117. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)1
SUBJECT
- ICBM Modernization
Part of the unwritten understanding that emerged from last year’s Peacekeeper fight was that we would let the issue “cool” for a year. Because of this we have, for the past year, been implementing a low-key strategy on ICBM modernization. The decisions that we face in December, however, on the basing mode for the second 50 Peacekeepers and the full-scale development of the small ICBM (SICBM), will require that we abandon this approach in the near future. We must soon shift to a more visible and vigorous campaign to lay the foundation for the solution we desire, if we hope to eventually win approval for the decisions we announce in December after the November elections.
Although the small ICBM could be a problem, (The SASC cut FY 87 funding by 50% and fenced the other half, pending our decisions at the [Page 402] end of this year, and any movement away from single warhead at this point, could lead to the defeat of the program.) the issue that will require a major White House campaign is the second 50 Peacekeepers. We have tied the two together because the beginning of full-scale development for the small ICBM is probably the last leverage point where we can salvage the second 50 Peacekeepers. If we let this event pass without a decision on Peacekeeper, the second 50 Peacekeepers will most likely fade away unless some unforeseen event occurs which we cannot now predict (i.e., major confrontation with the Soviets, etc.). The purpose of this memo is to outline to you how we may be able to develop a consensus for both the SICBM and the second 50 Peacekeepers.
Happily, the situation is not hopeless. The flaw in Peacekeeper has always been survivability. We may have lost a few votes to the hard core Left for other reasons, but the main issue has been that the poor survivability of fixed silos breeds instability in the nuclear balance.
With this in mind, it is important to note that the SICBM has been popular for the same reason. The Hill equates mobility with survivability. The single warhead issue is important to Aspin and some others (Scowcroft), but again, the main issue is survivability. The articles at Tab A2 by Les Aspin and Pete Wilson are good summaries of how the Hill looks at survivability in a historical and perspective context.
It’s important to realize before we start that we face a very significant challenge. As of today, there is insufficient support in Congress for a second 50 Peacekeepers, regardless of basing mode. This is important to bear in mind, because you must weigh the risk of setting up a possible major loss for the President in 1987 (the votes on this would most likely come in the Spring and Summer of 1987) when the election atmosphere will begin to dominate the issues.
Thus, we can look back on these past ten years and note that little has changed for ICBMs. In the mid-1970s, everyone felt basing survivability was the key challenge, not the missile’s design, and that’s exactly what happened as time passed. We now have an excellent missile, but the Air Force is still foundering around looking for a survivable basing mode. Those who postulated that accuracy could defeat hard targets were essentially correct. I’ve taken you through this short digression because it forms an essential background to the decisions that lie ahead. The Air Force and DOD have eight candidate basing modes:
- Hardened Minuteman Silos
- Superhard Silos
- Superhard Silos with Deception
- Hard Mobile
- Rail Mobile
- Carry Hard
- Shallow Tunnel
- Deep Underground
The first three can be dismissed summarily, in my judgment. Without real atmospheric tests, hard silos will never sell and probably shouldn’t, anyway. But the Air Force missile people will cling to them because that’s the world they know best.
Deep Underground and Shallow Tunnel are both too expensive and too exotic.
The three that remain all involve mobility. Carry Hard is a kind of MPS with a very hard capsule. It won’t sell out West, and it probably will look too much like MPS to SecDef and the President to be acceptable. You should know, however, that it looks good on paper and may be the DOD technical community’s first choice.
That leaves Rail Mobile and Hard Mobile. Hard Mobile is the same basing concept as the SICBM. It works well for a small missile, but probably is not practical for a missile the size of the Peacekeeper.
Thus, by process of elimination, I believe we end up with Rail Mobile. While there are genuine problems with this concept (nuclear weapons safety and security, for example), our initial problem with Rail Mobile is that the Air Force will resist its serious consideration because it’s doctrinally repugnant to them. I lived through the invention of GLCM (I was one of the Deputies in the Joint Cruise Missile Project), and I can tell you first-hand that the Air Force does not want to take on these mobile ground missions. Once we get past the initial kneejerk responses (you know how the Services hate for us to invent programs), we will then face political problems of basing scenarios (we will need to be skillful to postpone announcing where we will base the launchers), and the charge that we are simply copying the SS–x–24 (so here comes a new arms race, etc.).
Finally we will face the inevitable argument that the D–5 will give us all the prompt hard target kill we need. This argument will be heard more often as we approach the D–5 IOC in 1989.
While these problems are important, they can be overcome if we design the package deal skillfully. For example, we can avoid having the opposition focus on certain basing areas by expanding the number of possible rail routes to include many states. Our plan must begin with a strong campaign by the Air Force and DOD to sell mobility. At the same time we will need external support from individuals of the stature of those on the Scowcroft Commission for the concept of a large mobile ICBM. We will have to be very careful to avoid any appearance that we are rejecting the SICBM in favor of increasing to more than 100 Peacekeeper. There will be plenty of people ready with glib arguments [Page 404] that deploying a total of 100 mobile and 50 silo-based Peacekeeper will be cheaper/better/more cost-effective than the SICBM; accepting that position risks losing both Peacekeeper and the SICBM. We will also need a sophisticated argument which supports deploying large MIRVed ICBMs after D–5’s IOC without leading to questions about submarine survivability.
Despite these problems, if we build on the work already done (and the support that already exists) for the SICBM to link mobility and survivability, then a package deal of SICBM and Peacekeeper can be sold, just like we sold the B–1B—ATB. A phased approach to stability in ICBMs where the transition to Mobile systems starts now and ends where Arms Control or SDI dictate a stop, is a good theme to use. If we can wrap that idea with a sensible program that is affordable, we can win. If not, the best we can hope for on Peacekeeper is to keep the production line open to produce test missiles and hope for better times.
In taking stock of the Administration’s assets as we plan ahead, it becomes quickly evident that there are few veterans left from the original big Peacekeeper push. The Air Force has an entire new team which, unfortunately, is both less supportive and less skillful at working the Hill. OSD has suffered the loss of Russ Rourke and will soon lose Don Hicks, and in general has suffered a sharp decline in credibility. Here we’ve lost Bud, Ron Lehman, B. Oglesby, Chris Lehman, and Max Friedersdorf. Only yourself, Ron Sable, Bob Linhard and myself remain as veterans. Given Bob’s enormous workload with running the Defense Group and looking after Arms Control and SDI, it pretty much leaves Ron and me with the ball. With that in mind, we need to solicit your views on how far you want us to go with raising the stakes on this issue.
Ron and Bob and I need to talk this over with you before you go to California with the President. After we talk, we envision the development of a detailed game plan that will cover the 150 days between August and December. We need to walk you through this issue as soon as possible because we need to then lay the groundwork with DOD and the Air Force so they can bring the issue to the SecDef in a proper forum. Ron also feels strongly that we must not become too visible with a “solution” prior to the November elections, or we run the risk of having the DOD effort perceived as being “front loaded”, thereby eliminating any credibility that might otherwise be present.
Bob Linhard, Ron Sable, Mike Donley, and Lint Brooks concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you take 30 minutes to meet with us on this in the near future.3