Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

114. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikle) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, June 10, 1986

SUBJECT

• NSPG on “US-Soviet Relations”: Follow-up Meeting
• June 12, 1986 (S)

A. General Points on US-Soviet Relations.

(S) Time permitting, you should try to fit in the following, broader points, to correct some of the mistaken assumptions implicit in last Friday’s NSPG discussion:²

(1) (S) Longer-term trends, you could note, are in favor of democracy (“as George Shultz said in last meeting”). Hard currency shortages and other economic problems force Gorbachev to make careful choices on military/foreign policy expenditures. Hence, this is a good period to bring the Soviets gradually around to reducing their military effort. But we won’t accomplish this by making early tactical concessions; rather we must convey our position with conviction and consistence.

(2) (S) Arms control is but a part of the larger US-Soviet relationship. The Carter Administration made the mistake of turning US-Soviet arms negotiations into the be all and end all of our relations—till Afghanistan caused a rude awakening.

(3) (S) As to the Soviet propaganda gains, we must guard that we do not inadvertently stimulate such gains. If the Western media and Allied governments keep saying that “the Soviets are winning the propaganda battle,” they make this assertion self-fulfilling. If we in the Administration appear to react nervously to such stories, we give them more weight. If we keep revising our arms control proposals “to demonstrate flexibility,” we instead demonstrate a lack of conviction in our position. It is self-confident repetition that gains plausibility for our proposals.

(4) (S) Timing of a possible new US initiative: a move before the summer recess may not be a good idea.³ By the time Europe returns from vacation, our initiative would be forgotten and the Soviets could recapture public attention by another repackaging of their old proposals. To strengthen Congress now, we can accomplish more by articulating the good rationale for our present position, than by creating headlines about some new position.

B. The Question of the ABM Treaty.

(1) (S) It would be a likely strategy for the Soviets, to slow down our SDI as much as possible by insisting on a most restrictive interpretation of the Treaty and by complaining publicly as to how our specific SDI actions violated the Treaty. At the same time, the Soviets could plan to violate most of these actual or alleged treaty restrictions themselves, counting on concealment and denial to delay a US reaction to their Treaty violations for many years. Thus, they could gain a significant head start in ballistic missile defense.

(2) (S) Some years hence, when our SDI comes up against the Treaty limits and/or when we are ready for deployment, it is therefore most unlikely that the Soviets would agree on a Treaty revision that would authorize such additional SDI development or deployment. They might pretend willingness to negotiate such a Treaty revision, in order to string us along. But they almost certainly would proceed with their initial deployment steps as far as possible while holding us to the Treaty and denying that they are deploying.

(3) (S) In sum, for the US the decision on SDI deployment in the next decade is likely to come down to three choices:

• 1. to use the withdrawal clause in the Treaty relatively early (citing, among other reasons, Soviet violations such as Krasnoyarsk).
• 2. not to deploy SDI and seek to deter more massive Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty by the threat of deployment.
• 3. Failing the above, to wait until the Soviets have violated massively, and then declare the Treaty voided by the Soviets and try to catch up.

(4) (S) The Soviets have been trying to convince us that they need reassurance on our good motives on SDI. However:

• 1. They don’t need reassurance that we will not suddenly break out of the ABM Treaty and deploy, for they know full well we can’t do so for many years. Hence, their expressed interest in a commitment not to use the withdrawal clause for a period of time suggest that they want to lure us into an “interim agreement” which will be extended—till they have begun to deploy.
• 2. They don’t need much reassurance that SDI will not include offensive “space strike arms” that can do substantial damage on the ground, for their experts know that it would be foolishly expensive for us to put such systems into orbit for doing damage on their territory. And to the extent that there might be gray areas, the President has already assured Gorbachev we would be pleased to address those.

C. Summary.

(S) You should try to gain time in the NSPG

— to prevent a bad proposal (such as locking us more into the ABM Treaty) from being rushed forward.

— to develop better approaches that the President could use next fall, or in conjunction with a summit, truly supportive of SDI.

(S) Zero Ballistic Missiles—One of the proposals on which I initiated some work quietly is the total elimination of all ballistic missiles (not just INF); that is to say reductions down to reach the zero over a number of years (say 15 years). There are some pitfalls and definitional questions that must be watched (in particular, how to permit missiles for space launches and for air- and missile-defense). But based on the reactions of some “hard boiled” critics, it appears we could construct a proposal that is responsible and yet effective in the public arena.

(S) Max Kampelman, with whom I discussed this idea, likes it and wants to lend his support. Bill Crowe also indicated he was sympathetic. If you want us to pursue it, we need to figure out the best timing and context.

(U) The ultimate success or failure of the Strategic Defense Initiative—President Reagan’s most far-reaching and most innovative decision on strategic arms—depends largely on whether our arms control policy will help SDI or will hobble it. Our arms control policy can help SDI by inducing the Soviets to move away from their reliance on offensive missiles, and by convincing the American people that SDI—complemented by arms control—offers a plausible road to a safer future. Our arms control policy can hobble SDI by tightening the restrictions of the ABM Treaty, or by proposing a future that is contradictory to SDI (such as a return to a “stable” relationship of mutual assured destruction).

Fred C. Ikle⁴

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 843, Subject File, 1986, General Arms Control: Set B. Secret. The National Security Planning Group met in the White House Situation Room from 2 until 2:45 p.m. on June 12; minutes are in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 243.
2. June 6. See Document 112.
3. Weinberger underlined “a move before” and “summer recess may not be a good idea.”
4. Ikle signed the memorandum and wrote “Fred” above his typed signature.