Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

444. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)¹

Washington, February 27, 1987

SUBJECT

• Military Situation in the Western Sahara

— A large Polisario armored force attacked Morocco’s defensive barrier (berm) in the Western Sahara February 25.²

— This was the largest Polisario armor movement ever, and the first large-scale attack employing armor unit tactics.

— Timely warning and inadequate Polisario air defenses enabled the Moroccans to fend off the attack; [1½ lines not declassified].

— Nevertheless, the Moroccans are vulnerable to such attacks, due to thinly spread armor resources; more night-capable anti-tank weapons would bolster their defenses.

Morocco forewarned. Following several minor attacks on the berm last week, the Polisario attempted a major attack in the Mahbas area (see map)³ February 25. Preparations for the attack began February 18–22 when five tank and six mechanized companies—a substantial portion of the entire Polisario armor force—left garrison in Algeria. [3 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

We have no explanation for this uncharacteristic failure to provide adequate air defense for the assault force. (An SA–6 inside Algeria downed a Moroccan F–1 during a smaller attack in 1985.) Possibly, the Polisario realized they had been detected and launched their attack before the preparations were complete.

A real problem. Moroccan forces along the berm are stretched thin. There are only some 78 tanks along the entire segment of the berm running south parallel to the Algerian border—the area which can easily be reached by heavy equipment operating from Polisario base camps in southern Algeria and northeastern Mauritania. The problem has been exacerbated by the shift of some units to protect the construction force now extending the barrier southward from the Bir Enzaran area. Only some 15 or so fighters are available at southern airbases.

There is some question as to how capable the Polisario are of continuing such attacks. They have only recently begun to conduct armor unit exercises, and will doubtless have difficulty replacing trained tank crews. Nevertheless, in this case and in numerous others, fairly large Polisario units have proved capable of using the terrain and the cover of darkness to approach the berm undetected and launch surprise attacks. Moroccan ground and air surveillance is quite deficient, due to budgetary constraints affecting both the overall equipment inventory and proper maintenance.

TOWs would help. [1½ lines not declassified] it is clear they face a potentially serious armor threat. The Moroccan army might find it hard to cope with a large armor force if that force used surprise to get inside the berm and was adequately supported by mobile SAMs. A large supply of TOWs and launchers would help redress the potential imbalance in armor in such a scenario. Equipped with night vision devices, these anti-tank missiles would also give the Moroccans a means of preempting an attack at night, when the Moroccan air force’s planes are out of the equation. For Moroccan overall defensive strategy to be fully effective, major improvements to Moroccan ground and air-surveillance capabilities are also needed, as is an upgrade in electronic protection (ESM) of Moroccan aircraft against Polisario/Algerian SAMs.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis and Exdis Memoranda: Lot 94D432, Nodis Memoranda March 1987. Secret; Noforn; Nodis. Drafted by Jefferson. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “Mar 2, 1987.”
2. In telegram 1974 from Rabat, February 26, the Embassy reported that “Moroccan forces in the Al-Mahbas (Northeastern) sector of the Western Sahara defensive berm sustained a major Polisario armored/mechanized attack in the morning hours of February 25.” The Polisario “breached the berm and reportedly penetrated as far as three kilometers before being driven off.” One-hundred eighty Moroccan soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870152–0229)
3. Attached but not printed.
4. In telegram 582037 to Rabat, February 27, Weinberger requested that the Embassy transmit the following message to Hassan: “We have received your request for rapid military support. I give you my firm assurance that the United States will stand by its esteemed friend—the Kingdom of Morocco—in its hour of need. I have therefore approved your request and we will begin shipping requested items within 15 days.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–90–0023, 1987 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 44, Morocco 1987) On February 26, the Moroccan Defense Attaché, Mohamed El-Kostali, wrote Armitage requesting 50 TOW launchers and 500 TOW missiles. (Letter from Kostali to Armitage; ibid.)