Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

340. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, April 10, 1986

SUBJECT

• Dealing with Post-Bourguiba Tunisia

SUMMARY: Tunisia faces unprecedented political, economic, and social problems, which will come to a head with Bourguiba’s death. A successor regime will find it difficult to govern effectively and to sustain Tunisia’s American connection.To protect our interests in Tunisia, we should support Prime Minister Mzali and use our assistance to encourage political liberalization and economic reform. END SUMMARY

Political Malaise

Tunisia’s political process is moribund. The aged Bourguiba (now 84) is out of touch with public attitudes, and widespread perceptions of corruption have eroded public support for his government. The ruling Destourian Socialist Party has failed to broaden its base. Prime Minister Mzali, Bourguiba’s constitutional successor, faces strong opposition within the party, is unpopular with the military, and has a narrow political base. Popular participation in the political process is virtually non-existent. And as long as Bourguiba remains in control, the government is unlikely to pursue meaningful political liberalization.

The absence of a viable opposition movement and legitimate channels of dissent will almost certainly complicate a peaceful transition of power. The moderate opposition parties are weak and disorganized and have little credibility among younger Tunisians, who are turning to more radical alternatives. All the ingredients exist for serious polarization and political instability once Bourguiba departs the scene.

Bleak Economic Outlook

The Tunisian economy is a mess. Declining oil revenues, a slump in phosphate exports, poor agricultural performance, rapid population growth, a growing foreign debt, a drop in worker remittances, high unemployment, and a reduction in foreign aid have all combined to create a stagnant economy. Over the next two years, the government will have to cope with almost zero economic growth, belt-tightening, and a severe financial crisis. According to a recent World Bank study, correcting Tunisia’s economic problems will require a sweeping structural adjustment program of considerable political risk.

Growing Social Mobilization

A high degree of political alienation exists at all levels of society. The frustration of the lower classes was evident in the 1984 bread riots.² More disturbing is the growing alienation of the middle class—the traditional bulwark of support for the regime—as a result of the squeeze of economic austerity. Moreover, sympathy for Islamic fundamentalism is on the rise among students and unemployed youth. Mzali’s crackdown on Tunisia’s main labor organization will fuel greater popular discontent by closing a legitimate channel of political expression.³ In this environment, a government decision to raise food prices could touch off large-scale unrest which extremist groups and Qadhafi could easily exploit.

The Politicization of the Tunisian Armed Forces

The Bourguiba government still commands the loyalty of the generally pro-American senior officer corps. However, the officer corps is increasingly unhappy over economic austerity, high-level personnel changes and Tunisia’s pro-Western policies. Moreover, there is growing discontent at lower levels of the Tunisian military, stimulated by poor leadership, corruption, and equipment shortages. These problems could pave the way for the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the regular Army and a breakdown of its reliability in the post-Bourguiba period.

The Libyan Threat

The Libyan threat to Tunisian security has intensified over the past year and will probably increase as the situation in Tunisia deteriorates. Bourguiba has pursued a strong pro-U.S. stand in our confrontation with Libya. Most recently, Tunisia refused to support the Arab League’s condemnation of U.S. actions in the Gulf of Sidra. Qadhafi has warned Tunisia that it will be a target if the U.S. attacks Libya, and Qadhafi will almost certainly use his assets in Tunisia to stir up trouble.

The Future and U.S. Policy

Mzali is likely to succeed Bourguiba when he dies or if is incapacitated. The longer Bourguiba lives, the more time Mzali has to expand his personal power base. However, Mzali’s staying power and ability to contain the severe turmoil that is likely to attend Bourguiba’s demise are uncertain. Mzali has little popular support. He is widely regarded as a tool of the ruling elite, committed to perpetuating the status quo and unwilling to press for urgently needed economic reforms, social justice, and meaningful political participation. Mzali’s use of the security apparatus to repress dissent and his crackdown on the opposition have laid the groundwork for a serious challenge to his leadership. His position would be further undermined if he were forced to rely on the Army and security forces to contain unrest in the post-Bourguiba period.

As NEA has suggested in its memo “Tunisia at the Crossroads”,⁴ we should give priority to alleviating the root causes of political and social unrest. This is easier said than done. Tunisia’s needs are massive, and our assistance levels will fall far short of the government’s requests for increases in economic aid (from $20 million to $100 million) and military assistance (from $70 million to $800 million over a seven year period).

Our policy toward post-Bourguiba Tunisia will also have to adjust to the fact that U.S.-Tunisian relations will probably cool as Mzali realigns Tunisian policies with domestic public opinion and the Arab world. We will want to show a degree of understanding if Tunisia adopts a more independent foreign policy—expressing our concerns privately but avoiding public recriminations.

We should also support constitutional succession, despite our concerns over Mzali’s weaknesses and prospects. To do otherwise would be to introduce another unsettling element in the situation. Moreover, there is a reasonable prospect that Mzali, once he feels secure, will permit some opening of the political process. He was instrumental in promoting the limited political liberalization that has occurred, and at one time expressed an interest in opening a dialogue with the opposition.

Our support for Mzali should not be unconditional. Nor should we convey the impression that Mzali is our hand-picked choice. The theme we want to emphasize is U.S. support for Tunisia’s constitutional process. The following approach, while not without risks, may be the most effective way of helping Mzali muddle through the transition while keeping our options open in case he falls on his face:

— We should buck up Mzali through continued high level contacts, such as that provided by Vice President Bush during his recent visit to Tunis.

— We should support political liberalization and encourage Mzali to help establish a credible centrist opposition. This will be a touchy issue and we must ultimately let Mzali determine the timetable for implementing democratic reforms.

— We should use the leverage of our aid program to promote economic reform and structural adjustments, especially a rapid reduction in the current account deficit and external debt, deep cuts in public spending, increased agricultural productivity, and an opening up of the economy. We should not push Mzali to adopt a wrenching austerity program, given its potential for causing political and social upheavals.

— We should try to bolster our image among the Tunisian people. USIA should be urged to expand our cultural and educational programs, and we should publicly express support for democratic reforms and economic progress.

— We should not push for an increase in visible U.S.-Tunisian military cooperation. We should try to dampen Bourguiba’s enthusiasm for a high U.S. profile and support Mzali’s more cautious approach. Where possible, we should let Mzali be the final judge of what the political traffic will bear.

— We should ask our European and Asian allies to help Tunisia. France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, and Korea should all be encouraged to provide more foreign aid on highly concessional terms.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Records, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron April 1–30, 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on April 9 by Sokolsky; cleared by Ledsky, Zweifel, and O’Neill. Sokolsky initialed for Ledsky, Zweifel, and O’Neill. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “GPS.” Quinn initialed the memorandum and wrote: “4/10.”
2. See Document 314.
3. In telegram 3070 from Tunis, March 27, the Embassy contended that while “Tunisia is still far from becoming a police state, the breakdown of popular channels for expressing dissent has been matched by the increasing use of an expanding security apparatus to repress any signs of dissidence.” Mzali in particular “continues to be unpopular,” since “he has used threats such as that posed by Libya to justify the security forces’ actions towards trade unions and student opposition.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860240–0427)
4. Not found.