Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

82. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

9759.

Rabat, October 8, 1987, 1743Z

SUBJECT

• Morocco, Libya and Maghreb Integration.

Refs:

• (A) Tunis 11365,²
• (B) Rabat 9655,³
• (C) Rabat 9694,⁴
• (D) Rabat 9680.⁵

1. (Secret/Noforn—Entire text)

2. Begin summary:
Embassy Tunis reftel on current U.S. loneliness in arguing for isolation of Qadhafi is consistent with what we hear in Rabat. Part of Qadhafi’s attraction derives from the structure of intra-Maghreb competition. This being the case, we are unlikely to have much success in dissuading our friends unless and until progress is achieved in lessening active Algeria-Moroccan conflict. That means ensuring that the UNSYG’s effort on the Sahara⁶ in fact moves forward productively. End summary.

3. Morocco appears to be taking in stride recent Libyan-Tunisian and Libyan-Algerian talks about closer relations and the possibility of Libya joining the Maghreb treaty of friendship. As reported ref B, the Moroccans say they are not objecting to Tunisian-Libyan rapprochement, nor, according to the GOM’s Intelligence Chief in a conversation of October 8, does Morocco fear recent Algerian-Libyan moves toward union or whatever. While some of this could be bravado, the Moroccans, as shown by the Libyan Peoples Bureau Rep statement of support on the Western Sahara (ref C), are capable of playing off the Libyans against Algeria. In addition, the Tunisians appear to be keeping King Hassan informed of their moves with the Libyans (ref A). A Medi I (Tangier) radio report of 10/8 says Hedi Baccouche already is in Rabat.

4. The point in these moves is that none of the Maghreb powers appears to be willing to take a stand against Libya, each for its own special reasons: Algeria because of its Maghreb/Western Sahara and broader Arab agenda interests, Tunisia because of its special economic/security needs, and Morocco to secure its Western Sahara goals and keep Algeria off balance. In fact, Qadhafi seems to have rediscovered in his need to break out of diplomatic isolation that each of his neighbors have some use for him, quite apart from the fact of his unreliability and unsavory reputation. Internal and regional considerations, thus, appear to outweigh U.S. concerns about Qadhafi’s breaking out of diplomatic isolation and gaining diplomatic respectability.

5. What is sorely needed is a better set of U.S. arguments, if we are to have any impact on the question of relations with Qadhafi. Given the individual and regional concerns noted above, our arguments need to have some appeal to the interests of the players involved. In the case of Morocco, so long as there is active conflict with Algeria, there will be interest here in playing off Libya. The now defunct Arab African union with Libya was inspired in large part by the desire to secure marginal gain (i.e., neutralizing Libyan support for the Polisario) in the long contest of wills with Algeria. We expect that similar motives are in the minds of GOA leaders as they contemplate closer relations with Qadhafi.

6. If we are to keep Qadhafi in the isolation he richly deserves, we must change the regional perception that he is a necessary, if erratic, make-weight, to a realization that he is a threat to specific and immediate regional interests. We cannot get an audience for our case on Libyan terrorism and subversion so long as our friends believe they have far more important and direct security concerns, with which Qadhafi may be helpful, or at least not harmful. One of these is obviously the agony of the Bourguiba regime. Another is the Saharan war. As a continuing conflict, it has provided both a vehicle for Moroccan-Algerian competition and a durable incentive to their respective diplomatic efforts with Qadhafi, despite their caustic views on his behavior. Removing the conflict would of course not totally remove Qadhafi’s freedom of action—there are many other reasons why countries in the region deal with him, including broader Arab and Islamic agendas. But it would significantly reduce the perception in Rabat and Algiers that he could offer something positive in their bilateral competition. And that would, at a minimum, give us more air time for our case.

7. Fortunately, the UNSYG has already taken the initiatve on this issue. He will, however need support.

Hawes

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870830–0685. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Nouakchott, Paris, Rome, USCINCEUR, and USUN.
2. In telegram 11365 from Tunis, October 7, the Embassy reported that Baccouche “stressed that GOT continued to feel pressure” from both Libya and Algeria “and also its own public opinion to restore diplomatic relations.” The Embassy continued: “U.S. appears to be alone in urging Tunisia to resist regional pressures to normalize its relations with Libya and bring Libya into closer association with the Maghreb.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870826–0587)
3. In telegram 9655 from Rabat, October 6, the Embassy reported that in a meeting with Cherkaoui, Casey “underscored U.S. opposition to steps which would reduce Qadhafi’s isolation and assured Cherkaoui that the U.S. understood unity in the Maghreb could not be achieved without Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870830–0863)
4. In telegram 9694 from Rabat, October 7, the Embassy reported that in a “widely reproduced interview given to a Paris-based Arabic weekly,” the Libyan People’s Bureau representative in Rabat stated: “(A) it was never intended that the Sahara would constitute a state; (B) early Polisario leaders had foreseen reintegration of the territory with Morocco; and the Polisario must revise its position, which constitutes an obstacle in the path of Arab unity.” The Embassy continued that this statement “coincides with recent indications in the Moroccan media of stepped-up Moroccan-Libyan contacts between Qadhafi and the Palace. At the same time the ex-Moroccan representative to the now-defunct African-Arab Union, tells us that he expected no major new developments in Moroccan-Libyan relations.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870827–0087)
5. In telegram 9680 from Rabat, October 7, the Embassy reported that on October 6, Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Europe/Americas Director Zine El Abadine Sebti told Casey: “Moroccan del at UNGA was talking up possibility of a consensus resolution in the Fourth Committee” on a Western Saharan referendum. The Embassy continued: “Sebti said GOM was exploring a possible African-drafted text which simply would state membership’s support of SYG’s referendum initiative and steer clear of polemics.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870827–0225)
6. Reference is to Pérez de Cuéllar’s attempts to reach a diplomatic solution to the war in the Western Sahara. See Document 451.