Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

383. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

238561.

Washington, September 5, 1981, 0805Z

SUBJECT

• Moroccan Ambassador Requests U.S. Support on Western Sahara.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. On September 1 at his suggestion, Ambassador Bengelloun reviewed the recent decisions taken at the OAU implementation meeting in Nairobi (Nairobi II)² with NEA Assistant Secretary Veliotes. DAS Peter Constable, AFN Director Robert Flaten, and Moroccan Country Officer, Thor Kuniholm participated. After describing the results and recommending King Hassan’s August 29 speech³ as essential to a full understanding of Morocco’s position Bengelloun asked for our assessment. We told Bengelloun that we were pleased with the progress made at Nairobi II and with the constructive role played by King Hassan. In response to our question about official acceptance of the Nairobi II decisions, Bengelloun replied that Algeria and Morocco had accepted the results while the Polisario was holding out for direct negotiations.

3. Bengelloun also asked for our assistance to limit the size of the UN presence in the Western Sahara; in fact King Hassan would prefer an OAU peace-keeping force, he added. We responded that while UN presence need not be large, some UN participation is important to ensure international acceptance of the referendum. We added that we believe it unlikely that the UN would decide upon an excessively large and costly presence.

4. Concerning Algeria, Bengelloun asked for our assistance with the Algerians to lean on the Polisario for its acceptance of the ceasefire. He said that he hoped the Algerians would accept the Spanish census as the basis for voter eligibility instead of countering with exaggerated demands for a larger electorate. (Bengelloun commented that Morocco believes that 110,000 should be the upper limit of eligible population.) We told Bengelloun that we would continue to urge all of the parties to cooperate with the OAU mediation effort, otherwise we made no specific commitment to intervene with the Algerians.

5. For Embassy Rabat: You may share our preliminary upbeat assessment of the Nairobi II outcome including our appreciation of the constructive role played by King Hassan. We believe that the King deserves special credit for stepping down from his original call for an “affirmative referendum” and agreeing to a vote on the issue of independence or integration with Morocco. You may tell the Moroccans that we are pleased with the outcome. You may mention that we are also in touch with the Algerians on Nairobi II and that we shall recommend they urge the Polisario to respect the ceasefire. Finally, you may tell the Moroccans that we expect to encourage UN participation in the referendum but believe that the UN presence in the Western Sahara need not be large.

Stoessel

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810419–0146. Secret. Drafted by Kuniholm; cleared by Ralph Graner (AF/I), Morton, Smith, and Flaten; approved by Constable. Sent for information to Algiers, Tunis, Nouakchott, Paris, Madrid, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi.
2. In telegram 2572 from Addis Ababa, August 28, the Embassy reported: “OAU Asst SecGen Onu has described the recently concluded Nairobi Heads of State meeting on the Western Sahara as a limited success, with the OAU perceiving some light at the end of the tunnel. However, the official reactions of Morocco and the Polisario to the OAU decision have not been received and problems could arise.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810405–0166)
3. In telegram 6210 from Rabat, September 1, the Embassy reported that in his August 29 address to the nation, Hassan “presented the outcome of the Nairobi II as cause for great satisfaction, due to its vindication of Moroccan claims on the Western Sahara, in general, and of Hassan’s recent initiatives for settlement, in particular. He emphasized as important gains for Morocco the de facto recognition at Nairobi II of the Moroccan administrative and military presence in the Sahara, i.e. there was no request for its withdrawal.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810410–0395)