Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

441. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia and the Mission to the United Nations¹

280047.

Washington, September 6, 1986, 0710Z

SUBJECT

• Western Sahara Policy Review.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Over the next 2–3 weeks NEA and AF will be reviewing policy options for the Western Sahara. As this dispute is a fundamental element of the competition between Algeria and Morocco, the scope of the review will necessarily include our bilateral relations with Morocco and Algeria as well as regional questions such as maintaining support for Tunisia, maintaining Mauritania’s neutrality, and limiting expenditure of our diplomatic capitol on this issue in Africa. The value of the review will be enhanced by a discussion of the widest range of options. The purpose of this message is to solicit contributions for this review which should be sent Stadis no later than September 11.

3. We propose that the review initially examine long and short term U.S. interests which relate to the conflict (last review was based on an assessment of prospects for a negotiated settlement). These U.S. interests would include the following:

— Regional stability and the U.S. strategic posture for the long term are best served by the territory of the Western Sahara remaining under Moroccan control. Our interests would not be served by an independent non-viable Western Sahara state subject to Libyan, Soviet or other influences hostile to or nonsupportive of U.S. strategic interests.

— U.S. interests are best served through maintaining good relations with both Morocco and Algeria. Moroccan/Algerian cooperation is the best assurance of long term regional stability. Competition between these two states, however, is fundamental in regional politics. Contrary to our interests, both states have used their relationship with Libya as an element in this competition.

4. Policy propositions (the intent here is to be stimulative—not inclusive):

— We should avoid entanglement in efforts to mediate the Western Sahara conflict between Morocco and Algeria as long as prospects for a settlement remain unpromising.

— Continue to encourage Moroccan and Algerian cooperation and flexibility.

— We wish to avoid policies that might lead to greater direct U.S. involvement in the Western Sahara war. At the same time a Moroccan military defeat by Algeria in an expanded conflict would lead to severe destabilization of a friendly regime, and is therefore to be avoided.

— We do not want Moroccan/Algerian friction over the Western Sahara to escalate, given the danger of direct military conflict between Algeria and Morocco and its consequences.

— After the King’s meeting with Peres and his abrogation of the unity agreement with Libya, we wish to increase support for Morocco (and to be perceived as doing so). However, our budgetary resources are severely limited. Are our Western Sahara policies an area in which we can demonstrate support without undue harm to our relations with Algeria nor changes to our basic view of the legal status of the territory?

— We wish to avoid extension of the hostility to Mauritanian soil.

5. Policy options: We would appreciate each post defining Western Sahara policy options as they see them with suggested changes as well as a discussion of the pros and cons of each option. While we expect the outcome of this examination will lean toward the no change or modest change end of the spectrum, discussion of longer term and wider ranging policy alternatives is encouraged. The review will examine our policy and guidelines for casual incidental contact with the Polisario. Other issues which might be considered are:

— A Western Sahara referendum under other multilateral sponsorship, perhaps stimulated by the U.S. (assuming lack of success of referendum proposals by the OAU and UN).

— How we should react if Morocco takes moves towards a unilateral referendum?

— Liberalized travel policies for U.S. officials in the Western Sahara. Who should be allowed to travel and under what circumstances?

— Should we formally include the territories ceded by Mauritania in the area we consider under Moroccan administrative control?

— Can we constructively discuss limiting Libyan support for the Polisario with Algeria? What will be the effect of greater Libyan support for the Polisario on our bilateral relations with Algeria? How will Libyan support for the Polisario color our wider perceptions of the Western Sahara conflict?

— If the Polisario adopts indiscriminate terrorist tactics in Morocco, how will our posture change on the conflict? Can we persuade Algeria that the adoption of such tactics by the Polisario would be inimical to their interests?

— We have generally been supportive of Moroccan positions on the Western Sahara in international fora, particularly the U.N. and in OAU countries. What would be the effect of increased support? Would it be productive? How would it affect our relations with African states?² Algeria?³ Can we encourage more effective Arab support of Moroccan positions on the Western Sahara?⁴

In this exploratory phase, posts may wish to examine some “straw man” options⁵ which they oppose simply to widen the area of discussion.⁶

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860677–0664. Secret; Priority, Stadis. Drafted by Merrick; cleared by Bishop, Willett, Mann, and Laipson; Ussery in substance, and Biniaz for information; approved by Suddarth.
2. In telegram 8819 from Tunis, September 10, the Embassy replied: “Aside from encouragement of Tunisian initiatives and continuing our consultations with the GOT on the problem, there seems little the U.S. can do from Tunis. Tunisia already gives its quiet approval to our support of Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860689–0963)
3. In telegram 4583 from Algiers, September 11, the Embassy replied: “We agree that the U.S. should continue to avoid direct entanglement in proposals to resolve the Western Sahara conflict. Nevertheless, we should continue to maintain a posture to encourage all sides to seek a political settlement and not lead any to expect that a military solution would be acceptable to the U.S. In the end, we continue to believe that direct Algerian-Moroccan discussions offer the best prospect for resolving the conflict.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860691–0280)
4. In telegram 3988 from Nouakchott, September 11, the Embassy replied: “This Embassy welcomes the chance to participate in the Western Sahara policy review, though we regret we have no new ideas to offer. In our view, protracted conflict is inevitable, and the role of policy must be reduced to damage control. A Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement would certainly assure regional stability and best serve U.S. interests, but it is utopian to expect that it is possible.” The Embassy continued: “Current U.S. policy on the Western Sahara, while not particularly satisfying, seems appropriate.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860702–0175)
5. In telegram 2600 from USUN, September 13, the Mission replied: “We think that the U.N. is no place for the USG to deal directly with the Polisario or to initiate changes in our current policy.” The Mission continued: “Polisario has not been able to improve its official status here” and contended, “while we could actively seek to keep Polisario’s access limited, its lack of progress under current conditions argues in favor of a more discreet approach—if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860696–0921)
6. In telegram 9197 from Rabat, September 15, the Embassy reported: “The Western Sahara issue appears to be on dead-center with little hope of early resolution. We consider just about right the present U.S. policy of stated neutrality with respect to the outcome of a negotiated settlement or referendum, while encouraging Algerian-Moroccan contacts and urging a peaceful solution.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860711–0273, S860700–0329)