Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

116. Memorandum From the Vice President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, June 13, 1986

SUBJECT

• Disarray on Arms Control Issue

From a variety of people at State, the NSC, and particularly Nick Platt, the following picture emerges of the state of play on arms control.

Shultz sees our decision on SALT II as a loss and a defeat. Right-wing Senators (Symms among them) got to the President and urged him to scrap the SALT Treaty. This tipped the balance. The President is now somewhat confused on the issue as was evidenced in his press conference.²

The Wednesday morning breakfast with Shultz, Weinberger and Poindexter was bitter on the issue of coordination.³ Shultz hit Weinberger hard on Perle’s remarks to Congress and on Cap’s own public criticism of the Soviet ABM proposal.

What has happened is that Poindexter is more even-handed than McFarlane. As a result, Weinberger has now been granted private time with the President, something which Shultz has had for many months, and which Cap had hankered after. Shultz is very upset at this, feeling he has lost his edge.

The future prospects for an arms control agreement are very murky. DoD opposes any major agreement. Shultz feels that there is an opportunity to reach a significant agreement on at least some aspects of arms control. With regard to SDI, Shultz feels strongly that it needs to be woven into a U.S.-Soviet agreement to protect the ongoing research programs from changes in Congress and/or changes in an Administration. Weinberger wants to stonewall all efforts to limit SDI in any fashion. Shultz believes that we will not know the feasibility of SDI until around 1992 and that it had better be enshrined in an agreement that would permit essential research to continue until that time.

The view at State is that the Soviets still want a Summit and that an arms control agreement may be possible if we move this year. The control of Soviet policy toward the U.S. has been moved back to Moscow from Washington and is being centralized under Dobrynin and Gorbachev. The Soviets seem more unified in their view toward us than we are in our view toward them.

Shultz’ personal relationship with Weinberger is as bad as it has ever been and he is privately furious at both Weinberger and Perle. Perle’s testimony on Capitol Hill, in which he said that the Members either stood with the President or the Soviet Union, has stirred a growing storm of resentment which Shultz believes may in the long run benefit those who seek some sort of arms agreement. Shultz feels strongly that we need to significantly limit the Soviet ability to deploy mobile, accurate long-range ICBMS. This would be the center of any agreement that he would seek.

At the NSPG meeting yesterday, Weinberger came up with a far-fetched scheme designed to abolish all ballistic missiles.⁴ Shultz did not oppose the idea, hoping through dialogue to engage DoD in a discussion which could lead to a more sensible proposal (Nitze feels Cap’s idea is ridiculous). Nick Platt feels it is “chaff.” The idea comes from Fred Ikle.⁵

NSC staffers say the President is somewhat isolated and confused on the arms control issue. It is clear from talks with everyone that Shultz needs all the help he can get at this point.

Comment: My own feeling is that the President would welcome an input from you on this issue. I certainly come down on the side of those who feel that we ought to look for some sort of verifiable arms reduction agreement. If the Administration remains split and confused as it is now, you are going to get a series of increasingly difficult questions as to where you stand. If we move toward an agreement, your answer can be that the President is in control of the process and that you stand with him. Unfortunately, he does not seem in control at the moment.⁶

[Omitted here is material not related to arms control.]

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Don Gregg Files, Subject File, OA/ID 19865–020, Foreign Policy Issues. No classification marking. Personal; Eyes Only. An unknown hand wrote “Don, p. 2” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. Reference is to Reagan’s question-and-answer session with reporters in the Cabinet room on June 12. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1986, Book I, pp. 759–760)
3. June 11; no minutes were found.
4. See Document 115.
5. See Document 114.
6. An unknown hand wrote below this paragraph: “Reaction to the decision from our NATO allies continues to be very bad. This is one of Shultz’s major concerns, & mine as well.”