Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

123. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, July 24, 1986

SUBJECT

• ICBM Modernization

Several weeks ago I sent you the memo at Tab II.² On 21 July we met briefly to discuss my memo in more detail. At the close of our meeting you asked for some time to consider the issue further and directed that I raise the issue with Bill Cockell. The purpose of this memo is to follow-up our discussions with several specific proposals.

Since the 21st I have had an opportunity to discuss this fall’s ICBM decisions on MX and SICBM with Don Hicks, Bill Cockell and General Larry Welch, the new Air Force Chief of Staff. These discussions have led me to believe that unless we begin to activate a senior interagency group to coordinate the decision process, the Pentagon will not produce a timely or politically acceptable decision this fall. Bill and General Welch agree with this assessment. The IG would be program oriented now with a later shift to congressional support orientation.

The problems with timing relate to the natural decision process within the Air Force and OSD. Both have differing decision schedules and both tend to structure their decision sequences later than we directed in NSDDs 178 and 227.³

The problems of “sellability” relate to my views that neither OSD nor the Air Force are likely to choose a politically acceptable basing mode if left to their own devices and neither proposed decision process has allowed time for the consensus building needed to sell a new basing mode to the public or the Hill.

My views of where to go from here are somewhat clouded by your reactions to our discussions on the 21st. I came away from that discussion troubled by the concern that you might have felt that I was trying to get you to endorse rail mobile basing at this time. I am not. In fact, I believe any White House endorsement of a single basing mode at this time would be counterproductive.

I do believe, however, that our best hope for keeping the basing effort alive is to propose a solution that is analytically easy to understand and one that can pass the same survivability criteria imposed on the SICBM. The democratic opponents of MX have committed themselves to the SICBM and the concept that mobility equates to survivability. By proposing a similar basing mode for MX, we can deny them their traditional argument that MX is not survivable and is therefore destabilizing.

I further believe that at this time the only feasible basing mode that can do all this is rail mobile. General Welch agrees with this, but told me his staff talked him out of supporting rail mobile based on worries about protests blocking the rails.

I fully realize, however, the undesirability of the NSC imposing a basing solution on the Pentagon. We must lead them to the right solution or we cannot hope to have a successful resolution of this issue in the fall. I believe that this can be done (I’d rate our chances of success at about 40–50%), but to do it we must begin now to change the views of several important interest groups.

First, we must convince the OSD and Air Force leadership that rail mobile is demographically feasible. The Air Force has not taken rail mobile seriously since the early 1960’s (when it was abandoned due to cost and technical problems by McNamara) because they have assumed it was not politically or demographically feasible. The Peacekeeper community continues to believe this, but General Welch told me he would press them for a better look at the program.

I believe (from my experience with the SICBM) that we could propose, develop, and deploy a rail mobile system without a serious challenge from the public provided we win the support of the liberal left (like we have done on SICBM). Thus, we may find ourselves, having outgrown the people problems of the 1970’s, in an environment where we can clearly take advantage of our technical progress since the 1960’s to solve any remaining technical problems with the concept.

Second, we must convince the arms control community that a U.S. move away from fixed silos towards the stability of mobile systems (large or small) is worth the risks or problems that may arise in the area of verification. Right now the common logic is that it is difficult to verify mobile systems so let’s not have any. I believe that it is unrealistic to expect the Soviets to abandon either the SS–25 or the SS–24 because of verification even if they want a new arms control agreement. We might be far better off by moving quickly towards mobility ourselves and concentrating on ways to verify mobile systems so we can be perceived as leading the way away from the instability of fixed silos versus the other way around.

Thirdly, we must be able to convince the Congress that these first two rather abrupt turns of policy are genuine and may lead towards an arms control solution that both the U.S. and the Soviets could endorse in the critical years of transition from offense only deterrence to an offense/defense mix. Also, we must, of course convince them that we should get started on all this in the two years we have left.

These are formidable tasks. As formidable as these efforts may seem, we have few alternatives.

The two great technological challenges that are reshaping the ICBM force structures of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are defense and the need for mobility to offset accuracy. You are well versed on the defense issue through your involvement with SDI so I will say no more there except to note that DOD is working hard to find near-term defense options to mate with the various basing modes. We may hear more from this as the summer passes.

We have been reluctant to pursue the issue of ICBM mobility for a variety of reasons. As a result, the Soviets have moved out ahead of us with this concept. Their move in this direction and our own reluctance to do so has raised one of the least known but potentially most important strategy dilemmas of our time. The stock answer of our military planners is that Soviet mobile systems are almost invulnerable, but U.S. mobile systems are not. This contradiction has never been adequately addressed.

To cast light on this contradiction last summer, I wrote into NSDD–178 a requirement for a DOD study on relocatable targets. This was done with the specific intent of forcing some attention to this dilemma prior to this fall’s ICBM decisions. The DOD report is at Tab III.⁴

In NSDD–178 we asked for a specific program including recommendations for force structure. One year later we received the fuzzy report at Tab III that promises to study the issue further and keep us informed. I spoke to Don Latham on this and he told me that despite the poor quality of the report they sent us (essentially a brush-off report), real work is taking place within the Pentagon to define a program.

Thus, we find ourselves with two alternatives. First, we can let the ICBM issue continue as is with the expectation that we will not get the solutions we need in time to influence events on the Hill next year. Or we can return to a more active posture through the reactivation of the senior MX working group. This latter course will not ensure success, but is, in my opinion, essential to achieving a successful outcome. In my discussions of this issue with Bill Cockell and General Welch, both agreed that now is the time for us to become more active and suggested that a short NSDD which outlines our views regarding the structure of the decision process would be helpful. The NSDD at Tab A has been drafted with this in mind.⁵

Bob Linhard and Ron Sable concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the activation of the senior MX interagency group (chaired initially by Bill Cockell and later co-chaired by Will Ball or Ron Sable as appropriate).⁶

That you sign the memo at Tab I which forwards the draft NSDD⁷ to DOD for comment.⁸

1. Source: Reagan Library, Alton Keel Files, Subject File, ICBM Modernization. Top Secret. Sent for action. Keel drew an arrow point to Douglass’s name in the “From” line and wrote: “from AK—see note.”
2. Not found attached. See Document 117.
3. See Documents 51 and 108.
4. Not found attached.
5. Attached but not printed is a draft National Security Decision Directive.
6. Poindexter approved the recommendation.
7. Not found attached. The undated, unsigned memorandum to Weinberger is attached to another copy of this memorandum in Reagan Library, Alton Keel Files, Subject File, ICBM Modernization. The memorandum reads: “As you know, this fall we must select a basing mode for the second 50 Peacekeepers and approve the configuration and the start of a full-scale engineering development for the SICBM. These two decisions will form the foundation for our ICBM program for the next decade. I have prepared the draft NSDD at Tab A in order to structure this fall’s decision process. I would appreciate any comments you may have by 15 August.”
8. Poindexter approved the recommendation and wrote below the “Approve” line: “But connect NSDD to memo from me to Cap saying this is the way I would like to handle these issues and asks for his comments.” Keel wrote below Poindexter’s comments, on July 31, 1986: “John D—As we discussed, I’m very much interested in this issue and agree it needs immediate attention plus NSC coordination. Please send cy of paperwork to Wilma for me until I come on-board. When I get on-brd you, Bill C. and I can discuss. Perhaps cover note (if not NSDD) shld put more emphasis on need for WH coord legis strategy, etc. AK”