Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

115614.

Washington, April 14, 1986, 2146Z

SUBJECT

• U.S. Action Against Libyan Terrorism (TS). For Chargé from Secretary.

1. Top Secret—Entire text.

2. The President has directed that U.S. military forces attack terrorists and terrorist-related targets in Libya in the very near future. These attacks are being undertaken with land and sea based U.S. military aircraft. Chargé is instructed to draw on text below to alert personally the highest ranking, appropriate host nation officials as soon as possible after 2359 GMT on April 14. No reference should be made to this cable or appointment requested prior to 2359 GMT.

3. Talking points as follows:

— In the past we have had significant circumstantial evidence of Libyan plans for terrorist action against the United States. A number of these activities have been undertaken in European, Middle East, and African countries.

— We now have confirmation of direct Libyan-sponsored activity against the U.S. in both Berlin² and Paris.³ In both of these operations, the Libyan goal was to inflict maximum numbers of indiscriminate casualties.

— We have additional information that Libya is well underway in planning further operations against U.S. citizens in twelve other countries. We have good reason to believe that some of these operations in Sudan, West Germany, Turkey, Syria, Spain, Central African Republic, Kenya, and in several Latin American countries will take place in the immediate future.

— Despite our efforts to warn our citizens and host governments in advance, it is inevitable that unless something is done to stop Qadhafi now, other innocent victims will die.

— Because the evidence we have on direct Libyan involvement is so convincing and our information on Qadhafi’s future plans is so threatening, the President has reluctantly taken the decision to use U.S. military forces to attack targets in Libya that are involved in the conduct and support of terrorist activities.

— The President has also authorized attacks against certain command and control functions and logistics support for terrorist operations. Our military will also undertake limited suppression missions in order to defend our own forces.

— I am instructed to assure you that we are not targeting civilians, economic facilities, or regular military troop concentrations.

— The USG has no illusions that these actions will eliminate entirely the terrorist threat posed by Qadhafi. We are however, convinced that we must demonstrate that officially sponsored terrorist actions, undertaken by the Libyan Government, incur a significant cost.

— Over the longer term, we expect that Qadhafi and others like him, who support and sponsor terrorism, will come to realize that the costs are higher than they wish to bear.

— We also believe that the measures we have decided to take will inevitably weaken the ability of terrorist organizations to commit their criminal attacks as we work through diplomatic, political, and economic channels to alleviate the more fundamental causes of such terrorism.

— In the past, Qadhafi has been able to claim that he conducts these activities with impunity and without risk. He has lied to his own people and intimidated his moderate neighbors, because there has been no response to his one-sided pattern of violence.

— The President believes that this is a crucial time for the Western democracies and other moderate governments. Citizens of many countries, and American tourists, servicemen, and diplomats are being brutally murdered by Qadhafi’s terrorists. The United States feels a special responsibility because we are in a position to act decisively.

— The President has asked me to alert you to this military operation and ask for your support in this undertaking. He hopes, for all of us, that it will be forthcoming.

— After we have taken military action, the President will address the American people regarding our operation. I will provide you with a text of his statement as soon as we have it.

4. Appropriate enhancements to normal security measures should be undertaken as necessary immediately after U.S. military strikes against Libya. SecState will advise via Flash cable once strikes are underway.⁴

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, A Bureau, Department of State Central Foreign Policy Files: Lot 12D215, Top Secret Hardcopy Telegrams. Top Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis Special Encryption. Drafted by Raphel; cleared by Poindexter and Quinn and in S/S–O; approved by Shultz.
2. Reference is to the bombing of La Belle discotheque in West Berlin on April 5 in West Berlin that killed a U.S. service member and a Turkish woman and injured 230 others, including 50 U.S. service members. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.
3. Reference is to three bombings that took place in Paris February 3–5 at popular bookstores and shops. The bombings wounded approximately 20 people. French police defused another bomb discovered at the Eiffel Tower on February 3. (Richard Bernstein, “Bombing in Paris Wounds 9, 3 Badly,” New York Times, February 6, 1986)
4. In telegram 3643 from Tunis, April 15, the Embassy reported that after hearing the Ambassador’s presentation of the U.S. position, Acting Foreign Minister Mestiri responded: “Tunisia uncomfortable. It shares U.S. views on terrorism, particularly Qadhafi’s. But U.S. strike made for non-combatant casualties which RAI–UNO (Italian television seen here) showing this morning, leaving impression Libyan Arabs being massacred. This likely upset Tunisian public.” Mestiri continued: “Tunisian Chancery and residence damaged by U.S. raid; former severely (‘rendered unusable’) and latter had windows blown out.” The Embassy concluded: “City remains calm at this writing.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23. Tunis)