81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia1
260613.
Washington, August 21, 1987, 0615Z
Milads handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Tunisian Policy re Rapprochement With Libya and Maghreb Unity. Reference: Tunis 8957.2
- 1.
- Secret—Entire text.
- 2.
- Ambassador took right line on Libyan-Tunisian rapprochement and Maghreb unity in August 12 conversation with Tunisian Minister of Social Affairs Hedi Baccouche (reftel). There follows some additional material which you may want to draw on in future conversations with Baccouche on this subject:
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- Libyan Rapprochement:
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- We continue to believe that a normalizaton of relations with Libya will diminish pressure on Qadhafi at a time when he is faced [Page 176] with isolation in GOT, the Arab and African worlds and in a military confrontation with Chad, which is supported by France and the U.S.
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- Qadhafi’s policies of terrorism and aggression have not ended as is evidenced by Libyan attacks against dissidents, by continued aggression in Chad, and by firm support for Iranian terrorist tactics at a time when Tunisia has broken relations with that state.
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- Qadhafi is unreliable and cannot be trusted to keep his promises.
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- Past experience teaches that once Qadhafi is confronted, he backs off, reappears docile, only to return to his aggressive ways.
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- The problems that exist between Tunisia and Libya were created by Libyan aggressiveness. The USG has responded to the Libyan threat with increased assistance to the GOT including even closer military cooperation
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- We trust that GOT will firmly maintain its position that normalization is contingent on adequate compensation for expelled workers, a reduction of Libyan military presence along the border, the closing of dissident integrity and sovereignty.
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- Maghreb Unity:
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- We remain opposed to Libyan membership in an expanded tripartite friendship agreement. Such a development would lend a false aura of legitimacy to Libya. We do not anticipate that including Qadhafi in arrangements for a greater Maghreb will diminish his aggressive tendencies.
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- We are equally suspicious about schemes that would isolate Morocco. We support Tunisia’s efforts to keep King Hassan apprised of proposals for Maghreb unity and urge the GOT to continue its efforts to thwart proposals that would result in Morocco’s exclusion from a Maghrebi union.
Whitehead
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870753–0464, D870680–0214. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Ndjamena, Nouakchott, DOD, and USCINCEUR. Drafted in NEA/AFN; cleared by Casey, Eastham, Laipson, Long, Sharon Wiener (NEA/AFN), Michael Minton (S/S–O), and Mueller; approved by Ussery.↩
- In telegram 8957 from Tunis, August 13, the Embassy reported: “Tunisia and Libya are still far apart in their negotiations to settle economic claims and security arrangements, according to Social Affairs Minister Baccouche. Meanwhile, Tunisia is nervous about Algerian-Libyan rapprochement which is perceived to have significant support inside Algeria and possibly Soviet backing. For strategic reasons, Tunisia wants Morocco included in any Maghreb unity scheme, but surprisingly Tunisia’s recent envoy to Morocco found King Hassan relaxed about the Libyan-Algerian initiatives. Baccouche was mindful of U.S. reaction to improved ties between Tunisia and Libya. Action requested: further guidance.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870739–0302, D870655–0481)↩