Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

442. Memorandum From the Vice President’s Military Assistant (Menarchik) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, November 1, 1986

SUBJECT

• Response to President Bendjedid’s Message on the Western Sahara

President Bendjedid of Algeria sent you a message concerning his complaints that US/United Nations actions were incompatible with stated USG policy (see Tab 2).

The Algerian concern arose as a result of Ambassador Walters’ statements and actions during UNGA discussion on the Western Sahara. Ambassador Walters defined Morocco and Algeria as the parties to the dispute, rather than Morocco and the Polisario. This point, and the fact that Ambassador Walters’ rhetoric was slanted in an anti-Algerian tone, irked the Algerians and precipitated the complaint to you (see Tab 3).

BACKGROUND: During the 1986 UNGA debates, the Algerians appeared to be predestined to “win” their case again on the Western Sahara issue (Algeria, perennially gets near automatic support from Third World supporters). The Moroccans were opposed, but did not actively participate; rather the Moroccans “leaned” on the US to “carry their freight for them.” This Ambassadors Walters and Reed did with enthusiasm. Evidently USUN wanted the US to vote NO rather than ABSTAIN as State instructed them to do.² A donnybrook arose between the State Department and USUN. State instructed USUN to abstain and to explain the abstention by citing the intransigence of the Polisario.³ Several “heated” phone calls ensued between Ambassador Walters and Asst Secretary Armacost.⁴

Ambassador Walters appeared before the Fourth Committee of the UNGA (the committee on decolonialization) and delivered his rather emotional, pro-Moroccan speech.

STATE RECOMMENDATIONS: The State Department believes that a formal response from you is not expected, but provided a draft letter should you choose to answer President Bendjedid.

NSC and OVP/NSA RECOMMENDATIONS: NSC (Dennis Ross) and OVP/NSA believe you should respond with a verbal answer (using OVP/NSA as your surrogate) using the draft letter as an outline.⁵

Tab 2

Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State⁶

5462.

Algiers, October 28, 1986, 1556Z

Dept pass VP Office for Don Gregg. Subject: Bendjedid Message to VP Bush.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. After discussing Syria (septel),⁷ Foreign Minister Ibrahimi pulled Ambassador aside saying he had been asked to pass personal message from President Bendjedid to VP Bush. The message was simply to raise to the Vice President’s attention Bendjedid’s concern over the activities of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations over the past two weeks.

3. Ibrahimi said that Algeria found the U.S. Mission’s role during the debate on the Western Sahara to be incompatible with stated U.S. policy on the region. The Mission had lobbied for Moroccan positions, even trying at one point to convince the Algerian delegation to accept Moroccan amendments. Although Algeria had, in the interest of keeping peace at the UN, not proposed any substantive changes to last year’s UN resolution, the U.S. Mission worked very hard to undermine the Algerian position. In addition to Ambassador Reed’s efforts to lobby on behalf of Moroccan amendments, General Walters had involved himself personally in the fray (for the first time, he said), having given a strong speech critical of the Algerian resolution just prior to the vote. Ibrahimi judged that the speech had cost Algeria several votes.

4. Ibrahimi summarized by noting that the U.S. has reiterated its neutral policy in the Western Sahara in statements in Washington during the past year. The policy pursued by the U.S. Mission in New York, he claimed, seemed to be unrelated to that of Washington. He reiterated the President’s hope that his concerns would be passed on to VP Bush. He did not leave the impression that a reply was expected.

5. Ambassador promised to transmit the message but expressed the view that U.S. Mission in New York was simply fulfilling its mandate to seek areas of agreement in its discussion of the resolution in question. He said U.S. abstention was proof positive of U.S. position and, although he said he had not yet had the opportunity to see the text of any U.S. Mission statements, he was quite confident that no one had taken sides on the Western Sahara conflict. In any case, there was no question of there having been any change in the well-defined U.S. policy in the region.

Johnstone

Tab 3

Telegram From the White House to Air Force Two⁸

WH00504.

Washington, November 1, 1986, 2130Z

Please Deliver to LtCol Doug Menarchik. Memorandum for Mr. Donald P. Gregg, The White House. Subject: Algerian Message on the Western Sahara Problem.

Growing out of last week’s debate in the U.N.’s Fourth Committee on the Western Sahara conflict, the Algerians have complained to us that USUN’s actions were incompatible with stated USG policy.

In considering the request for Department views and recommendations concerning President Bendjedid’s message to the Vice President on this subject (Algiers 5462, Nodis), we noted that Ambassador Johnstone responded to Foreign Minister Ibrahimi in very good fashion and that Embassy Algiers does not think a formal response is expected. This would be the Department’s preferred course of action as well. However, a proposed draft is appended should the Vice President choose to answer President Bendjedid.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

His Excellency

Chadli Bendjedid

President of the Democratic and Popular

Republic of Algeria

Algiers

Dear Mr. President.

I am pleased to continue our exchange of messages on issues of concern. These messages provide an invaluable means through which we can further the growth of mutual understanding and cooperation between our governments.

You will recall that I wrote to you in January of this year on the subject of the Western Sahara. At that time, I expressed my concern about the continuation of the conflict, an issue which I find particularly disturbing as it involves two friends of the United States, Algeria and Morocco. My concern is undiminished, Mr. President, just as the basic policy of the United States Government toward the dispute remains unchanged. We still are convinced that this problem cannot be solved militarily, that a resolution will come only through direct negotiations among the concerned parties, and that any solution must reflect the desires of those directly affected.

Regarding your observations on the recent United Nations debate, I wish there could be closer correlation in our views on a range of topics in international fora. In this case, I want to reassure your that Ambassador Walters’ statement to the Fourth Committee was, in itself, an expression of our deep apprehension about this issue. Our long-held position is that resolutions which do not have support from all those directly involved do not enhance prospects for solutions to problems and might actually impede progress. This is the context of Ambassador Walters’ explanation of vote, as well as of my government’s abstention on your resolution.

Mr. President, I reiterate my pleasure at hearing from you again. I continue to count on your friendship and assure you that you may count on mine and that of the United States Government.

Sincerely,

George Bush

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19816, Folder 19816–022, Western Sahara—1986. No classification marking. Sent through Fuller.
2. In telegram 330954 to USUN, October 22, the Department instructed the Mission to abstain on the Algerian resolution. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860803–0345) No record of the Mission’s desire to vote “no” on the resolution has been found.
3. No record of the Department’s instructions has been found. In telegram 3425 from USUN, October 23, which contains the text of Walters’s statement of explanation, the Mission reported: “The impact of Ambassador Walters’s explanation of vote given before the vote was enormous. Literally dozens of delegation representatives descended on U.S. delegation requesting copies of the statement.” The Mission also reported: “The level of support for Algeria in the resolution appeared to have slightly dwindled since 1985,” by four votes. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860804–0926)
4. No record of the telephone calls has been found.
5. At the bottom of the memorandum, Bush wrote: “1. Yes, keep channel ‘open.’ 2. Ask Johnstone to reiterate policy thanking Bendjedid for his message. GB 11–3.”
6. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.
7. In telegram 5461 from Algiers, October 28, the Embassy reported that Ibrahimi “said he had received report on British Ambassador’s démarche made to Hamdani. The British had put forward a convincing case that three officials of the Syrian Embassy in London were deeply implicated in the attempt to blow up the El Al airliner. Nonetheless, Ibrahimi said that he remained personally convinced that the hand of Israeli intelligence was behind the entire event.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860819–0263) Documentation on the attempted bombing of the El Al airliner is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989.
8. Secret.