Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

443. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

354.

Rabat, January 13, 1987, 1047Z

SUBJECT

• Western Sahara: Algerian Initiative.

Ref:

• Algiers 16.²

1. (Secret/Nodis—Entire text)

2. Summary: Embassy does not think there is much prospect of moving the Western Sahara dossier off dead-center. On the other hand, it would be useful for the U.S. to remind both Algeria and Morocco of our continued interest in an early negotiated settlement, provided we are careful to avoid becoming substantively involved in the test of wills between Algiers and Rabat. Embassy has previously recommended strongly that Vice President Bush head a high-level delegation to Morocco for March 3–4 Feast of the Throne/U.S.-Morocco bicentennial kick-off celebrations. We recommend that the Vice President visit Algeria as well and that he take up the Western Sahara in both capitals. U.S. should approach this exercise with modest expectations, however, and not unnecessarily use up political capital. End summary.³

3. Embassy read reftel (and reports on previous contacts in Algiers) with great interest and is intrigued by the Algerians’ efforts to bring the U.S. into the negotiating process on the Western Sahara and by the GOA’s insistence that a 2–3 month window of opportunity for ameliorating the problem is now open. Since this Embassy does not see much likelihood of an early settlement, we wonder about the reasons for the full court press by the Algerians. It may well be that the GOA believes Moroccan plans to build the sixth berm and extend it to Mauritania, will further solidify the Moroccan position and thus close the window of opportunity. (According to our DAO, if the Moroccans go all out, they can complete the main construction in less than two months.) It may also be that the GOA is trying to make an impact on what they perhaps consider to be a warming trend in U.S.-Moroccan relations. In any case, given U.S. interest in enhanced regional stability, Embassy thinks that with certain cautions, the Algerian proposal that the U.S. reiterate its interest in a peaceful settlement could be pursued.

4. Implicit in the Algerians’ proposal are several apparent assumptions that we think may be invalid: (1) The first is that if the Algerians can deliver the Polisario, the U.S. can deliver the Moroccans. Apart from the asymmetry of the suggestion—Algeria, after all, is itself a party to the conflict with its own interests to serve in a settlement—it is far from clear that either the Polisario or Morocco is prepared to make major concessions. The Western Sahara remains, for the King and the Moroccan populace, a national issue of historic dimensions. U.S.-urged concessions would be politely but firmly rebuffed; (2) there is an assumption that Morocco is disposed to negotiate when it is in fact in a position of growing strength, having forced a stalemate in the war on the ground and now moving to fill in the final link in its defenses. The Moroccans think they are playing from a strong hand, and, if we read them correctly, they have a long-term strategy of gradual absorption of the Sahara which would not admit major concessions at this time. There appears to be at least a hope on Algeria’s part that Morocco is tiring of the game and may be ready for talks, when the prospects have actually diminished for a political settlement that would do much more than put the seal on what Morocco already holds. Although Algeria has won the diplomatic battle for SDAR recognition by a substantial list of countries, the GOM has, as noted above, outflanked the Polisario and, following on its efforts to stabilize the Sahara militarily, is already moving to develop the populated areas economically. Seen from this perspective, the motivation for wide-ranging negotiations has diminished since 1984.

5. We note that the Algerians have been careful to keep this project separate from the SYG’s effort and his presumed visit in late January to Algiers. We doubt that either side puts much stock in Perez de Cuellar’s ability to resolve the issues.

6. Leaving aside the actual prospects for the Algerian proposal to us, what should be the U.S. attitude? So long as the U.S. observes certain principles and cautions, we see some merit in a new U.S. effort to stimulate direct talks between Algeria and Morocco. Whether or not the proposed meeting between Bendjedid and King Hassan takes place, we think it would be useful to have a high level U.S. visitor in the region at the end of February–early March time frame. This Embassy has already proposed a Vice Presidential visit to kick off the bicentennial of U.S.-Moroccan relations on the anniversary of the “Fete du Trone”, March 3. This might well be an opportune moment for us to undertake a high-level review of the bidding on the Western Sahara and perhaps to urge a meeting between Hassan and Bendjedid. The Vice President could presumably then travel to Algiers (and we would urge Tunisia or some other regional stop also).

7. We would strongly urge that the U.S. limit its role to that of friendly but noninvolved party. We should be careful lest Hassan sense any Algerian-inspired pressure on him, which might stiffen his resolve to let events take their course. We should make it clear to all that we are not substituting for the parties, are not going to get involved in the substance of the dispute and that we seek merely to play a facilitating role in bringing the two sides together.

8. We do not think the preliminary visit suggested in para 6–F would be productive on this issue.

9. Department please pass to Algiers.

Nassif

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19874, Folder 19874–017, Western Sahara [Morocco, Algeria] 1987. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Underneath the date line, Gregg wrote: “Mr Vice President: Sensible cable. I might suggest that a PRG be held to look at this issue, if a trip to the Maghreb is at all of interest to you.” No record of a subsequent PRG on Western Sahara has been found.
2. In telegram 16 from Algiers, January 3, Johnstone reported that during a December 31, 1986, meeting, “Ibrahimi thought the U.S. had a critical role to play” on the Western Sahara and believed “it would be useful if the Vice President would renew the appeal he made last year encouraging a negotiated settlement and possibly visit the region in the next few months.” (Ibid.)
3. Gregg drew a vertical line in the left-hand and right-hand margins bracketing the last three sentences of this paragraph.