Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

124. Electronic Message From Peter Rodman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, July 24, 1986, 1:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Gorbachev Letter: Problems Ahead

I had a long phone conversation and argument with Richard Perle, who expressed grave concern about the President’s letter² and what he thought it represented. I did not succeed in easing his fears, and I am worried about his line of thinking spreading among conservatives on the Hill. In your Congressional briefing this afternoon, think there are things you can do to (a) protect yourself against erroneous charges of “sell-out” and (b) make clear the correct interpretation of the President’s letter.

To my amazement, Richard was convinced that Cap got rolled on every issue in the letter. He thinks a 7½-year nondeployment pledge is enough to reduce SDI to a mere bargaining chip and undermine Hill support by demoralizing its supporters. I disputed his interpretation—adding that SDI supporters would be very much influenced by what they heard from DoD. He is disturbed by the way Nitze is briefing and by all the press stories in which State is claiming a great victory over Cap; this bothers me too, but I said it was hardly in DoD’s interest to go along with State’s tendentious interpretation! To me it looked like Cap had gotten his way on most disputed points.

A lot of what Richard said was an implied criticism of the procedure that was followed; he suggested that Cap was taken advantage of. This is clearly nonsense, but it’s a forewarning of the political problem that lies ahead. You should probably talk to Cap at some point to make sure that DoD is solidly out there defending the letter.

Nor should we forget that State is indeed part of the problem. Their tendentious briefing may be helpful in soothing allies but it is only provoking a problem on the right, as well as misinterpreting our policy.

Operationally, this means that in your briefings you should lay down markers about what the policy is NOT as well as what it is:

— We have not pledged to “delay” SDI in any sense; the time scale corresponds to the schedule we expect to be on anyway (indeed, may understate it).

— SDI is NOT a bargaining chip; it’s something we believe in.

— The President is determined to move ahead with a program (including testing) that brings us all the way to the point of an informed decision on deployment. That’s the bottom line.

— The ABM treaty stands. But we’re talking about a new agreement that accommodates OUR program as set forth in the letter.

I have talked to Bob Linhard about all this. He will get you some supplementary talking points along these lines.

1. Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 30168. Secret. Copies were sent to McDaniel and Linhard.
2. Reagan’s July 25, 1986, letter to Gorbachev is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 254.