Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

140. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikle) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

I–23878/86

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Post-Reykjavik Instructions to the NST Negotiators (U)—ACTION MEMORANDUM—URGENT

(S) Below action memorandum at Tab A² you will find the current draft instructions for the US negotiators to the Nuclear and Space Talks, intended to take into account developments at Reykjavik. The President’s decision is expected to be made over the weekend. While there may be issues raised to the President on START and INF, by far the most important controversies are associated with the Defense and Space talks. In the draft memo conveying your views to the President (Tab B), we have therefore focused exclusively on the dangerous proposals being advanced in the D & S area.

(S) The principal issue at stake here is Paul Nitze’s proposal that we offer the Soviets the opportunity to negotiate agreed understandings of what is permitted and what is not under the ABM Treaty—without requiring them to accept the President’s Reykjavik framework (i.e., for delayed deployment of SDI provided all ballistic missiles were eliminated). As you can readily appreciate, such a proposal would give the Soviets precisely the leverage they seek—and the President rejected—over SDI. It would in all likelihood result a year or so hence in a new agreement restricting our current (legally correct) interpretation of the ABM Treaty, divorced from all the other elements of the President’s position. This new “Nitze agreement” might then turn out to be the only signed strategic arms agreement in this Administration.

(S) A related point is reflected in brackets we have inserted in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 asserting the requirement for a new treaty. As we discussed in connection with the NSC-produced “clarification” of the President’s July proposal, it should be self-evident that any future addressal of the ABM Treaty (e.g., non-withdrawal, what is permitted/not permitted, novation) must be undertaken in the context of a new agreement—not as an amendment to the existing accord. One would think such a new treaty would have to have its own “supreme national interest” for withdrawal clause to be ratifiable.

(S) START. The outstanding issues in START are reasonably straightforward:

○ We believe that we should not move away from the sublimits (para. 3, fourth tick) associated with our previous 50% without some movement on the Soviets’ part. State believes we should give the negotiator the flexibility to move to the higher sublimits envisioned in our 30% reduction proposal tabled in July.

○ The JCS have reserved on the proposed elimination of all ballistic missiles by 1996 (para. 5) pending completion of an analysis now underway. We will have a hand in shaping this study and its conclusions. (I’ll have a separate memo following on this general point.)

○ We have reserved pending your guidance on paragraph 6, which State has advanced, offering a separate, interim deal on 50% reductions. The obvious danger here (in addition to your general disdain for so-called “interim” agreements) is that the deployment of defenses could be strung out pending completion of the second phase of negotiations.

(S) INF. The only real issue in INF is the same bullet above, namely our reservation on your behalf about paragraph 7’s reference to the zero-in-Europe/100-global level as an interim step to be followed by negotiations to zero globally. We understand that, subsequent to the President’s decision about retaining our right to Alaska basing, no agency will support the third tick under paragraph 5—this is progress. (The bracket is being retained pending comments from Ambassador Glitman.)

(S) Recommendation:

We recommend that you focus your message to the President on the “ABM treaty-clarifying negotiations” proposal to nip this poisonous plant in the bud. See draft memo at Tab B.

Fred C. Ikle³

Tab B

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan⁴

Washington, October 19, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT

• Post-Reykjavik Instructions for the Geneva Negotiators (U)

(S) New draft instructions have been prepared for the Geneva arms negotiations, based on the Reykjavik meeting. I want to draw your attention to some critical choices that these proposed instructions raise.

(S) The instructions for the Space and Defense area are of particular importance, since they involve options that would have the effect of undoing the position on SDI that you so effectively defended in Reykjavik. You refused to accept additional limitations on research, development, and testing of SDI, and this decision of yours must not be undone through the back door.

(S) One of the options would authorize negotiations in Geneva on “exactly what activities are prohibited under the ABM Treaty” (paragraph 5 of the draft Defense and Space instructions). In my judgment, this will lead to crippling limitations on SDI.

(S) In the absence of an overall agreement, the only foreseeable outcome of negotiations on the activities allowed by the ABM Treaty would be new restrictions on SDI. No other outcome is possible since now, by our interpretation, the only limitation on SDI research is that we cannot deploy a completed system. The inevitable result of the compromise proposed in the new instructions would be new constraints. Why is it that there are always proposed to you new concessions for us to make? You have gained the respect of the world by standing firm. Let’s let the Soviets make a few new offers and compromises.

(S) We must not permit the essence of your Reykjavik proposal to be eviscerated by offering the Soviets the chance to negotiate additional limitations on SDI. I strongly urge your rejection of any option having the effect of tightening the ABM Treaty restrictions, or defining what it is we can and cannot do as part of our SDI research. We can only injure, probably fatally, SDI if we try to define now what we cannot do as a part of our future research. And, of course, we could never verify Soviet compliance with any such restrictions.

Cap

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Subject File, 1986 Arms Control Reykjavik Summit #2–11 (2). Secret.
2. Attached but not printed are undated draft guidance telegrams for the Nuclear and Space Talks, sent under cover of an October 16 memorandum from ACDA Assistant Director for Strategic Programs Michael Mobbs to the Arms Control Support Group.
3. Ikle signed the memorandum “Fred” above this typed signature.
4. Secret.