Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

421. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Deputy Secretary of State Dam¹

Washington, August 10, 1984

SUBJECT

• US Policy Toward Morocco, Algeria and the Western Sahara

We understand that the issue has been raised of whether the US should begin to play a more active role toward achieving a settlement of the Western Sahara dispute. Our policy judgment is that the US should not depart from the policy toward North Africa established at the outset of this Administration: that we should emphasize our bilateral relationships with Morocco and Algeria and subordinate settlement of what is essentially a regional dispute to our larger strategic objectives in the region. The following background information may be of use as you make your own determination.

BACKGROUND

Western Sahara. Basic US policy toward the Western Sahara dispute has been that (1) we acknowledge Moroccan administrative control of the area but not Moroccan claims to sovereignty; (2) we wish to see a negotiated solution to the dispute but are neutral with respect to its eventual modalities; and (3) we prefer OAU to UN mediation efforts.

• Before 1979, US arms sales policy toward Morocco was relatively unforthcoming and was crafted to prevent Moroccan use of US-supplied arms in the Western Saharan conflict.

• In 1979, this policy was changed.² US arms sales were expanded to include weapons that could help Morocco maintain its administrative control over the Western Sahara, pending a negotiated solution. Specifically, and for the first time, OV–10 helicopters, a weapon particularly suited for anti-guerrilla warfare, were sold to the Moroccans.

The 1979 policy change was designed to position the US to follow a self-consciously two-track policy of promoting negotiations, on the one hand, and using US military assistance to prevent what then seemed to be imminent Moroccan military defeat, on the other. It was anticipated that a stronger military position would give Morocco the confidence it needed to pursue the negotiating track. The Presidential Directive outlining the 1979 policy change contained stipulations (never fully communicated to the Moroccans or to the Congress) that required the Moroccans to negotiate directly with the Polisario and made delivery of the OV–10s contingent on a demonstrated Moroccan willingness to negotiate.

In 1981, the Reagan Administration changed US policy toward Morocco and the Western Sahara. Emphasis on the negotiating track became muted on the ground that Morocco is a staunch friend of the US having helped the West in Zaire, being willing to provide strategic access, and taking moderate positions on issues pertaining to the Middle East. Any effort by the US to bring about a negotiated solution was judged to have the potential of forcing us to “lean on” Morocco, to the harm of that friendship. Emphasis on the military track was increased, partly to enhance Morocco’s strategic and regional security position, partly to aid Morocco in establishing a stronger military position in the Western Saharan war. US security assistance [1½ lines not declassified] have contributed to a strengthened Moroccan position in the usable Sahara, which is being effectively integrated into Moroccan society.

The Region. The Reagan Administration policy of emphasizing bilateral relationships and eschewing the policy of pressing the parties to the Western Sahara dispute to negotiate has served US interests well. Morocco has scored military and diplomatic successes and the US-Moroccan bilateral relationship has strengthened to our mutual advantage. The US-Algeria bilateral relationship continues to improve, and the Algerians place their own pragmatic interests above solidarity with the Polisario. Most important from a regional perspective, the Moroccans and Algerians have improved their own bilateral relationship and secret talks are underway between them toward the end of settling the Western Sahara dispute. (We believe that the Moroccan-Libyan rapprochement is transitory and was designed, in part, to show Morocco’s pique at Algeria for not dropping its insistence that the Moroccans engage in direct talks with the Polisario.)

US POLICY

We believe that interjection of the US into the Western Sahara dispute would serve only to antagonize each of the major parties—Morocco and Algeria. Trying to work with each to find modalities for solution of the dispute would be misinterpreted as exertions of pressure. Each side would probably misperceive the US role as being that of secretly siding with its adversary and the capital that we have built up in each of the two bilateral relationships would be squandered. Finally, an election year is probably not the appropriate time to undertake a new initiative, the purposes of which could be misperceived in the region and at home.

American efforts to try to resolve the Saharan conflict also would run the risk of causing us to bear the burden if failure occurs. On the other hand, a naturally evolving solution to the Western Sahara dispute would enable the US to improve its bilateral ties with both Morocco and Algeria—free of current Moroccan perceptions that we are doing too little to aid them on the Western Sahara and perceptions by the Algerians that we are doing too much. Premature efforts to resolve the dispute, under whatever auspices, could lead instead to the creation of an unviable Polisarian “mini-state” that would contribute to continuing instability in the region, provide a potential staging ground for Polisario attacks into Moroccan territory, and potential Soviet strategic access to facilities on the eastern coast of the Atlantic.

You have already received a joint AF-NEA memorandum on this subject (attached at Tab A). S/P supports Options (1) and (3) which, in combination, constitute a continuation of present US policy. S/P recommends disapproval of Option (2), believing that the US should not play a more active role in the negotiating process until the Moroccans and the Algerians are closer to finding their own solution—and then only if both parties take the initiative in asking for US “good offices”.

In this framework, resolution of the Western Sahara dispute could serve US interests by contributing to stability in the region and enabling Morocco to devote fuller attention and more substantial resources to its pressing internal economic situation. Healing of the rift between Morocco and Algeria would permit each to play a more vigorous role in counter-balancing Libya and in protecting weaker states of the region from Libyan aggression—particularly Tunisia and Niger. Regional economic benefits could also be obtained if Morocco and Algeria were able to take advantage of inherent complementarities in their economies and the benefits that would accrue to Algeria from Moroccan-facilitated access to the Atlantic. But these benefits only would accrue if Morocco (and Algeria) sought our help in seeking an agreement.

As for the concern expressed by NEA and AF about the possibility of Moroccan diplomatic isolation at the OAU and UNGA, this has been a perennial problem and one that usually is met by an eleventh-hour solution. Even if a worst-case scenario were to transpire and Morocco were to walk out from the OAU without being joined by others, the negative effects, both for Morocco and for the OAU, are not likely to be long-lasting. While it would set an unfortunate precedent with respect to other entities like the PLO, seating of the SDAR by the OAU (1) may not actually happen, and (2) if it does occur, the seriousness of this event for US interests does not merit rushing head-long into a US-sponsored Saharan negotiating effort designed to head it off. In any case, Embassy Rabat has concluded that, for the King, “there is no choice between claims to the Sahara and OAU membership: Morocco clearly intends to walk out, with or without company, if the SDAR is seated.”³

Tab A

Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) and the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Crocker) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)⁴

Washington, August 6, 1984

SUBJECT

• The Western Sahara—U.S. Policy

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether the U.S. should take some initiative to stimulate positive movement on the Western Sahara dispute prior to the UNGA and the next OAU summit, expected to occur in November.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is the only international entity engaged in efforts to resolve the Western Saharan dispute which dates from 1977. Because most OAU members view Moroccan refusal to negotiate directly with the Polisario as the principal obstacle to a settlement, we expect a majority to acquiesce in the seating of the putative Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR) by the OAU at its next summit, for which the target date is November.

From the U.S. perspective, seating the SDAR is objectionable for a number of reasons. First, the SDAR is not a state and recognition of an armed political movement as a state is an undesirable precedent with implications well beyond the OAU, namely in a UN context. Secondly, seating the SDAR would further internationalize the dispute, “legitimizing” military assistance to the Polisario by radical and east bloc countries. The abandonment by the OAU of its support for negotiation/referendum solution to the question of legitimacy would put us at odds with an African majority which would include a number of states whose regard we value. And finally, it would tend to isolate Morocco diplomatically and widen the dangerous cleavage between Morocco and Algeria.

Morocco, which previously has demonstrated diplomatic resourcefulness presenting its case internationally, appears to be preparing itself for the inevitability of loss of its diplomatic support. Morocco’s apparent willingness to forego African support may stem from the improvement of its military position established through successive extensions of the “berm” which now prevent Polisario attacks throughout most of the Western Sahara.

THE OPTIONS

Our longstanding policy has been to support the OAU’s peace keeping activities by urging the Moroccans and Algerians to be cooperative and the OAU to be energetic. No party has asked us to be an intermediary (although the Algerians and others have suggested that we put pressure on the Moroccans to negotiate directly). We have taken the view that others are better positioned in terms of interests and culture to play such a role; e.g., the Saudis. We have given the Moroccans quiet diplomatic support. We have made the point that admission of the SDAR to the OAU would be inconsistent with the ceasefire/referendum the OAU itself has repeatedly said should determine the status of the Western Sahara.

Since the origin of the dispute, we have supported the principle of self-determination. If the outcome of a referendum were an independent Sahara, however, we believe such an entity would not be viable and its creation could undermine stability in Morocco. At the same time, we believe it is in the interests of both the Moroccans and the Algerians to reach a modus vivendi in order to settle the impasse definitively. This implies a negotiated settlement which has substantial international acceptability.

In the likelihood that there is no settlement prior to the UNGA, the 4th Committee will again consider resolutions condemning Morocco. The eleventh hour compromise resolution language which prevented us from having to take sides in 1983 is unlikely to be repeated unless there has been considerable movement on the issue.

The U.S. government could become more active itself in promoting a settlement. As a first step, we should undertake in house to devise a strategy which we think could lead to an outcome acceptable to all parties. One possibility is a Saharan autonomous region within Morocco but set in a network of political and economic arrangements with real appeal for Algeria. This would perforce mean that we would put forward our own proposals in substantive points which would inevitably be seen as partisan. Indeed there would be considerable inclination to favor an outcome most acceptable to Hassan, a result which might put us at odds with a number of friendly African governments, particularly the Algerians.

Once devised, a more forward USG strategy could be used as a basis for engaging Hassan and Bendjedid in discussions aimed at defining with each of them⁵ a realistic outcome consistent with our and their other regional interests.

Independent of efforts to devise and promote a settlement, we could explore with the Moroccans procedural tactics to head off the seating of the SDAR at the OAU later this year. There is some margin for maneuver. For example, Morocco’s natural allies within the OAU could capitalize on well-crafted statements of Moroccan intentions. Rabat could agree to talks with a formula close to the OAU’s urging but likely to provoke a Polisario rejection—shifting the onus to the Polisario and its Algerian backers for blocking the peace process. This option, if it becomes public, would provoke charges that we have become a wholehearted proponent of the Moroccan position. Side negotiations with the Moroccans could be inferred by Hassan to constitute a USG commitment to ensure an outcome which meets his objectives.

Another potential negative consequence of becoming engaged as an intermediary is that we would “Americanize” a dispute in which our role heretofore has been limited. Escalating US involvement risks Soviet response and the burdening of the Soviet-American agenda with yet another dispute. A more direct USG role could remove the impetus from the Algerians and the Moroccans to continue high level direct, secret discussions on the issues. Given the intractable nature of the problem, we must also assess the political and other costs should our efforts fail. Thus, by assuming a higher responsibility, we might set ourselves up for a foreign policy defeat.

However, it is not likely that a purely military strategy on Morocco’s part can, in fact, lead to a stable result or a settlement. To be durable, and enhance Moroccan and regional security, we believe there needs to be a process that obtains legitimacy—something Morocco cannot do by itself. In the absence of a probe by the US, it is difficult to test either Morocco’s or Algeria’s bottom line or to explore the basis for a “pre-cooked” compromise that might defuse the situation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) That we continue our present course, quietly encouraging as opportunities arise all parties to work toward the OAU-mandated negotiated political settlement.

(2) That we examine possibilities of a strategy for achieving an outcome acceptable to all parties, thereafter that we discuss this with Hassan and Bendjedid. (AF and NEA support this option).

(3) That we consult now with the Moroccans on procedural steps which might be taken to avoid SDAR admission to the OAU later this year.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Records, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron, August 1–15, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Armacost, who did not initial the memorandum. Drafted by Morton; cleared by Kaplan. Kauzlarich initialed the memorandum and wrote: “8/10.”
2. For Carter’s decision to provide OV–10s and arms to Morocco, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, Document 49.
3. In telegram 6799 from Rabat, August 4, the Embassy contended that “options for U.S. mediation remain limited,” and recommended, based on recent developments, “at a minimum reassessment and, possibly, some modest tailoring of present policy.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840498–0024)
4. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on August 1 by Bishop and Schermerhorn; cleared by Nassif, Perkins, Zweifel, and Jeffrey Davidow (AF/RA). An unknown hand initialed for Murphy. Kauzlarich initialed the memorandum and wrote: “8/10.” Attached but not printed are a map entitled “Polisario Activity April 16–22, 1984” and an undated paper entitled “The Western Sahara—U.S. Policy” prepared in NEA/AFN.
5. An unknown hand underlined “defining with each of them.”
6. Armacost did not approve or disapprove the recommendations.