Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

399. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

1509.

Algiers, April 5, 1982, 1246Z

SUBJECT

• Western Sahara—Algeria Asserts Polisario Accepts Principle of Referendum.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Ambassador took advantage of talk with Benouniche, Director of European and North American Affairs, on other subjects April 4 to ask how Algeria saw future prospects for the Western Sahara after the Nouakchott meeting.²

3. Benouniche began by saying that the admission of the SDAR to the OAU was an irreversible fact. He noted that there was talk of a restricted summit meeting to discuss the matter, but he doubted such a gathering would be very credible.

4. I then asked if the Nouakchott communiqué meant that the problem had been returned to the OAU Implementation Committee to carry forward on the Nairobi decisions.³ After much circumlocution, Benouniche affirmed that this was the case.

5. In response to probing on the current position of the Polisario, Benouniche said the Polisario accepted Nairobi I and II, that is, the principle of a general, free and regular referendum. The Polisario did not accept Nairobi III but, after the “balancing action” at Addis, there was now a possibility for progress.

6. Benouniche rehearsed Algeria’s strong doubts about King Hassan’s sincerity. He then went on to compare the situation with the hostage crisis after Khomeini’s famous four points were announced. Each side could accept the principles, but their respective difference in interpretation was so wide that there was, in fact, no agreement.

7. Seizing on this analogy I said what was needed was some intermediary activity, possibly by President Moi or others, to do what Algeria had done in the hostage negotiations. Benouniche confirmed that Polisario FornMin Ibrahim Hakim had met President Moi in Nairobi and he considered this to be positive development.

8. I again strongly urged if Algeria and the Polisario had doubts about Moroccan sincerity to test this factor through the Implementation Committee process.

9. Comment: While Benouniche was negative on the idea of a restricted summit and defensive concerning the SDAR’s admission to the OAU, it was interesting that he implied the action at Addis Ababa now permitted the OAU to carry forward discussion on the modalities of a referendum and a ceasefire.

Newlin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820178–0757. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Lagos, Nouakchott, Paris, and Rabat. Sent for information Priority to Nairobi.
2. Mauritania hosted the Sixth Conference of Saharan States, which included Libya, Mali, Algeria, Chad, and Niger, March 28–29. In telegram 1560 from Nouakchott, March 30, the Embassy reported: “Despite trappings of outward unity, conference was characterized by backstage bickering over the Western Sahara and the SDAR. The SDAR did not seek admission, but its specter dominated the proceedings, even in such a small regional grouping.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820168–0273)
3. In telegram 1560 from Nouakchott, March 30, the Embassy reported: “The final communiqué of the Heads of State encouraged the OAU Implementation Committee to undertake negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario.” (Ibid.) No other record of the communiqué was found.