Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

45. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, December 12, 1984

NSSD 6/84: U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE MAGHREB

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The treaty of union between Morocco and Libya has readjusted the political situation in North Africa in a troubling manner. Hassan and Qadhafi apparently each felt politically isolated, and perceived the union to be a way out of their respective dilemmas. Through union, Hassan may have won time during which to consolidate his position on the Western Sahara. Qadhafi gained an unmerited measure of respectability. Despite his subsequent diplomatic maneuvering, we anticipate continuation of habitual Libyan adventurism and use of terrorism focussed on Libyan dissidents.

The GOA perceives Algeria to be the primary target of the union. In response, it has increased support for the Polisario attacks against Moroccan positions, and deployed regular military forces in greater strength along the entire length of the common border with Morocco. In Morocco there is a growing presentiment that military confrontation is possible. Meanwhile, the GOM apparently intends to proceed with further extension of the berm; this further will provoke the GOA. Both governments disavow aggressive intentions, but missteps could lead to escalating clashes. Meanwhile; the Tunisians have adopted essentially a wait-and-see posture in reaction to the treaty while privately voicing their unhappiness.

We are concerned by the damaging political respectability conferred on Qadhafi by the Union with Morocco. Beyond this consideration, our primary specific concerns relate to the potential transfer of US intelligence, military equipment and technology, or other controlled items from Morocco to Libya. King Hassan repeatedly has assured us that no such transfers will take place. This bears close monitoring. We are also concerned that enhanced Libyan access will pose long-term security problems for Morocco and that additional Libyan dissidents or intelligence concerning them might be turned over by the Moroccans to the Qadhafi regime.

Despite these concerns, we have concluded that the treaty poses no immediate legal impediments to continuation of present US programs with Morocco. Likewise we conclude that Hassan wants the union (which stemmed from his initiative) to work and, hence, will not soon abrogate it.

We strongly desire that the union collapse at the earliest possible date; in the meantime, our objective is that Hassan so circumscribe his relationship with Libya that the treaty remains relatively meaningless. To achieve this, we should carefully avoid too much overt pressure on the King; politically, he cannot be seen to be backing down in the face of US pressure. Instead, we should underscore Qadhafi’s actions which may be contrary to the spirit of the treaty and focus Moroccan attention on our concerns about implementation of the union.

In addressing the changing regional situation, other key conclusions are:

— The Bendjedid Government in Algeria continues to move in cautious fashion along a path of pragmatism and away from pedantic socialism. There is some dissatisfaction with the Soviet arsenal and support which we might be able to exploit. However, this dissatisfaction does not reflect a deep-seated GOA desire to abandon either good relations with the Soviet Union or its carefully burnished non-aligned credentials.

— Political malaise in Tunisia continues to grow. Bourguiba’s tenacious hold on power complicates the transition already in train. Tunisia’s near to mid-term future may be turbulent. A successor government may move to associate Tunisia more closely with the Arab mainstream. Continued US support and assistance, especially in the military field, is a positive stabilizing factor against radicalism.

— Qadhafi may change tactics, but not his basic objectives. Knowing this, area governments presumably will act accordingly to protect their national interests, but may concomitantly engage in closer relations with Qadhafi than we believe are prudent. This will continue to complicate our own policy toward Libya.

— Following seating of the SDAR by the OAU summit in Addis November 12, Morocco walked out as anticipated.² When the Western Sahara issue subsequently was debated in the Fourth Committee at UNGA, the Algerian resolution was passed, inter alia calling for direct Moroccan-Polisario negotiations. Although no move was made to extend UN membership to the SDAR, this could come in the future. Meanwhile on the ground, Moroccan military control continues to be strengthened.

— Across the area, longer term, endemic challenges to stability stem largely from problems of population growth, poor agricultural outputs, sluggish markets for petroleum and phosphate exports, and maldistribution of resources. Unrest growing out of deteriorating social and economic conditions, especially in Morocco and Tunisia, is likely and easily exploitable by Islamic fundamentalists and other groups inimical to US interests. We recognize these factors, but cannot unilaterally offer sufficient resources to resolve the basic, interrelated problems. Nevertheless we should work to increase our resource flows in the area. (OMB Comment: “This judgment lacks analytical justification. There is no necessary correlation between increased economic aid to the Maghreb and reduced political instability. While it may be necessary periodically to increase aid in response to a country’s specific economic needs, there is no justification for a policy assumption that higher economic aid levels will substantially correct the complex social-political-economic problems that are endemic in the region.”)

Despite troubled prospects, we retain strong, healthy relations with Morocco and Tunisia and improving ones with Algeria. Important US interests are served by relevant programs.

U.S. OBJECTIVES

— To foster political stability and economic and social development through preservation and strengthening of moderate regimes.

— To limit regional subversion, particularly to neutralize relevant Libyan-sponsored activities, and restore Qadhafi’s isolation.

— To assure passage through the area for commercial and strategic military purposes.

— To deny the area to further Soviet penetration; to diminish existing Soviet influence.

— To guarantee Western access to the area’s material resources; to expand the market for American goods and services.

— To limit regional polarization.

— To reduce Algerian-Moroccan tensions and prospects for conflict.

— To help bring about abrogation of the Moroccan-Libyan treaty of union.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Morocco:

— [2 lines not declassified]

— Do not press Hassan publicly to abrogate the treaty, but periodically remind him of our concerns and of his statement that if attempts to “tame” Qadhafi fail, he will sever the union.

— [3 lines not declassified]

— Conclude a General Security Of Military Intelligence Agreement (GSOMIA) with Morocco.

— Continue visible cooperation under the Joint Economic (JEC) and Joint Military (JMC) Commissions at current levels (DOD would delete “visible cooperation” and substitute “all on-going economic and military cooperative programs”.)

— Unless or until we determine that treaty implementation unacceptably harms US interests, economic and security assistance levels for Morocco should be determined on criteria other than the GOM’s relations with Libya. (OMB Comment: “The proposed separation between assistance levels and Moroccan-Libyan relations is artificial and unrealistic. US efforts to convey our deep dissatisfaction with the Oujda Agreement will be severely undercut if we propose increasing security assistance to Morocco in 1986. Furthermore, Congress will probably oppose the proposed increases. Such a request could set off a politically counterproductive public debate on the merits of aid to Morocco at a time when the King is pursuing policies contrary to US interests.” DOD would reword second clause to read “. . .economic and security assistance levels for Morocco should not be contingent on the GOM’s current relationship with Libya.”)

— Proceed on schedule with joint US/Moroccan military exercises, keeping in mind Algerian and Spanish sensitivities as to time and place and notifying those governments in advance as appropriate. (DOD would reword first clause to read: “Proceed on schedule with planning and execution of the joint US/Moroccan military exercises program, . . .”)

— In the short-term (through March 1985), continue working level visits pertaining to JEC and JMC activities but discourage Cabinet level and other US high visibility visits. (DOD proposes rewording “In the short term . . .continue working level visits to Morocco but discourage Cabinet level, high visibility visits.”)

— Do not invite, but respond positively should King Hassan propose to come to Washington for private meetings with the President; use such meetings to reiterate our concern about the Moroccan-Libyan union.

— Prepare for the 4th Annual Joint Economic Commission meeting to take place on schedule in May 1985. (DOD would propose same treatment for Joint Military Commission meetings.)

— Proceed to negotiate texts for the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and Bilateral Tourism Agreement (BTA) to be signed no earlier than March 1985. (USTR position is that BIT should be signed as soon as it is ready.)

Algeria:

— Seek further to improve relations through the visit by President Bendjedid in 1985, by increasing Sixth Fleet port calls, and by other gestures as appropriate.

— Expand military cooperation by issuing a Presidential determination permitting access to defense articles and services via FMS, increasing IMET funding for career professional training, and modifying policy to permit GOA acquisition of “lethal items”.

— Stimulate US private sector participation and transfer of technology by establishing a Joint Economic Commission.

— Intensify efforts to persuade the GOA to shift its gas export policy to a market-oriented basis so as to increase likelihood for future sales in Europe and the US.

Tunisia:

— Demonstrate continuing, visible support by Sixth Fleet port calls, occasional joint military exercises and other gestures as appropriate; reaffirm publicly that these actions are in support of Tunisian security and independence. (NSC supports an increase in military exercises and other gestures.)

— In planning security assistance levels, take into account Tunisia’s need to limit debt service on military procurements and obtain additional military training. (NSC supports an increase in economic and security assistance levels.)

— Continue to identify and expand contact with potential leaders, whether in power or in the opposition; make clear in such contacts that we continue to support the established GOT.

— Offer appropriate military/logistical support in the event of a Libyan move against Tunisian territorial integrity, preferably in support of the lead of France or other interested countries but unilaterally if necessary.

— Enter into discussions with the GOT and other concerned governments to establish realistic USG responses should Libya attack Tunisia.

Libya:

— While maintaining current levels of political pressure and economic sanctions on Qadhafi, continue to review possibilities for increasing such pressure.

— Continue a policy of containment based on strengthening ties with Qadhafi’s neighbors and utilizing our rhetoric to advance our goals while avoiding elevating his status in the international arena.

— Publicly now reiterate our existing NSDD 16 policy encouraging US nationals to depart from Libya.³ Should future Libyan actions be sufficiently egregious, consider the use of mandatory measures to require Americans to depart Libya. (USDOC urges that this be done as routinely and discreetly as possible.)

— Continue our intelligence sharing and cooperation with friendly governments in our efforts to combat Libyan terrorism. (DOD proposes alternate wording “Continue our intelligence sharing and expand political-economic cooperation with friendly governments in our efforts to combat Libyan terrorism and other unacceptable behavior.”)

Regional:

— Continue to endorse publicly a political settlement of the Western Sahara issue by an expression of self-determination.

— If necessary, veto SDAR membership in the UN Security Council.

— Proceed with implementing the VOA modernization agreement with Morocco.

— Within approved budget levels, pursue expansion of public diplomacy and educational/cultural programs with Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.

— Morocco and Tunisia should have access to the blended credit programs rather than increased PL 480. (State opposes) (Treasury proposes alternate wording as follows: “Morocco and Tunisia should have access to blended credit programs to an extent dependent upon both need to counter subsidized competition and periodic assessments of their creditworthiness.”)

New Recommendations:

During the policy-level clearance process, the following new recommendations were put forward. Some of these may not have been addressed in the NSSD study/analysis. None of them has been formally agreed to by the IG. The proposing department or agency should be prepared to explain and defend the respective recommendation in the context of the SIG.

— Make every effort to assist Tunisia’s external security and economic vitality. (DOD proposes)

— Continue to search for opportunities to exploit Qadhafi’s weaknesses, internal instability and paranoia. (DOD proposes)

— The task force on Libya established by NSDD-16 should be reconvened to explore the entire spectrum of feasible political, economic and military options available for dealing with Libya.⁴ (DOD proposes)

— A policy of “correctness” toward Qadhafi is recommended which places the onus on him to conform to acceptable standards of international behavior. (DOD proposes)

— Encourage Hassan to cooperate visibly with the US in a manner that will “irritate” Qadhafi. (NSC proposes)

— Prepare internal paper on diplomatic options for US to try to reduce Moroccan/Algerian tension and conflict potential.⁵ (NSC proposes)

— The NSC wishes to discuss a possible recommendation relative to the “Stairstep” program in the Gulf of Sidra.⁶

— The Office of the Vice President wishes to discuss the merits of pressing for a UN initiative to resolve the Western Sahara dispute.

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, 1985. Secret. Drafted by Sheila Lopez (S/S–S); cleared by Nassif, Zweifel, and Johnson. Sent under a December 12 covering memorandum from Hill to Senior Interagency Group No. 48. Platt forwarded the draft NSSD, which he noted was “fully cleared interagency and can be drawn on when preparing the NSDD on this subject,” to McFarlane under a January 25, 1985, covering memorandum.
2. See Document 423.
3. Scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.
4. In a January 3, 1985, briefing memorandum to Armacost, Murphy wrote: “In negotiations leading up to the January 8 S/IG on North Africa, Arnie Raphel achieved Rich Armitage’s agreement to drop two DOD-proposed new recommendations.” (Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, 1985) No record of the S/IG has been found.
5. No record of the paper has been found.
6. Reference is to the operational name for naval exercises in the Gulf of Sidra. Documentation on the exercises is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.