Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

46. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

5910.

Nouakchott, December 12, 1984, 1733Z

SUBJECT

• Effects of the Coup. Ref: Nouakchott 5905.²

1. C—Entire text.

2. Based upon our knowledge of the members of the reconstituted CMSN, and on the assumption that there will be no wholesale changes in the membership—at least in the near term—we offer the following preliminary and tentative assessments of what the ouster of Haidalla may mean.

3. For the U.S. continued good and improving relations. The key players are still well disposed towards us. Our economic assistance, especially the emergency food aid, is very much appreciated, and the other phases of the relationship (IMET, internal security, the USIS program, Peace Corps, etc.) are equally solid and on the upswing.
Haidalla was an enthusiastic backer of the orientation in our direction; we believe that the vast majority of the committee was and is in full and complete agreement. Taya, as the new President, is clearly in that grouping.

4. For the West. More of the same. If the anticipated purges focus on those who have always been rumored to be the most nearly out of step, i.e. Boukreis, the pro-Libyan, the solidly pro-Western stance that Mauritania has followed will be maintained.

5. For the Maghreb. A more difficult call, but probably a continuation of the present course. There is a slightly improved chance of a gesture of some minor kind toward Hassan, which the timing could make more meaningful, as long as Morocco does not make any unfriendly noises in the interim.

6. Internally. To the extent Haidalla’s removal reflected discontent with specifics of his stewardship, there are two candidates for consideration as possible results.
The rumored move, toward democratization/legitimization of the government. The CMSN announced a return to democratic rule as one of its three goals when it overthrew the Ould Dada regime five years ago (end the war with the Polisario and economic recovery were the other two), and made an unexpected, almost fatal effort in 1980 that involved a projected constitution, civilian government and a discussion of political parties. It was being rumored that Haidalla wanted to try again, using the Structure for the Education of the Masses (SEM) as the vehicle, in the belief that it was ready to serve that function. We understand that not very many people on the CMSN agreed (for good reason, in our opinion) and therefore suspect that the experiment will be postponed.
Islamization. The cautious but steady implementation of the Sharia may be accelerated by the removal of Haidalla as one of the cautious but steady proponents. Mauritania is not at all a hot bed of fundamentalism, but Maurs have been strongly advocating a more rapid and more strict application of Islamic laws. The black community has been somewhat apprehensive about the potential impact on their marginally more liberal habits, and too much of a too rapid change could precipitate problems, especially if the Maur dominated CMSN does not maintain its cohesion.

7. Unless the CMSN does itself in as the result of the departure of Haidalla, matters will go on much as before. We speculate that there may well have been an accumulation of minor disatisfactions that finally led his colleagues to vote him out. Perhaps he was beginning to enjoy his role a bit too much, and offending his colleagues by tending to forget he was only primus inter pares, as tends to happen to people in similar positions. (The recent proliferation of large-sized portraits of Haidalla prompted quiet expressions of disapproval in some quarters.) To the extent this is the real reason he was dethroned, and the rather thin list of domestic and external issues mentioned above lends some credence to the thesis, the eventual results of the change may not be numerous.

Peck

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840795–0430. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers, Dakar, Madrid, Paris, Rabat, Tunis, and USCINCEUR.
2. See footnote 2, Document 44.