical to the two you elected for cost effectiveness reasons, to dismantle in May, are due for overhaul this fiscal year. The overhauls begin on November 30 and next June. (Overhaul of a third Poseidon submarine has already begun.) Each overhaul will cost around 170 million dollars and will result in each submarine being out of service for over two years. [4½ lines not declassified]

In view of the cost of the overhauls, the substantially reduced Defense Department funding levels finally approved by Congress for fiscal year 1987, the comparatively limited military utility of this older system, and the politically sensitive concern among our European Allies that we not discard SALT II sublimits even as we put SALT II behind us, it is prudent to consider whether these submarines should be retired instead of overhauled and which of two retirement approaches should be undertaken.

Retirement could either be accomplished by dismantling the submarines (thereby continuing technical observance of SALT II) or it could simply entail decommissioning without dismantlement. Either course would save approximately 150 million dollars per submarine or 300 million dollars for both. An advantage we see in decommissioning without dismantlement is that this would make it clear you were not complying in any way with the obsolete SALT II Treaty, while making it equally clear you were exercising fiscal prudence and utmost restraint with regard to our strategic forces.

The NSPG will provide you an opportunity to hear the views of your senior advisors on this subject. I do not expect unanimity. Secretary Shultz will doubtless stress the importance the Europeans place on continued observance of the SALT II sublimits and the value of remaining in technical observance of SALT II by both decommissioning a submarine and dismantling it according to SALT II procedures. In contrast, Secretary Weinberger will argue that retention of these submarines through their scheduled overhaul is necessary to avoid a walk back from your May 27 decision not to undertake compensating dismantlement, as a hedge against Soviet ABM programs, and to provide coverage of the overall target base. Others may consider that decommissioning without dismantlement might be the worst of both worlds, not the best. That is, they will suggest, such a step will not placate our European allies but will enrage the pro-defense members of Congress, who believed SALT II was finally behind us and who, like Senator McClure and Goldwater, have urged you to implement your May 27 decision as soon as possible.

No decisions are required at the meeting. Since, however, the first of the two submarines involved is scheduled to begin overhaul on November 30, we will be soliciting your decision immediately after the NSPG on whether to overhaul the two submarines in question.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab B.²

IV. PRESS PLAN

None

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

After a brief introduction by me, I will ask Secretary Weinberger to report the status of the 131st bomber, the impending submarine overhauls, and the overall fiscal 1987 strategic funding. I will then open the floor to general discussion. Before concluding the meeting I will also discuss the timing and content of any possible announcement of your decision on overhauling or decommissioning the submarines and on the deployment of the 131st bomber.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–111, NSPG 0140, 11/25/1986. Secret. Prepared by Brooks and Kraemer. Copies were sent to Regan and Bush. Attached at Tab A but not printed is the meeting agenda. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum on November 25.
2. Attached but not printed.