Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

139. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 16, 1986

SUBJECT

• Why We Can’t Commit to Eliminating All Nuclear Weapons Within 10 Years

Purpose. Mr. President, my purpose in this note is to strongly recommend that you step back from any discussion of eliminating all nuclear weapons in 10 years, and focus attention on the proposals that you handed over to General Secretary Gorbachev in writing in Iceland which were focused on the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles in 10 years.² Further, I would recommend that you make no further public comment endorsing the idea of the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in 10 years as something discussed and agreed with the General Secretary. If asked, I would recommend that you stand firm by your long-term commitment to the ultimate goal of the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, but always cast this in terms of a long-term goal which will require the correction of existing conventional force imbalances and other conditions that require us to have the nuclear weapons in the first place.

Eliminating Ballistic Missiles. The idea of calling for the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles is not a new one. And although we had not previously considered suggesting that this be accomplished by 1996 (in 10 short years), it is a concept that we have studied carefully.

As you will remember, the idea of calling for the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles grew out of a proposal initially made by Cap Weinberger.³ He made it to you as we were working your last arms control letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.⁴ Cap suggested that it be coupled with the idea of sharing the benefits of advanced defenses.

The logic of this idea is simple and direct. Cap argued that it would make no sense to commit to share the benefits of advanced defenses with the Soviets if they insisted on continuing to possess large numbers of offensive ballistic missiles which would attempt to defeat our defenses. In short, why share the benefits of our research unless the Soviets showed a willingness to join us in making the transition to a more defense reliant world by reducing and ultimately eliminating offensive ballistic missiles.

The call for the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles was also consistent with what we were trying to do both in START and in INF, and also with the fundamental goal that you specifically set for the SDI program.

With respect to START, the call for the total elimination of all ballistic missiles is a logical extension of the position we have taken in the START negotiations that we must reduce and eliminate the unique threat posed by ballistic missiles. Our position has long been that while each side may need nuclear forces for some time to deter conflict and underwrite its security, neither side needs fast-flying, non-recallable offensive ballistic missiles for this purpose. From the very first, in START, we have been trying to draw a clear distinction between fast-flying ballistic systems, which are uniquely suited for an attempted first-strike by an aggressor, and slow-flying systems which are better suited for retaliation (less so for aggression). As a result, we have been attempting to focus on reductions in ballistic missile warheads as the heart of the issue to be resolved—and have treated slow-flying bombers largely to meet Soviet concerns.

In INF, we have taken a similar position. We have kept the focus on missiles, and avoided discussion of dual-capable, tactical aircraft. We proposed the zero-zero solution for the LRINF missile problem. We have called for the similar reduction and elimination of shorter-range ballistic missiles, missiles that pose as direct a threat to our Allies as Soviet ICBMs do to the United States.

With respect to SDI, your specific, stated goal was to make ballistic missiles obsolete, not to make all nuclear weapons obsolete. Here, again, your focus was on promptly eliminating the threat posed by these fast-flying missiles. You did discuss the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, but you made it very clear that this step could only be taken if either the conventional balance of forces were corrected, or if the conditions of the world changed sufficiently so that the conventional force imbalance was not as a direct a threat as it is today and our requirements for nuclear weapons were removed.

After study and discussion, you incorporated the idea of proposing the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles into your letter to the General Secretary. We then consulted our Allies about this idea, and gained their support for it.

In Iceland, at the critical point of finding a response to Soviet concerns which neither compromised our principles or our security, we recommended that you draw upon this previous consensus and adapt this element (a call for the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles) into your response to the Soviet call for a 10 year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. By doing so, we undercut any Soviet objection to our having the right to deploy defenses as insurance, since we would have committed to wait until all offensive ballistic missiles of the two superpowers should have been eliminated anyway. By calling for the elimination of missiles of all ranges, we also, in one step, solved the problem of getting rid of both the last 100 Soviet SS–20 warheads in Asia (a concern of our Asian allies) and the remaining shorter-range INF missiles that still would threaten our European allies (a particular concern of Kohl).

It was for these reasons that we recommended to you, and you agreed and passed to the Soviets, the proposal calling for the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles in 10 years attached at Tab A.⁵ It was also for these reasons that we recommended to you, and you agreed and passed to the Soviets, a rejection of their attempt to alter this to a proposal for the elimination of all strategic forces (Tab B)⁶—and instead went back to them with a second proposal that was altered in certain language but firm on the call for the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles (Tab C).⁷

Under the recommended proposals, at the end of 10 years, when no offensive ballistic missiles exist, the US and the Soviet Union would still have up to 50% of today’s strategic nuclear offensive force levels, although they would now be concentrated in slow-flying systems (bombers and cruise missiles). This would provide a modest strategic retaliatory force to deter attack on the US and conventional aggression against our allies throughout the world until our conventional forces could be upgraded and our air defenses put in place. It would keep a US nuclear umbrella, although a quite smaller one, over NATO. We would also still have some nuclear weapons in battlefield systems like artillery and in our dual-capable fighter aircraft that could hold Soviet tank concentrations at risk. Thus, keeping some nuclear forces would offset the great Soviet advantage in conventional forces that exists threatening NATO. These were the very significant reasons behind our recommendations to you that you reject any Soviet attempts to shift the proposal from the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles to either the elimination of all strategic forces or the total elimination of nuclear weapons in 10 years.

Eliminating All Nuclear Weapons. In your speech announcing the SDI program in March, 1983, you called for a future nuclear free world.⁸ Prior to finalizing that speech, as you will recall, we had a series of discussions about the fact that until regional conventional force imbalances could be corrected, such a step was simply not possible—and, therefore, the main thrust of the SDI program announced in your speech, and the specific objective given to that program by you was not to make nuclear weapons obsolete, but to make ballistic missiles obsolete.

In January, 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed a plan for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000.⁹ You will remember that we very carefully studied the plan, and reached the conclusion that while we agreed with the ultimate goal, that such a step could only be taken if we were confident that we had other means to offset Soviet conventional force advantages. You responded to the General Secretary’s proposal along these lines. Nothing has changed since that time.

The Conventional Imbalance. Given the differences in the size of conventional forces that exist today, and the military requirements we face, it is very unlikely that we could take the actions to improve our conventional force capabilities needed to permit us to do without some nuclear weapons within the next ten years. Our allies face the same problem, and many have made it clear that they do not support any move in this direction for this very practical reason. Thus, both US and Allied security require at least some nuclear weapons be retained for the foreseeable future.

Mrs. Thatcher’s Views. Mrs. Thatcher, in her recent phone conversation with you, made the very same points. She strongly feels that the premature elimination of all nuclear weapons would strike at the heart of our deterrence strategy. She also feels that the Soviets clearly have conventional superiority, and that doing away with all nuclear weapons would give them the upper hand. She said to you that she remained concerned that if we were to give up all our nuclear weapons, the Soviets, with their conventional superiority, could just sweep across Europe. She noted that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is what her political opposition (Neil Kinnock) is advocating, but that she feels that this would be tantamount to surrender. Finally, she reminded you that Winston Churchill had long ago declared that an independent nuclear deterrent was the only way for smaller countries, like Great Britain, to equalize the strength and power of bigger countries—and that she fully agreed with this.

The Impact on US/Allied Military Strategy. If we could put aside for the moment the nuclear forces of the UK, France and China—and others who could become nuclear powers like India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, etc.—we should also consider the situation we would face if the types of proposals discussed above were implemented.

Eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles would push us back to a condition similar to that which we faced in the 1950s. A limited number of nuclear weapons would exist, largely deliverable by aircraft.

In terms of military tactics, the existence of these remaining nuclear weapons would mean that an aggressor could not mass his forces in any one place in the hope of breaking through conventional defenses because he could not be sure that nuclear weapons would not be used to destroy these forces when they are massed. The fact that the threat of nuclear attack prevents an aggressor from massing his conventional forces without risk makes modern conventional weapons more effective, giving them the chance to handle the threat they face since the existence of nuclear weapons means that the aggressor can’t simply mass forces and overwhelm positions with force of numbers.

In terms of strategy, the existence of these weapons (too slow to be used to surprise and defeat retaliatory forces, but still well suited for a retaliatory mission) would still raise the price of aggression to a level high enough that it could help deter aggression.

Eliminating all nuclear weapons (once again ignoring the forces of the UK, France, China and others for simplicity) would push us back to a situation that existed on the eve of WW II—with the peace dependent upon the assessment of an aggressor of the relative strength of his conventional forces alone. However, instead of the Panzer divisions that Hitler had at his disposal, we would face the challenge posed by the combined arms capability of the Soviet army. It simply is not clear that we can take the steps necessary to upgrade our own and NATO’s conventional defenses sufficiently to have our security rest on conventional forces alone within 10 years. If we cannot, then the Soviet ability to coerce our allies—to Finlandize other nations—will increase, and our security decrease, as a result of the premature elimination of all nuclear weapons.

While our allies certainly are not happy having their security tied to the use of nuclear weapons to offset conventional forces, and the prospect of nuclear war in Europe is unacceptable to them, so is the alternative if they are faced with added expense for conventional forces and all they get as a result of that added expense is the replacement of the potential for nuclear war in Europe with the potential of an equally devastating high-tech replay of WW II.

Verification. Finally, we can’t ignore that others have nuclear weapons. The elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles will be difficult to verify, but it is likely to be child’s play compared to verifying the elimination of all nuclear weapons. In addition, the need for verification will be enormous since if we believe we are living in a nuclear free world and suddenly someone demonstrates that they have a covert nuclear stockpile, their ability to coerce this great nation would be immense. This, alone, is a fundamental reason for moving much more slowly on the path towards an agreement now on the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Bottom Line. All this being so, the main point of this memorandum is simply that neither our military experts or our allies would support the idea of moving to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons within 10 years.

They can likely support a goal of the elimination of all ballistic missiles in that period. The elimination of offensive ballistic missiles would remove not only the nuclear threat posed by such weapons, but the chemical threat as well. It would also enhance our conventional capability by removing the direct threat of rocket attack against our conventional forces, our airfields, the sites where we store the tanks and vehicles that our troops coming from the US in a crisis which would reinforce NATO reinforcements coming from the US would need in a crisis. It would make the planning of a quick disarming first strike by a conventional aggressor much more difficult.

Recommendations. Based on all of the above, Mr. President, I would strongly recommend that:

(1) you step back from any discussion of eliminating all nuclear weapons in 10 years, and focus attention on the proposals that you handed over to General Secretary Gorbachev in writing in Iceland which were focused on the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles in 10 years;

(2) you make no further public comment endorsing the idea of the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in 10 years as something discussed and agreed with the General Secretary; and

(3) if asked about such discussions or your position on this, I would recommend that you stand firm by your long-term commitment to the ultimate goal of the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, but always cast this in terms of a long-term goal which will require the correction of existing conventional force imbalances and other conditions that require us to have the nuclear weapons in the first place.

We have a good, consistent position in our proposal to reduce by 50% the existing strategic nuclear arsenals and then to totally eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles. We can be reasonably assured that our military can support this, that our allies can support this, and that our security requirements can support this. We have adjusted your recent report to the nation to reflect this approach, and it was well received.¹⁰ We have explained this position to the Congress, our allies, and the American people—and it was well received.

I recognize that I am asking you to step back from an idea that did come up in Iceland. I also recognize that you may feel that you have committed to supporting this idea. However, I strongly feel that you should step back—and do so now.

Once you have read this memorandum, I am prepared to discuss this with you in whatever detail that you desire. I would ask that if you disagree with the recommendations I have made, that you give me the opportunity to explain them in person to you before you address this subject publicly.

1. Source: Reagan Library, John Poindexter Files, Chron File, Chron October 1986. Top Secret; Sensitive. Poindexter wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “0930 10/16/86 President read and agreed. JP.”
2. See Document 138.
3. See Document 114.
4. Reagan’s July 25, 1986, letter to Gorbachev is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 254.
5. Not found attached.
6. Not found attached.
7. Not found attached.
8. Reagan’s March 23, 1983, speech announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 145.
9. Gorbachev’s January 14, 1986, letter proposing the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 177.
10. See Reagan, “Address to the Nation on the Meetings With Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland,” Public Papers: Reagan, 1986, Book II, pp. 1367–1374.