Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

54. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) and the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Crocker) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 20, 1985

SUBJECT

• King Hassan’s Comments on Libya; Possible Adherence by Chad to Moroccan-Libyan Union

Summary: At the end of a wide-ranging May 16 discussion with Assistant Secretary Murphy and NSC staffer Teicher,² King Hassan confided that during Ramadan, he, Qadhafi, and Habre will sign an “international agreement” bringing Chad into the Moroccan-Libyan “Arab-African Union.”³ Hassan stressed that this secret should be shared only with President Reagan, Vice President Bush and you. The King said this proposal originated with him—his vision of an opportunity to solve the long-festering Chad problem. He claimed at least tacit acquiescence of Mitterrand. End summary.

During lengthy audience with King Hassan May 16, Assistant Secretary Murphy raised Qadhafi’s growing boldness in challenging U.S. interests. There are contradictory tendencies—on the one hand Qadhafi has made overtures to the USG for improved relations, and on the other he continues to work actively against Libyan citizens in the United States and elsewhere and against American worldwide interests. Teicher elaborated, providing examples of Qadhafi’s actions and rhetoric in various areas of the world. He noted that President Reagan has become increasingly concerned about the mounting evidence of Qadhafi’s continued subversive behavior and insults directed against the President himself and against the American people.

Murphy then invited Hassan’s views on how to deal with Qadhafi in order to try to change his behavior.

In reply, Hassan said that Qadhafi is an “unbalanced child”; he has his own peculiar mind-set based on ‘‘Bedouin law.” He mused that the USG ought to ask some “trusted friend” to pose to Qadhafi the following question: Leaving U.S. support for Israel aside (which is a question concerning all Arabs and not just Qadhafi), what is Libya’s specific grievance against the United States? Hassan would be willing to undertake this mission if the President so desired. He then expressed his strong belief that if Qadhafi were ever to make an explicit promise to the United States with regard to his behavior, he would live up to it.

Murphy commented that one of the most disturbing things is that Qadhafi has never foresworn terrorist activity. Hassan responded that Qadhafi is not, in any case, responsible for all such activity in the world.

Hassan then continued that President Reagan is a great friend and almost a brother. Qadhafi, on the other hand, is a temporary associate because of temporary circumstances. Last year Hassan had seen himself threatened by two strong enemies, Algeria and Libya. He had sensed an opportunity to neutralize perhaps the more dangerous of the two—i.e., Qadhafi. Given his responsibility to the Moroccan people, he had seized the opportunity to do so via the Oujda accord.

Hassan wanted the President to know that he, Hassan, is willing to give his head and heart to any effort that the President might request. He hopes that the President will have NSC Adviser McFarlane prepared, when he visits Morocco in June, to tell Hassan what we wish him to do with respect to Qadhafi, the Gulf, or any other area. He wants to help the President and believes that a searching “unofficial” conversation with McFarlane could usefully explore how he might be of assistance.

After a pause, Hassan said that he wished to inform the President, Vice President and you of a matter in strictest confidence. (He stressed this need for secrecy several times.) Sometime in the weeks just ahead he, Qadhafi and Habre will sign an agreement bringing Chad into Morocco and Libya’s “African-Arab Union”. Hassan said he had proposed this to Habre as a way of ending the thankless, unavailing conflict in Chad. Habre had agreed, provided Hassan himself would strongly back the undertaking. Hassan had then proposed Chad’s incorporation to Qadhafi, stressing that (A) this would be an “international agreement” which would commit Qadhafi, and that (B) Morocco would march out of the union if undertakings arrived at were not adhered to. After six days’ reflection, Qadhafi had agreed. It now appears that the deal will be signed during Ramadan. Hassan said that French President Mitterrand has been informed and in effect accepted; with French parliamentary elections coming up, Mitterrand is not interested in getting further bogged down in Chad. (Comment: Implicit in Hassan’s account is that Habre will continue as President of Chad.)

In response to a question by Ambassador Reed, the King said that he thought he probably will have to visit Tripoli “some day, but not right away.”

In subsequent conversation over lunch with Foreign Minister Filali, Murphy explored further the Libyan question. Filali said Qadhafi still operates from a sense of isolation and continues to seek international acceptance and legitimacy. He contended that Libya is interested in improving relations with the U.S. for precisely that reason. Qadhafi will not necessarily moderate his fiery rhetoric while seeking acceptance; he sees no contradiction between the two.

Murphy pointed out that the GOM should be under no illusion that the USG will moderate its views on Qadhafi. Teicher cited the extremely dangerous nature of the “Voice of Vengeance” broadcasts, Libyan subversion in Tunisia (apparently in anticipation of the post-Bourguiba era), and the Libyan provision of Scud rockets to Iran. He also reviewed the heavy-handedness of Libya in post-Nimeiri Sudan.

Comment: Since the issue of Chad’s possible adherence to the “Arab–African Union” previously has come to our attention, we will be able to probe Habre about the matter without betraying Hassan’s confidence. We will pose to him (and separately to Hassan) questions as to what Chad may stand to gain from this move. Our earlier information was that Habre had decided against the union, and there may still be some maneuvering taking place. End comment.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (05/18/1985–05/31/1985). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Teicher on May 18; cleared by Bishop, Johnson (P), and Zweifel. Bishop initialed for Crocker. McKinley initialed the memorandum and wrote: “20 May.”
2. A record of the portion of the Murphy-Hassan conversation devoted to bilateral relations is in telegram 4624 from Rabat, May 7. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850348–0373) A record of the Murphy-Hassan conversation devoted to Algerian-Moroccan relations and the Western Sahara is in telegram 4623 from Rabat, May 17. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850348–0348)
3. Hassan’s statement to Murphy about Chad’s possible adherence to the Libyan-Moroccan treaty is in telegram 159491 to Rabat, May 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])