Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

160. Memorandum From the Vice President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg) and the Vice President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Watson) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, November 21, 1986

SUBJECT

• Arms Control: Jim Hoagland article

Hoagland’s article plays on the now popular theme that “we don’t have our act together.”² He has pulled together pieces of evidence to show our “disorganization.” Hoagland’s thesis is that no one has been willing or has had the courage to tell the President, since his March 1983 SDI speech, that eliminating all nuclear weapons is not a very practical idea. Whether one agrees or not with that thesis or that nuclear weapons should be eliminated, there is a confusion factor out there that resonates well given the current climate.

To be more precise, consistently since March 1983 the President has spoken of complete elimination. Briefing paper after briefing paper, NSDDs, and talking points for the President and Secretary Shultz have included points on complete elimination as a goal. The President has been beat up over the years on this from all sides—critics can’t have it both ways. They can’t criticize him for not being interested in arms control and disarmament, and then criticize him for making sweeping and revolutionary proposals.³ At the same time, we are faced with an internal dilemma: we are in a good rhetorical position, on the moral high ground with proposals to eliminate all nuclear weapons. People want it. It is appealing. As a matter of national strategy, and of military planning, a world without nuclear weapons would be very hard for the west to cope with. We made a fundamental decision in the late-1940’s to keep conventional force levels low, and compensate with nuclear weapons. This decision carries through to today. It is most recently enunciated in the NATO triad strategy (deter/fight with conventional battlefield forces, deliberate escalation to battlefield and theater nuclear weapons, if that doesn’t stop a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack then escalation to strategic and intercontinental nuclear forces.

Now, back to the Hoagland article. Hoagland says the White House is blaming the press for misunderstanding the President’s vision. No one misunderstands his vision. Few, though, understood how seriously he believed it. Our proposal for elimination of all nuclear weapons eventually, or even of all strategic offensive ballistic missiles in ten years will be tough for the Joint Chiefs to live with,⁴ and to adjust their strategy to. That it took people outside our government to tell him of the practical problems is troublesome.⁵ True, the Joint Chiefs (Admiral Bill Crowe) have recently gone public on this issue. But serious doubts over that goal have not been surfaced inside. Rather, all agencies have agreed with the talking papers, etc.⁶

I doubt a “czar” or a backchannel is needed. We have a NSC structure and a Chief of Staff. The problem is not here. The problem is that the agencies and departments don’t trust each other. The stakes are too high. They insist on sending agency representatives with the President or George Shultz. The NSC staff, John Poindexter, and Bud have done a darn good job of pulling together the vastly disparate views in Washington. Reasonable and principled decisions made after discussion with the President are often taken as staff decisions, not as Presidential. Discipline by the agencies would help move the negotiations along.

What can be done to repair our image? Here at home many will fasten on the President. They’ll push him hard to make a definitive speech on his arms control goals. Not a bad idea. But the President should not carry the entire burden. The departments and agencies need to pull together behind the President.⁷ A little head bashing might help.

Asia does not seem to be a problem, though Rowny can discuss his Asian consultations Monday afternoon. Europe needs some high level stroking. As you know, we’ve previously discussed a trip by you to give them the final word on the issue. We should give serious thought to a trip—the NSC staff had asked in September if you would after the November Washington summit.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Sam Watson Files, Country File, OA/ID 19865–017, Arms Control—Other. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Gregg wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “MR VICE PRESIDENT A very good, & tough-minded paper from Sam. DG.” Bush wrote below Gregg’s note: “Good. somehow we must challenge all to think anew. Because it’s gone one way since ’40 does not mean we have to keep on with MAD for the next 40. GB”
2. Attached but not printed is a copy of Jim Hoagland, “Bailing Out the President,” Washington Post, November 21, 1986, p. A2.
3. Bush drew two short vertical lines in the right-hand margin beside this sentence and wrote: “good point.”
4. Bush underlined “Our proposal for elimination of all nuclear weapons eventually, or even of all strategic offensive ballistic missiles in ten years will be tough for the Joint Chiefs to live with.”
5. Bush underlined this sentence.
6. Bush underlined “serious doubts over that goal have not been surfaced inside. Rather, all agencies have agreed with the talking papers, etc.”
7. Bush drew a short vertical line in the left-hand margin beside the last three sentences of this paragraph.