Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

79. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)¹

Washington, July 24, 1987

SUBJECT

• North Africa: Shifting Sands

SUMMARY: The recent flurry of diplomatic activity among the North African states presents both opportunities and risks for our current policies in the region. We are encouraged by Moroccan and Algerian efforts at rapprochement and settlement of the western Sahara problem: we should look for ways to support and strengthen this trend. At the same time, Libyan moves to better its relations with Algeria and Tunisia—to date received favorably in Algiers, warily in Tunis—pose a possible challenge to our Libya policy. This memo examines the recent developments in the region and considers their implications for U.S. policy. END SUMMARY.

The Maghreb: Between Rivalry and Rapprochement

Underlying most regional activity in North Africa are two fundamental drives: one is the historic geostrategic rivalry between Morocco and Algeria, which keeps them locked in a pas de deux aimed at preventing the other from establishing regional hegemony; the second is the continued quest of all the regional states for greater cooperation and integration. The entire post-independence period has been characterized by both the competition between Morocco and Algeria (the Sahara war can be seen as a by-product of this competition) and the search for integration, for Maghreb unity.

In the past, most integration efforts have been at the expense of either Morocco or Algeria. The 1983 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, brokered by Algeria, brought it into alliance with Tunisia and Mauritania, leaving Morocco out. Morocco’s surprising (and short-lived) union with Libya of 1984, although driven by complex motivations, can be seen in part as a riposte to the 1983 accord.

At first glance, the current situation seems to fall into this pattern. Algeria’s qualified support for Libyan inclusion in the 1983 tripartite arrangement has been interpreted as aimed at isolating Morocco. But there is an alternative view: the willingness of Algeria and Morocco to work towards a new bilateral relationship is more significant than the probably passing reintegration of Libya into the regional system. The fact that the Algerians are working on both fronts at once is promising: their overtures to Libya should not be read as leaving Morocco out of any serious measures to promote regional economic and political cooperation.

Morocco and Algeria: Beginning of a New Era?

Since the Saudi-brokered May 4 summit between King Hassan and President Bendjedid,² follow-up has included:

— May 25 prisoner exchange involving over 200 prisoners,³ the first exchange in over a decade;

— June visit by a U.N. delegation during which Morocco and Polisario agreed in principle to receive a U.N. technical team to prepare for holding a referendum, and subsequent meetings under U.N. auspices in Geneva;⁴

— July 11 public visit by the Algerian foreign minister to Morocco.⁵

Progress in settling the Saharan war is the keystone to improved Moroccan-Algerian relations, and both sides are showing some flexibility in moving the process forward. Most significant is Morocco’s reversal of its previous position, now arguing that Algeria is not a direct party to the conflict—allowing eventual direct public contacts with the Polisario and offering the Algerians a face-saving out. In addition, Morocco now embraces more actively the long-standing plan for a U.N. supervised referendum in the territory. Algeria, at the May 4 summit and subsequent secret meetings, has hinted at deals that would provide nominal satisfaction to Polisario and non-aligned aspirations while recognizing Moroccan strategic control of the territory.

While a quick breakthrough on the war may be unlikely—due primarily to pressures within the Algerian and Polisario camps and to recent Polisario successes in breaching the Moroccan berm—Morocco and Algeria are also thinking about other bilateral issues, and this could sustain the momentum in this fragile rapprochement process. There are powerful incentives on both sides to improve trade and economic relations. A natural complementarity exists: trade of Moroccan agricultural products for Algerian oil and gas would be welcomed. Other border problems need to be worked out.

Where Does Qadhafi Fit In?

Libya has only a tenuous claim to membership in the Maghreb club. Its location and different colonial experience, coupled with the peculiarities of its current government, have historically made it a marginal player in Greater Maghreb schemes. Yet Libya has found a role as spoiler, and the regional players have been willing to expand the Greater Maghreb concept.

The Algerians have mixed feelings about Qadhafi. They are sensitive to the potential damage to their own image in being too closely associated with him, claim to recognize his unreliability, and are likely to stand firm on the importance of settling their bilateral border differences. At the moment, Algerian leadership is viewing the cup as half full, not half empty, arguing that closer ties to Libya will have a salutary effect. They are also trying to position themselves for a post-Qadhafi period, and prevent Soviet gains. They have argued to the Tunisians that bringing Qadhafi into the club serves Tunisia’s interests:⁶ the price for membership will be settling all outstanding Tunisian financial claims. For their part, the Tunisians remain more openly skeptical of Qadhafi’s capacity to change, see his so-called moderation as short-term tactics, but will remain engaged in the process in the interests of recuperating financial assets and jobs.

Considerations for U.S. Policy

The current state of intra-Maghrebi relations, albeit in flux, presents both opportunities and risks. Movement for greater regional economic cooperation and for settling bilateral differences is desirable for U.S. interests.

Morocco/Algeria

— We should look for ways to express publicly our encouragement of Morocco and Algeria in their efforts to improve bilateral relations and to settle the Saharan war. We might consider a major speech on the Maghreb by one of the Department’s principal officers, or include the two capitals in a senior official’s travel plans over the coming months.

— To complement our own public support, we should urge our European allies, France and Spain in particular, to do likewise. We should track closely the Saudi role. The Saudis, motivated by Arab League concerns, are playing the key broker role. We should consult with them and indicate our support.

— We should continue to indicate our support for the U.N. mandate in working for a settlement. Closer consultations with U.N. officials on the Sahara settlement process would send useful signals to the regional players and bolster the U.N.’s commitment to what is likely to be a long process.

Qadhafi’s New North Africa Policy

Qadhafi’s efforts to reintegrate himself into the Arab world’s western flank pose some problems for us. Our policy of isolating him while maintaining good relations with his neighbors is under challenge. We need to consider ways of influencing this current phase of intra-Maghrebi maneuvering, although not with a heavy or visible engagement.

We should consider:

— raising with the Algerians the terrorism implications of admitting Libya to the 1983 pact. This is difficult, since our bilateral dialogue over terrorism is complex and under stress because of recent Abu Nidal developments. But despite our sharp differences with Algeria over Palestinian activities, for the most part, the Algerians share our concerns about Libyan meddling in the region and against western targets.

— encouraging the Tunisians to stay the course: they are playing a useful role in keeping the Algerians mindful of both Qadhafi’s fickleness and the importance of keeping Morocco included in regional cooperation efforts.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Records, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron, July 1987. Secret. Drafted on July 21 by Laipson. Solomon signed “Dick” next to his name in the “from” line.
2. See footnote 4, Document 78.
3. See footnote 5, Document 78.
4. In telegram 5993 from Rabat, June 22, the Embassy reported that during a June 20 conversation, Filali informed the DCM that “the talks had gone well and that Morocco had given the green light for a UN technical team visit to the Sahara. Filali said in fact the discussions had gone so smoothly that ‘you could have written the script.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870494–0109) See also footnote 2, Document 451.
5. In telegram 4177 from Algiers, July 15, Johnstone reported that he had met with Sahnoun, who reported on Ibrahimi’s meeting with Hassan. According to Johnstone, Sahnoun said that “Ibrahimi had not been able to figure out what to make of Hassan’s new positions. Sahnoun pointed with satisfaction to Hussein’s ‘Times’ interview in which Hassan said he would accept a Saharan state if that was the will of the Saharan people, noting that Algeria viewed this as a significant statement. Sahnoun was encouraged by this progress but warned that Hassan is a devious poker player.” Sahnoun nevertheless “implied steady movement toward normalization with Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870558–0595)
6. In telegram 4184 from Algiers, July 16, Johnstone reported that he had met with Chaker, who said that “Tunisians now have come to a meeting of minds with Algerians on how to handle Qadhafi, and the two countries are moving together in close cooperation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870564–0068)