Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

78. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

5213.

Rabat, May 28, 1987, 1205Z

For Secretary, Armacost and NEA Asst Secy Murphy. Department please pass to White House for Vice President and NSC- Carlucci, DOD for Secretary and Armitage. Subject: May 27 Meeting With Foreign Minister: Algeria-Morocco Relations and King Hassan’s U.S. Visit.²

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Summary:

— King Hassan sent Foreign Minister to Algeria May 25 for a secret meeting with President Bendjedid. He carried a message urging reconciliation and putting forth a proposal to begin direct discussions on all outstanding issues.

— Filali, on King’s instructions, also asked that Hassan’s U.S. visit take place during last quarter of 1987 since his stay in Great Britain will preclude a July meeting. End summary.

3. I was invited to the home of the Foreign Minister Wednesday evening, May 27. He explained to me that no one else, including members of the government, were aware that he had been sent by King Hassan to Algeria Monday, May 25, carrying a personal message to President Bendjedid that it was time for Morocco and Algeria to resolve their differences directly. The Foreign Minister equated it to the U.S./Soviet relationship: “Regardless of your differences, you meet regularly to resolve them.” King Hassan made a proposal to establish two commissions. A foreign affairs commission headed by the respective Foreign Ministers would concern itself with diplomatic relations and the war in the Sahara. A second commission headed by the Interior Ministers would discuss trade, commerce, and open borders. The Foreign Minister found the Algerian President very receptive to this overture. Bendjedid’s counterproposal was to establish one commission headed by the respective Foreign Ministers but with the authority to discuss all issues. Filali agreed.

4. Filali then met separately with Foreign Minister Ibrahimi, whom he described as “apparently” supportive of the initiative. Ibrahimi spent quite a bit of time discussing Algeria’s concerns about Tunisian stability and rising fundamentalism. It was Filali’s view that Ibrahimi was more concerned with fundamentalism in Algeria, a popular theme in Morocco.³ Filali believed that it was Algeria’s genuine concern in this regard that was changing their thinking with regard to relations with Morocco.

5. Ibrahimi had then discussed the danger that Iran posed. He suggested that Iran was aiming at Syria and Lebanon after Iraq, followed by Egypt and others. Filali explained that in the Iranian definition of the “Islamic Republic of Iran” the “nation” was not confined to the territory of Iran.

6. The two Foreign Ministers agreed that the future of the Maghreb depended upon improved Moroccan/Algerian relations. (Filali commented to me that the 1983 treaty of fraternity and concord between Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania was a meaningless document.) They agreed to meet again next Monday, June 1, at the nonaligned Mediterranean Foreign Ministers’ conference in Brioni, Yugoslavia to discuss their respective ideas and agenda items. In the meantime, each side would work to come up with proposals of its own. Ibrahimi had also explained to Filali that Algeria’s prior proposal to settle the Saharan dispute was merely a framework for opening discussion. In principle, Algeria was prepared to open the border with Morocco but the two sides needed to discuss the question of visas.

7. I congratulated the King and Foreign Minister on their initiative and effort to continue the momentum begun at the May 4 summit meeting near Oujda.⁴ I asked how the U.S. could assist and Filali expressed King Hassan’s desire for us to encourage those elements in Algeria who support reconciliation. He specifically mentioned the Algerian Secretary General of Defense who would be visiting the Pentagon in July, implying that he would be a good person to talk with. He also asked us to push this line through our Embassy in Algeria. I assured him we always had and would continue to do so.

8. I inquired whether the King’s initiative had anything to do with the recent prisoner exchange.⁵ Filali denied any connection between the two and offered that the first the GOM had heard about Algeria’s willingness to make the exchange was last week. It had come up in discussions between the Saudis and the Algerian Prime Minister who was in Saudi Arabia for other reasons. The Saudis then contacted the Moroccans, who agreed.

9. I told the Foreign Minister that I would report this news and that of course we fully supported the spirit of cooperation that was emerging from the summit meeting.

10. The Minister then asked if the King could visit the U.S. during the second half of October, November or December. The visit to Great Britain was going to be extended and he would not be able to come in July. I mentioned that those dates were not now being filled by additional visits, given the possibility of a Reagan/Gorbachev summit this fall.⁶ He said he understood but hoped some time during the last quarter of 1987 could be found. He added that after Ramadan and his daughter’s wedding in Marrakech June 5–8, King Hassan would like to meet with me. Filali’s meeting with Ibrahimi in Yugoslavia would have occurred and hopefully there would be other things to discuss. He expressed a desire and need to keep in close touch with us on the progress of the talks.

11. Comment:
While I have never been sanguine about the possibility of significant progress in the Algerian/Moroccan dispute, including the Western Sahara, I must say I saw a new attitude developing. There appeared to be a desire and hope that the time is right for improved relations. Both sides have made significant gestures—Algeria, by its agreement to meet at the summit level with Morocco without preconditions and their apparent initiative to move the prisoner exchange question forward; Morocco, by the Foreign Minister’s mission to Algeria to put forward a suggested framework for continuing the dialogue. Each side will be looking to us to urge the other party along toward compromise. While we should certainly continue to do so, the problem is still best resolved in a bilateral and Arab context with the U.S. pushing it from behind rather than from the middle.

12. Department please pass to Embassy Algiers and Tunis.

Nassif

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19874, Folder 19874–017, Western Sahara [Morocco, Algeria] 1987. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. In the right-hand margin, Gregg wrote: “This is very helpful.” Underneath this notation, Bush wrote: “agree GB 6–2.”
2. Bush circled “Morocco” in the subject line.
3. Bush drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this and the previous sentence.
4. In telegram 4354 from Rabat, May 5, the Embassy reported on the Hassan-Bendjedid Summit, which resulted from Saudi King Fahd’s mediation efforts. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870345–0097)
5. In telegram 5124 from Rabat, May 26, the Embassy reported that Red Crescent officials had brokered the exchange of Algerian prisoners captured in 1976 by Moroccan authorities in the Western Sahara and Moroccans likely captured by Polisario forces in 1984 and held by Algeria. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870404–0730)
6. Reference is to the Washington Summit December 7–10, during which Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 105–115.