—Reduce by 50 percent (to 6000) nuclear warheads capable of reaching the
territory of the other side (i.e., the current Soviet START position).
—Ban on development, testing, and deployment of “attack space weapons.”
(No mention of research.)
—Elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe.
—No build-up of British and French nuclear forces, and no transfer of
U.S. missiles to other countries.
—Cease all nuclear test explosions.
—Britain, France, China freeze their nuclear forces.
—All nuclear powers eliminate tactical nuclear weapons.
—All nuclear powers cease testing.
—All powers eliminate remaining nuclear weapons by 1999.
Verification procedures for dismantling and destruction would be worked
out, including on-site inspection.
Portions of this proposal reflect long-held Soviet positions, such as
their traditional definition of strategic, the ban on space weapons, and
the test ban. But there are new elements as well:
Attachment
Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President
Reagan2
Moscow, January 14, 1986
Dear Mr. President,
After our meeting in Geneva where we agreed that the questions of
security are central for our relations, I have carefully thought
through the ways to implement the decisions of principle, which were
taken as a result of our meeting.
I am convinced that we should work for packing the period till the
next planned Soviet-American summit with constructive efforts of
both sides aimed at achieving concrete agreements, first of all, on
the urgent problems of arms limitation and reduction. I am,
certainly far from being forgetful about the major differences which
remain between our approaches to the resolution of these problems.
But all these things notwithstanding, it is also impossible to deny
that there exist now serious prerequisites to overcome the
difficulties we face and, without wasting time, to arrive at
mutually acceptable agreements in the interests of enhancing the
security of all the peoples. A foundation for that is the joint
document in which we clearly expressed ourselves in favor of
preventing nuclear as well as conventional war between our
countries, reaffirmed our mutual willingness to follow the path of
policy ruling out the seeking of military superiority.
[Page 773]
Now this declaration has to be substantiated by concrete actions. A
whole series of opportunities exists in this regard. The task is to
make use of them in practice. We are for casting aside the
stereotypes and outdated modes of thinking, hindering the advance
movement, and for tackling in a bold and new manner the resolution
of issues which you and I simply do not have the right to
postpone.
In your New Year address to the people of the Soviet Union you said
that it was your dream to one day free mankind from the threat of
nuclear destruction.3 But why make the
realization of this dream conditional on the development of new
types of weapons—space weapons in this case? Why take this extremely
dangerous path—which does not hold a promise for disarmament, when
it is possible already now to get down to freeing the world from the
existing arsenals?
We propose a different path, which will really enable us to enter the
third millennium without nuclear weapons. Instead of spending the
next 10–15 years developing new sophisticated weapons in space,
which are allegedly intended to make nuclear weapons “obsolete” and
“impotent”, wouldn’t it be better to address those weapons
themselves and take that time to reduce them to zero? Let us agree
on a stage-by-stage program which would lead to a complete nuclear
disarmament everywhere already by the turn of the next century.4
The Soviet Union envisages the following procedure of the reduction
of nuclear weapons—both delivery vehicles and warheads—down to their
complete liquidation.
The first stage. It would last approximately
5–8 years. During this period the USSR and US would
reduce by half their nuclear weapons reaching the territories of
each other. There would remain no more than 6000 warheads on the
delivery vehicles still in their possession.
It goes without saying that such reductions take place on the basis
of the mutual renunciation by the USSR and US of the
development, testing and deployment of attack space weapons. As the
Soviet Union has repeatedly warned, the development of space weapons
will dash the hopes for reductions of nuclear weapons on Earth.
The Soviet Union, as is known, has long been proposing that Europe be
freed from nuclear weapons, both medium range and tactical. We are
in favor of reaching and implementing already at the first stage a
decision to eliminate completely the medium range missiles of the
USSR and US in the European zone—both ballistic
and cruise missiles—as the first step towards freeing the European
continent from nuclear
[Page 774]
weapons. In this context, naturally, the US would have to assume the obligation not to transfer
its strategic and medium range missiles to other countries, and
Britain and France—not to build up their corresponding nuclear
weapons.
From the outset, in our view, it is necessary for the USSR and US to agree to cease all nuclear explosions and to call
upon other states to join such moratorium as soon as possible. I
shall return to this issue later.
The second stage. It has to start no later
than 1990 and last 5–7 years. Britain, France and China start to
join nuclear disarmament. To begin with they could assume the
obligation to freeze all their nuclear armaments and not to have
them on the territories of other countries.
The USSR and US continue the reduction on which they
agreed at the first stage and carry out further measures to
liquidate their medium range nuclear weapons, and freeze their
tactical nuclear systems. After the USSR and US complete
the reduction by 50 percent of their relevant armaments, another
radical step is taken—all nuclear powers liquidate their tactical
nuclear weapons, that is, systems with ranges (radius of action) of
up to 1000 kilometers.
At this stage the Soviet-American agreement to ban attack space
weapons must become multilateral, necessarily involving all leading
industrial powers.
All nuclear powers would cease nuclear testing.
A prohibition would be introduced on the development of non-nuclear
weapons based on new physical principles, which by their destructive
capabilities come close to nuclear or other systems of mass
destruction.
No later than 1995 the third stage will start.
During this stage the liquidation of all still remaining nuclear
weapons is completed. By the end of 1999 no more nuclear weapons
remain on Earth. A universal agreement is worked out that these
weapons shall never be resurrected again.
It is envisaged that special procedures will be worked out for the
destruction of nuclear weapons as well as for the desmantling,
conversion or destruction of their delivery vehicles. In this
context agreement will be reached on the quantities of weapons to be
destroyed at each stage, the places where they will be destroyed,
etc.
The verification of the weapons destroyed or limited would be carried
out both by national technical means and by on-site inspection. The
USSR is prepared to come to
terms on any other additional verification measures.
[Page 775]
All this’ll become possible if we close the way for the arms race in
outer space. I would like to hope, that you, Mr. President, will
consider this question with all the attention it deserves.
In connection with the problem of nuclear arms, I would like to
address once again the question of the cessation of nuclear
explosions. We have already discussed it with you at length, in
particular in our correspondence. In your letter of December 24 you
say that nuclear tests are “important to ensure the safety,
reliability and effectiveness of nuclear weapons”.5 Such is your
argument. It appears to us, however, that a different approach is
required. It should be considered: what would provide greater
security—the cessation or the continuation of nuclear explosions?
Our conclusion is that it is the cessation of explosions, which
would bring enormous, really tangible benefits both for enhancing
the security of the USSR and
USA and for strengthening
strategic stability.
Guided by the objective of facilitating the termination of the
nuclear arms race, the Soviet Union has taken the decision to
prolong its unilateral moratorium on any nuclear explosions for
three more months. I think, there is no need to prove the
significance of this action. Moreover, this is a practical
demonstration of the restraint on the need to exercise which we
agreed with you in Geneva. I will be frank, we made this step
intending to give to the American side additional time for taking a
decision, which is expected from Washington by world public, a
decision that the American side, too, will stop its nuclear
tests.
Should the moratorium become mutual, it would give a powerful impetus
to reaching agreements on the limitation and reduction of nuclear
armaments, to strengthening and broadening the mutual trust. The
questions of verification do not represent an obstacle. Here we
could go far—up to, if necessary, mutual on-site inspections for
verifying the non-conducting of the explosions. The Soviet side is
ready in principle to discuss the questions of verification on the
level of experts, but of verification precisely of the
non-conducting of nuclear explosions, and not of anything else.
[Page 776]
As to the question you raised of centers to reduce nuclear risk, it
could become a subject for discussion at the upcoming round of the
Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons.
We are convinced that there exist good opportunities for moving
forward as regards the banning and non-proliferation of chemical
weapons, the resolution of the issues discussed in Vienna and
Stockholm. The Soviet delegations to the relevant fora have
clear-cut instructions to work towards successful accomplishments
there through joint efforts of all the participants in the talks. We
proceed from the assumption that the American side, too, will act in
the same direction.
I hope that the new major initiatives I outlined will be considered
by you, Mr. President, with all the seriousness and favorably and
that a positive response to them will follow.
I also would like to hope that agreements on the range of problems I
addressed would become a weighty asset of our upcoming meeting with
you. We are ready—at various levels—to work together for the sake of
ensuring its success. Such a success, of course, will be possible if
the striving for it is shown by practical deeds on both sides.
Sincerely,
