Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

55. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

3167.

Nouakchott, June 13, 1985, 1546Z

SUBJECT

• Regional Tensions: Taya is Worried.

Ref:

• A) Nouakchott 3043,²
• B) DIA Wash 130028Z Jun 85.³

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary. Chief of State Taya is extremely ill at ease over what he perceives to be the increased regional dangers resulting from Morocco’s 5th berm. The Polisario is insisting on transit rights, Algeria is as yet unwilling to state its position on the subject, Morocco is seen as increasingly menacing, and the possibility of Moroccan-Algerian collusion is considered serious. Taya sought assurances of U.S. support in the event of trouble and an increased information flow in the interim. End summary.

3. Chief of State Taya called me in June 13 and started the discussion with an inquiry as to what is going on in the area. He said he would appreciate being informed on what the US knew, with particular respect to Morocco-Algerian relations and the current status of wall-building in the Sahara.

4. I provided a brief update on American perspectives, and reminded Taya that our position with respect to resolving the Saharan conflict had not changed since being clearly re-enunciated (and briefed to Taya) at the time of the Bendjedid visit.⁴ I added that there was something in the air which suggested that developments were taking place (ref A), and asked what the Mauritanians knew about the situation. Taya waffled around with generalities until I asked point-blank if the Polisario had recently demanded transit rights: The conversation became more focused.

5. Taya brought from his desk a map showing the Western Sahara and the locations of all the berms. He pointed to the work that has already been accomplished with the 5th berm (south to and around Guelta Zemour) and to the future plans for its completion (west to Dakhla). What Morocco has done, he said, is to take all the Sahara that is even marginally habitable, leaving the Polisario only sand. That organization, however, is totally unwilling to abandon the struggle and has therefore told the GIRM that it must have access to Mauritanian territory in order to be able to launch attacks against the new southern wall. Mauritania has refused and has informed Algeria of its position. (The Polisario demand was delivered by Mohamed Ould Salek—Nouakchott 2928;⁵ the Mauritanian demarche was made by FonMin Ould Minnih.)

6. Responding to questions, Taya said that the Algerians professed ignorance of this new development, and have since refused to make their position clear. (Taya saw Amb Djadri on June 11.) This has left the GIRM feeling particularly uneasy because they are no match for the Polisario unless Algeria cuts the supply lines. Taya added that Mauritania has many friends that it can count upon for support and asked what the United States would do in the event of a conflict. I replied that the U.S. was committed to Mauritania’s territorial integrity and would be opposed to any armed aggression, but that our efforts would be restricted to diplomatic and political channels, leaving any other measures to other countries more directly involved. Taya seemed quite satisfied with assurances of our political support.

7. Taya said he was particularly concerned by Morocco’s intentions. He remarked that he had been present when King Hassan had made a remark which had left him ill at ease ever since: “La mechoui du probleme Saharaoui sera cuit sur le does de la Mauritanie.” He said that in building the 5th berm, unnecessary since Morocco already controls the only parts of the Sahara that have any meaning, the King was intentionally forcing the Polisario to confront Mauritania in order to be able to continue the struggle. Morocco, in his view, would be the only one that would stand to benefit from such a development. I pointed out that to the extent this last point was correct, Algeria would be unlikely to let a conflict break out. Taya said he would feel a lot better if Algiers would make its position clear. (I asked if he had any plans to see Chadli, and he said there were none.)

8. Everyone had been hopeful that the reestablishment of relations with Morocco would remove all tensions with the northern neighbor, Taya said, which has not proven to be the case at all. King Hassan sees matters from a different perspective than do others, which makes his actions difficult to predict, but Mauritanians do not doubt that his interests in the country, while minimal, are inimical.

9. Taya was also deeply concerned over the possibility that Morocco and Algeria were working together to resolve the overall problem at Mauritania’s (unspecified) expense. I remarked that I doubted relations between the two countries were good enough right now to permit such a development, adding that Algeria, in particular, would be unlikely to benefit from any difficulties developing within Mauritania proper.

10. Comment. Taya was somewhat distraught, and stressed that he was the only one in the government that was concerned over these matters. He said he hoped that the U.S. would keep him informed of any developments of which it becomes aware bearing on the Sahara question. He was visibly pleased when he was reminded of the commitment to Mauritania’s territorial integrity and sovereignty which the U.S. made at the time of the March 16, 1981, coup attempt.⁶ He also understood why we would give to France, Algeria and others the lead role in efforts to resolve—by whatever means—any armed struggle involving Mauritania. Taya seems to believe that the possiblity of such a development is fairly strong.

11. He is also beset with a serious case of the jitters. If the Polisario is actually going to be let loose to undertake armed efforts to cross large segments of Mauritanian territory, then Taya is jittery for very good reasons. That would mean that Algeria’s policy (as seen from here) of keeping Mauritania out of the war may have changed, altering a major regional equation to a significant degree. It is for this reason that I think a real clash with the Polisario is unlikely: I do not see how it could benefit Algeria.⁷

Peck

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850417–0048. Secret; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Casablanca, Dakar, Madrid, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis. Sent for information to USCINCEUR.
2. In telegram 3043 from Nouakchott, June 6, the Embassy reported: “There is a faint sense of unease in the unfolding of the new relationship with Morocco. The exchange of Ambassadors and the opening of the Moroccan mosque have not generated the appropriate levels of enthusiasm, and it is possible that the Western Sahara question is adversely affecting the GIRM’s view of things.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850400–0393)
3. Not found.
4. Bendjedid visited Washington in April and met with Reagan, Bush, and Shultz. See Documents 147 and 148.
5. Reference is to the defensive perimeter—an earthen wall—built by Morocco in the Western Sahara against the Polisario guerrillas. See footnote 2, Document 431.
6. In telegram 2928 from Nouakchott, May 30, the Embassy “utilized” the Polisario’s demand “to direct attention to a point that appears to be relatively little-known: there is no official Polisario/SDAR representation in Nouakchott, nor has there been.” The Embassy continued that despite pressure from the SDAR and Algeria, the GIRM had refused in order to “avoid provoking Rabat.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850382–0042)
7. See footnote 3, Document 3.