Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

397. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Recipients¹

52115.

Washington, February 27, 1982, 0025Z

SUBJECT

• OAU Ministerial and Western Sahara.

Ref:

• (A) Rabat 1577,²
• (B) Addis Ababa 791.³

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Department concurs with suggestion made in para. 4. reftel A, and requests action addressees (except Addis) to make démarches outlined below at highest appropriate level to insure action before final OAU Ministerial plenary session in Addis, afternoon of Saturday, February 27.

3. For all posts (except Addis): Embassies should inform host governments that U.S. is increasingly concerned that the OAU peace initiative in the Western Sahara may be severely hampered if not rendered meaningless by the OAU Secretariat’s recent unilateral decision to seat the SDAR at the ministerial meeting still underway in Addis Ababa. You should state that our concerns are clearly shared by a significant number of member countries of the OAU who have dramatically demonstrated their opposition to the Secretariat’s action by refusing to participate in the ministerial meeting. FYI, these countries are: CAR, Cameroon, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, Zaire, Comoros, Gambia and Somalia. You should also note that seating the SDAR as a member state of the OAU could prejudice the referendum process approved earlier by the OAU and all parties involved in this conflict, and thus could well destroy the hope for a peaceful resolution of this problem. You should urge that host governments send immediate and unambiguous instructions to their delegation heads in Addis to join those African states refusing to participate further in this meeting.

4. For Tunis: We believe the statements made by the Tunisian delegation have been positive and very helpful, but request you raise the issue once again with the GOT with a view to encouraging them to suspend their participation in the final plenary session as a protest against the action taken by the OAU Secretariat.

5. For Cairo: We appreciate the Egyptians discussion with us in Addis per Addis Ababa 794.⁴ In light of seriousness of the Secretariat’s action and the importance we attach to the OAU mediation effort, however, we request you raise issue with the Foreign Office to encourage GOE to send instructions to Egyptian delegation to suspend participation in final session.

6. For Rabat: Re Rabat 1577, you may inform the GOM that we are following up with the listed countries plus Kenya and Upper Volta (requested by Ambassador Bengelloun) and Tunisia. Believe, however, the request is for assistance with Malawi rather than Mali per reftel. The Department believes that most effective presentation to Egyptians can be made by Moroccans themselves. Suggest you urge GOM to make direct request to Egyptians at suitably high level.

7. For Addis: You should contact delegation heads of action addressee countries, note that U.S. is making démarche at high level in their countries, and encourage them as appropriate along lines presented in para. 6.

8. For Nairobi: You will know best how to present this in most effective manner to Kenyans.

9. As appropriate Embassies may wish to refer to previous telegrams on this subject for further talking points.⁵ Ref. B outlining latest state of play in Addis being repeated FYI.

Haig

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820105–0962. Secret; Immediate. Sent to Cairo, Monrovia, Libreville, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Ouagadougou, Tunis, Rabat, Lilongwe, and Nairobi. Drafted by Fairchild; cleared by Larry Williamson (AF/I), Hudson, Flaten, Samuel Peale (NEA/EGY), and Sherman; approved by Bishop. Sent for information to OAU Collective.
2. In telegram 1577 from Rabat, February 26, Reed indicated that Sebastian received “an urgent request,” from a member of the Foreign Minister’s cabinet for “the earliest and most vigorous possible US representations to Egypt, Gabon, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, and Upper Volta, urging them to leave the current OAU Ministerial meeting in Addis Ababa. With fifteen states having already walked out, by Moroccan count, departures of these countries would deprive the OAU meeting of a quorum and would nullify OAU Secretary-General Kodjo’s admission of the Polisario to participation in the meeting.” Reed closed by saying he “strongly” supported these representations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820104–1068)
3. In telegram 791 from Addis Ababa, February 26, the Embassy reported: “Three more states (Comoros, Gambia, and Somalia) have joined the walkout for total of 15. Three more are needed for preventing quorum. Some states who have had ambivalent positions might be turned around. Most likely appear: Upper Volta, Gabon, and Egypt. Whereas blocking Third World would not reverse Polisario/SDAR seating, it should cut off current technical discussions and possible political resolutions. More importantly, it would publicize opposition and encourage cooperation of moderates in preparation for Tripoli meetings.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820105–0069)
4. In telegram 794 from Addis Ababa, February 26, Roberts, in reference to seating the SDAR, commented: “Time for helping Moroccan initiative to organize a blocking vote at the Ministerial is perhaps too short for practical.” He continued: “I have contacted Egyptian del and found them very reluctant to commit themselves, especially if they were the deciding factor.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820105–0330)
5. In telegram 811 from Addis Ababa, February 28, the Embassy reported: “Thanks to last-ditch efforts by Embassies Monrovia and Ouagadougou, the Upper Voltan and Liberian delegations received instructions early Sunday morning 2/28 to walkout of the OAU Ministerial conference,” which meant that a quorum would not be reached. The Embassy commented: “The walk-outs, even if they do not stop the conference in its tracks, represent a modified victory for Morocco while not reversing the Polisario/SDAR seating.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820107–0531)