115. Editorial Note
At the conclusion of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting on June 12, 1986, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs John Poindexter informed participants that he would summarize President Ronald Reagan’s views and circulate them to NSPG principals. Attached to the official minutes of the meeting is a paper summarizing Reagan’s position: “The President has provided the following guidance with respect to our arms control process: 1. The USG should act positively towards Soviet proposals put on the table at Geneva during this round. We should take their proposals seriously and develop appropriate counter-proposals within existing policy guidelines. Our public posture should project this positive/serious stance. 2. I believe that the Soviets oppose our development of SDI because they genuinely believe that we seek a first-strike advantage. Accordingly, I propose the development of a new initiative designed to counter this fear and to lead as rapidly as possible to a system of mutual deterrence based on defense. Development of this dramatic new proposal should commence now and be introduced at the next Geneva round in September. The basic elements of this initiative should include: —Continue our SDI research at our current pace. Acknowledge that the Soviets are free to continue their ABM research. —Agree that, when either side reaches the point in their ABM research that testing is required, then the other side will be invited to observe the testing. —Agree that there will be no deployment of an ABM system by either side until agreement is reached on reductions of ballistic missiles by both sides. Actual deployments of ABM systems would be linked and phased to actual ballistic missile reductions by both sides. —Agree that either side will share its ABM system with the other side, after the mutually witnessed testing has demonstrated that the system works. Eventually, our goal would be sharing the ABM systems with all responsible nations of the world.” (National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–110, NSPG Meeting 135)
On June 13, Peter Rodman of the National Security Council Staff sent Poindexter an electronic message at 6:02 p.m. reporting on a meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Reagan earlier that day. Although the White House Daily Diary states that Reagan met with Shultz and Poindexter from 1:39 until 2:16 in the State Dining Room, (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Rodman’s message suggests that he attended the meeting in Poindexter’s stead. Rodman wrote: “On arms control, Shultz said he wasn’t sure he was effectively communicating his view of the issue so he wanted to go over again what he had said at the NSPG. The key aim, he said, was ‘how to lock in SDI’ for succeeding administrations. He felt the Soviets had ‘reopened the [Page 399] bazaar’ in both START reductions and in conceding SDI research. He thought we could live with a 5–6 year pledge not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty since it would be 5–6 years until a deployment decision; the Soviets have also said it would take 5–6 years to phase in deep reductions. We could match these up, link the two, and ‘turn SDI into a compliance mechanism that keeps the reductions going.’ The President said this seemed ‘akin’ to what he had said at the NSPG: Both sides could keep on with SDI research and, at the moment of a deployment decision, share the knowledge, observe each other’s tests, and deploy based on the elimination of ICBMs. A treaty to this effect would lock SDI in. Shultz interpreted this as consistent with what he had said, and told the President he was ‘reassured’ by this conversation. I made no comment, but told Shultz afterwards that you too thought these concepts could be merged and that you would have a paper next week.” (National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration)