122. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- Interagency Study on Sharing Strategic Defense Benefits with the Soviets
On December 17, 1985, Jay Keyworth sent you a letter suggesting how the United States and the Soviet Union might share the benefits of strategic defense.2 His idea was to have joint U.S.-Soviet control over space-based ballistic missile defenses.
An interagency group has completed a study of Jay’s idea.3 We believe his idea has served a very useful purpose, in that it gave initial impetus to our study of the concept of sharing and led to the development of objective criteria to develop and evaluate a wide range of proposals for sharing the benefits of strategic defenses with the Soviet Union. These criteria address important strategic, technological, and cost issues.
Our interagency study also identifies a very broad spectrum of potential methods for sharing the benefits of strategic defense with the Soviet Union. This spectrum ranges from limited methods of sharing, such as sharing research program results, to far more extensive methods such as sharing defense system technologies.
In regard to Jay’s specific concept, however, our interagency study found a number of serious deficiencies that we believe make this particular idea an unsuitable method for sharing the benefits of strategic defense with the Soviet Union. We are concerned that, depending on how it might be implemented, the Keyworth concept could either give the Soviet Union the ability to circumvent the defense system covertly so that it would not operate as intended, or could give the Soviet Union information that it could use to develop countermeasures to the defense system.
The criteria on sharing the benefits which we have developed are:
- 1)
- Strategic-Based Criteria
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- Consistent with U.S. strategic concept, crisis stable, and verifiable.
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- Does not reduce the security of our allies or the strength of our alliances.
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- Does not adversely affect U.S. national intelligence capabilities; protects sources and methods.
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- Does not undermine our ability to achieve effective strategic defenses.
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- Should credibly express that the United States does not seek superiority or other unilateral strategic advantage through strategic defenses.
- 2)
- Technology-Based Criteria
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- Consistent with U.S. technology transfer policy.
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- Where appropriate, mutuality of access to technological advances.
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- Capable of being executed technically.
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- Invulnerable to circumvention or countermeasures.
- 3)
- Cost-Based Criterion
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- Does not increase cost of a deployed strategic defense beyond the benefits that we would receive from it.
Using these criteria, we plan now to evaluate very carefully and as expeditiously as possible several other potential concepts and methods for sharing the benefits. This will include further study of potential ways to share the actual control of strategic defense, which is the premise on which Jay’s concept was based. Our overriding objective now will be to identify for you as soon as possible the best way to demonstrate to the Soviets that the U.S. does not seek any unilateral advantage through strategic defenses.
My staff will continue to oversee this high priority examination in order to ensure that this effort to develop and evaluate proposals for sharing the benefits of strategic defenses are far-reaching and creative.
- Source: Reagan Library, William Tobey Files, Subject File, SHARING II (1 of 3). Secret; Wincey. Sent for information. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. Steiner and Tobey sent the memorandum to Poindexter for his signature under cover of a July 18 memorandum. (Ibid.)↩
- See Document 91.↩
- The interagency study is ibid.↩