Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

400. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Recipients¹

125206.

Washington, May 8, 1982, 0430Z

Geneva for Assistant Secretary Crocker. Subject: Kenyan Mediation Efforts on the Western Sahara. Ref: A) Nairobi 9494,² B) Algiers 1818,³ C) Nouakchott 1827,⁴ D) Nouakchott 2140,⁵ E) Algiers 1889,⁶ F) Nairobi 10846.⁷ Paris for Cheshes, London for Lanpher.

1. C—Entire text

2. We continue to seek means to reinvigorate OAU Implementation Committee peacemaking efforts in the Western Sahara and are encouraged by OAU Chairman Moi’s apparent determination to follow up on Nairobi III (reftel F) as well as indications that the parties may be ready to receive President Moi or his envoy (reftels D and E).

3. Our efforts are based on the premise that U.S. interests will be served by a public demonstration by the parties of their willingness to support the OAU mandate to engage in discussion on the modalities for a ceasefire and referendum under the auspices of the Implementation Committee. Should the Polisario refuse to participate in OAU sponsored talks, the current tendency to blame the 19 countries who walked out of the Addis meeting could be transferred to the Polisario and its backers.

4. The most apparent means for the U.S. to assist the OAU peace process at this juncture will be for a strong U.S. démarche to the Implementation Committee members and parties to the conflict urging them to support Moi’s efforts to follow up on Nairobi III.

5. Action addressees should seek early meeting with host governments to make following points:

— Underscore U.S. support for the OAU peace initiative in the Western Sahara and the decisions taken at Nairobi III and express our concern that the decision to seat the SDAR, taken unilaterally by Sec General at Addis, not be allowed to call into question or frustrate plan for referendum and ceasefire as laid out by Implementation Committee.

— Express U.S. hope that progress continue and that the Implementation Committee resume responsibility to undertake its mandate to implement a ceasefire and referendum in the Western Sahara.

— Express the hope, as an interested outsider, that in this connection President Moi’s efforts to fulfill his responsibilities under the mandate of Nairobi III will be fully supported by Implementation Committee members and will be met with cooperation from the parties to the conflict.

— Encourage host government as member of Implementation Committee to make these points to Moi or his emissary.

6. For Algiers: We realize that recent death of Foreign Minister and many of his aides⁸ might handicap GOA ability to respond to Kenyan initiative. For this reason, we believe it is all the more important for Embassy to reiterate US position to acting Foreign Minister and MFA’s Director for African Affairs at earliest appropriate opportunity.

7. For Rabat: In making your démarche, you should stress importance of GOM’s continued cooperation with Implementation Committee. (As you know, Congressional Committee are actively engaged in considering foreign assistance levels and debating the Moroccan program with renewed focus on the Western Sahara.)

8. In discussions with host governments, Embassies should avoid any indication that we are aware of upcoming Ouko trip (reftel F).

Eagleburger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820241–1164. Confidential; Immediate. Sent to Bamako, Lagos, Dar es Salaam, Conakry, Khartoum, Freetown, Rabat, Algiers, and Dakar. Sent for information to Nairobi, Nouakchott, Addis Ababa, Jidda, Cairo, London, Paris, USUN, Tunis, Gaborone, and the Mission at Geneva. Drafted by Hudson; cleared by Graner, Flaten, and in substance by Richard Roth (AF/E); approved by Bishop.
2. In telegram 9494 from Nairobi, April 22, the Embassy reported: “Discussions about moving toward a negotiated ceasefire and referendum in Western Sahara seem persistently to skirt the real problems now blocking progress.” The roadblock stemmed from the Polisario’s demand for direct negotiations with Morocco and the Moroccan willingness to engage only in “indirect” or “proximity” talks “under OAU or OAU Implementation Committee auspices.” The Embassy suggested that if the Algerians believed that the Moroccans would not negotiate, that Algerian officials should “be urged to put Morocco to the test by inducing the Polisario to accept some sort of indirect formula for discussions under OAU auspices.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820211–0895)
3. In telegram 1818 from Algiers, April 26, the Embassy noted that Moi had endorsed the “sensible suggestion that the parties should be induced to engage in indirect discussion on the modalities for a ceasefire and referendum” contained in telegram 9494 from Nairobi. (See footnote 2 above.) The Embassy also indicated its previous support for this idea, adding that Moi “is the ideal person to make progress on this issue.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820217–0442)
4. In telegram 1827 from Nouakchott, April 15, Schrager reported: “We share everybody else’s bleak outlook (with the possible exception of the Polisario) concerning the OAU mini-summit at Lagos and doubt that anything worthwhile will come out of it.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820197–0357)
5. In telegram 2140 from Nouakchott, April 30, Schrager reported that Mauritanian Foreign Minister Ould Minnih “instantly ruled out extraordinary summit saying that approval by two-thirds of Chiefs of State was impossible. He said that GIRM view was that OAU Bureau had no authority on the matter in any event, thus its deliberations were non-binding.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840810–1012, D820228–0820)
6. In telegram 1889 from Algiers, May 3, Newlin reported that he had reminded Benouniche that during an earlier meeting Benouniche “had agreed that the communiqué of the Nouakchott meeting of the Saharan states meant that the OAU Implementation Committee should continue its efforts to resolve the Western Sahara problem. I then noted that the Nairobi meeting of the OAU Bureau did not appear to have had significant results.” Benouniche replied: “The important result of the bureau meeting in Nairobi was that there was no question of suspending the OAU membership of the SDAR, and any political difficulties could be dealt with at the Tripoli summit.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820230–0142)
7. In telegram 10846 from Nairobi, May 6, the Embassy reported that the Foreign Office Political Director said that Ouko “was embarking on a major diplomatic mission” to seven African nations and that “Western Sahara would be primary topic of these talks.” The Embassy commented: “We can only hope that Ouko intends to make a try at consultations leading to ceasefire and referendum in Western Sahara as mandated by OAU Implementation Committee.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820238–0994)
8. In telegram 1920 from Algiers, May 4, the Embassy reported that Benyahia and his colleagues died in a plane crash in Iran. The Algerian Politburo called them martyrs to the cause of peace for their efforts to end the war between Iran and Iraq. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820232–1032)