Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

126190.

Washington, April 27, 1987, 2211Z

SUBJECT

• Assessment of Washington Visit by Tunisian FonMin Hedi Mabrouk.

Ref:

• 1) State 122253,²
• 2) State 120965.³

1. Secret (entire text).

2. Summary: FonMin Mabrouk did not pursue a particular agenda during his 4/20–24 visit to Washington. Rather, his approach was to respond to issues which were put to him by various interlocutors. This he did with Cartesian elegance. Our purposes were to reenforce friendship for Tunisia, assure Mabrouk of continuing USG support within budgetary constraints, caution against too-fast rapprochement with Libya, sensitize GOT to our growing concerns about human rights situation in Tunisia (without taking position on specific cases), and exchange views on a range of topics of regional concern. Overall, visit should have been gratifying from Mabrouk’s point of view. We achieved most of our objectives, although our position on human rights issues may be attenuated—if not misinterpreted—for GOT and Tunisian public consumption. End summary.

3. In developing program for Mabrouk, we responded to GOT requests for very high level meetings. This was designed to honor Mabrouk (partly with an eye to his post-Bourguiba leadership potential). At Tunisian request, we arranged for extensive photo coverage of meetings; on other hand, they deliberately turned aside opportunities to interact with American media.

4. Having spent a rest day consulting with his astute Ambassador, Habib Ben Yahia, Mabrouk was well-primed to handle USG questions about current, troubling events in Tunisia, especially those surrounding arrest of Muslim fundamentalists.⁴ Tunisian Embassy was at pains to shield FonMin from sharp exchanges or criticism. For example, it was only after Department’s repeated urging that Mabrouk finally arranged a meeting with Congressman Wolpe. Tunisians candidly admitted that they thought Wolpe would be sharply critical of human rights situation, and Mabrouk allegedly was prepared to be stiff in reply. In the event, meeting was a productive and friendly one. Mabrouk had two, controlled public appearances (with Heritage Foundation and with Georgetown’s Center for Strategic and International Studies). Incident at latter forum underscored Tunisian sensitivities. One CSIS invitee (Dr. Abdulgader Ali Muttardy) posed a rather hostile question after having introduced himself as a Libyan. Tunisian Embassy subsequently (and clearly on instruction of FonMin) raised this with Department in terms of security concern—that Muttardy or anyone else could have “brought in a bomb . . .”

5. Despite Mabrouk’s apparent lack of specific agenda, he had a clear objective: to reenforce for GOT and Tunisian public the close identification between USG and Bourguiba government. This was achieved with our active involvement. On touchiest issue, that of deteriorating human rights situation in Tunisia, Secretary Shultz sought to sensitize Mabrouk to USG’s concern by pointing to GOT’s historic adherence to an open political system, rule of law, and respect for rights of the individual. Tunisian media, presumably guided by GOT, trumpeted this as firm endorsement for GOT as a laudable, democratic government.

6. Mabrouk also had one specific, close-hold message: to reassure us that GOT leadership is working closely to assure smooth transition to post-Bourguiba government (details by septel, notal).⁵

7. Mabrouk did not press hard on resource issues, although he noted untimeliness of a reduction in assistance coincident to implementation of GOT’s structural adjustment program (which USG strongly supports) and continuing heavy FMS debt burden. Among few issues he raised was proposal for revitalization of Joint Economic Commission. Department, AID, Treasury and Commerce all were relatively noncommittal in response, noting that other venues for discussion of specific issues might be more productive. However, we are prepared to examine issue if GOT continues to press for another JEC meeting.

8. In sum, we believe that Mabrouk left with a sense of accomplishment. He should feel reassured of close relations which USG intends to pursue with GOT, but not overly optimistic about increased levels of assistance. Despite manner in which GOT appears to portray visit for its domestic purposes, we believe that Mabrouk clearly understood our reservations about Tunisian-Libyan rapprochement and our concern about the current course of events as the GOT pursues its internal security concerns.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870072–0385. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Ussery, Steinfeld (P), Pelletreau, Peter Covington (S/S–O). Deborah Graze,, and Quinn, cleared for information by Robert Rackmales (HA); approved by Murphy. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Rabat, Paris. Sent for information to the Secretary of Defense.
2. Telegram 122253 to Tunis, April 24, contains a record of the Shultz-Mabrouk meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870314–0020)
3. In telegram 120965 to Tunis, April 22, the Department noted that in his meeting with Murphy, “Mabrouk voiced strong Tunisian support for international conference on Middle East peace; Murphy explained USG’s skeptical willingness to contemplate such a conference if it leads to direct negotiations. There was consonance of views on Iran-Iraq war; Mabrouk will lead Arab League démarche in Beijing on subject, pressing for ceasefire and return to ante-bellum boundaries. On North African topics, Mabrouk reiterated GOT’s willingness to come to terms with Libyans under certain circumstances. He foresaw little movement on Western Sahara dispute. On resource issues, he made low key, general appeal for more support and asked whether it might be possible to review issue of FMS debt relief (Murphy did not respond). Finally, Mabrouk stated his interest in reviving Joint Economic Commission (for which there is little USG enthusiasm).” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870310–0367)
4. In telegram 3866 from Tunis, April 8, the Embassy reported that “Tunisian Government (GOT) actions to crack down on Islamic opposition, following earlier squeezes against union leadership and opposition parties, have increased concerns among non-Destourian Tunisians that no dissident political activity will be tolerated by GOT in current circumstances.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870272–0164) The Neo Destour was the political party headed by Bourguiba.
5. In telegram 122280 to Tunis, April 23, the Department reported: “In a one-on-one session aside, Foreign Minister Mabrouk told Secretary Shultz that a decision has been made on how to handle the transition following Bourguiba’s death. The plan calls for the Prime Minister to be named President (in conformity with constitutional provisions), but for an interim period only. This caretaker government will immediately call for elections in eight months time.” Furthermore, “the caretaker government meanwhile would undertake no treaties or other permanent forms of legislation. Mabrouk did not indicate who, including Bourguiba, has agreed to this plan, and he did not identify major parties.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D26, Tunis Nodis 1987)